Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Loving Yourself as Your Neighbor: A Critique and Some Friendly Suggestions for Eleonore Stump’s Neo-Thomistic Account of Love.Jordan Wessling - 2019 - Sophia 58 (3):493-509.
    Many Christian theorists notice that love should contain, in additional to benevolence, some kind of interpersonal or unitive component. The difficulty comes in trying to provide an account of this unitive component that is sufficiently interpersonal in other-love and yet is also compatible with self-love. Eleonore Stump is one of the few Christian theorists who directly addresses this issue. Building upon the work of Thomas Aquinas, Stump argues that love is constituted by two desires: the desire for an individual’s good (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don't Love You Back).Sara Protasi - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):214-234.
    The debate on love's reasons ignores unrequited love, which—I argue—can be as genuine and as valuable as reciprocated love. I start by showing that the relationship view of love cannot account for either the reasons or the value of unrequited love. I then present the simple property view, an alternative to the relationship view that is beset with its own problems. In order to solve these problems, I present a more sophisticated version of the property view that integrates ideas from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Metaphysics of Love: An Annotated Bibliography.Jasper Heaton & Aida Roige - 2014 - The Metaphysis of Love.
    A research resource created by the Metaphysics of Love project. -/- The Metaphysics of Love Project is an interdisciplinary investigation into the nature of romantic love, supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Grant and by the funding of Principal Investigator Carrie Jenkins's Canada Research Chair. The project is running from 2016 to 2019, following a successful pilot project that ran from 2014 to 2016 (funded by a Hampton Research Grant from the University of British (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Love of Whole Persons.Ginger T. Clausen - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics:1-21.
    According to quality theories of love, love is fitting by virtue of properties of the loved person. Despite their immediate plausibility, quality theories have met with many objections. Here I focus on two that strike at the heart of what makes the quality theory an appealing account of love, specifically, the theory’s ability to accommodate the fact that loving someone is a way of valuing them for who they are. The fungibility objection and the problem of love’s object maintain that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Procreative-Parenting, Love's Reasons and the Demands of Morality.Luara Ferracioli - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):77-97.
    Many philosophers believe that the relationship between a parent and a child is objectively valuable, but few believe that there is any objective value in first creating a child in order to parent her. But if it is indeed true that all of the objective value of procreative-parenting comes from parenting, then it is hard to see how procreative-parenting can overcome two particularly pressing philosophical challenges. A first challenge is to show that it is morally permissible for prospective parents to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Phainomena e explicação na Ética Eudêmia de Aristóteles.Raphael Zillig - 2014 - In Conocimiento, ética y estética en la Filosofía Antigua: Actas del II Simposio Nacional de Filosofía Antigua. Rosário, Argentina: Asociación Argentina de Filosofía Antigua. pp. 330-336.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Love and Attachment.Monique Wonderly - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):232-250.
    It is not uncommon for philosophers to name disinterestedness, or some like feature, as an essential characteristic of love. Such theorists claim that in genuine love, one’s concern for her beloved must be non-instrumental, non-egocentric, or even selfless. These views prompt the question, “What, if any, positive role might self-interestedness play in genuine love?” In this paper, I argue that attachment, an attitude marked primarily by self-focused emotions and emotional predispositions, helps constitute the meaning and import of at least some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Normative Reasons for Love, Part II.Aaron Smuts - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):518-526.
    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Is It Better to Love Better Things?Aaron Smuts - 2015 - In Tony Milligan, Christian Maurer & Kamila Pacovská (eds.), Love and Its Objects.
    It seems better to love virtue than vice, pleasure than pain, good than evil. Perhaps it's also better to love virtuous people than vicious people. But at the same time, it's repugnant to suggest that a mother should love her smarter, more athletic, better looking son than his dim, clumsy, ordinary brother. My task is to help sort out the conflicting intuitions about what we should love. In particular, I want to address a problem for the no-reasons view, the theory (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • In Defense of Trait‐Based Love.Roger G. López - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy:169-194.
    It is widely believed that a person's traits can function as reasons for loving her. Notable contemporary work in the philosophy of love has taken the rejection of this premise as its point of departure. As far as I can tell, none of that work has engaged with a careful philosophical exposition of the view under discussion. In the following pages, I will defend the idea of trait-based love against three of its critics and one of its advocates. I will (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Overcoming a Euthyphro Problem in Personal Love: Imagination and Personal Identity.Gary Foster - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):825 - 844.
    In this paper I address a Euthyphro problem associated with personal love. Do we love someone because we have reasons for loving that person or do we have reasons for loving that person because we love her? I argue that a relational view of identity will help us move some distance towards resolving this dilemma. But the relational view itself needs to be further supplemented by examining the role that imagination plays both in personal identity and in our experience of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Reconciling Appraisal Love and Bestowal Love.Dwayne Moore - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (1):67-92.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Are Lovers Ever One? Reconstructing the Union Theory of Love.Elke Schmidt - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):705-719.
    Current analytical philosophies of romantic love tend to identify the essence of such love with one specific element, such as concern for the beloved person, valuing the beloved person or the union between the lovers. This paper will deal with different forms of the union theory of love which takes love to be the physical, psychic or ontological union of two persons. Prima facie, this theory might appear to be implausible because it has several contra-intuitive implications, and yet, I submit, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against Strong Cognitivism: An Argument From the Particularity of Love.Hilla Jacobson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):563-596.
    According to the view we may term “strong cognitivism”, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject takes objects to have independently of her attitudes towards these objects. The main concern of this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. The central argument to this effect is a top-down argument: it proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Special Value of Others-Centeredness.T. Ryan Byerly & Meghan Byerly - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):63-78.
    Suppose you confront a situation in which you can either promote a good for yourself or a good for someone else, but not both. The present paper argues that it is valuable for your conduct in such circumstances to be regulated by a character trait the possession of which constitutes one way of having one’s life be centered upon others as opposed to centered upon oneself. The trait in question, which we shall call “others-centeredness,” is a disposition to promote goods (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark