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Natasha McKeever
University of Leeds
  1. Why, and to What Extent, is Sexual Infidelity Wrong?Natasha McKeever - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):515-537.
    Sexual infidelity is widespread, but it is also widely condemned, yet relatively little philosophical work has been done on what makes it wrong and how wrong it is. In this paper, I argue that sexual infidelity is wrong if it involves breaking a commitment to be sexually exclusive, which has special significance in the relationship. However, it is not necessarily worse than other kinds of infidelity, and the context in which it takes place ought to be considered. I finish the (...)
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  2. Critiquing Consensual Adult Incest.Natasha McKeever - forthcoming - In Brian D. Earp, Clare Chambers & Lori Watson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality.
    In this chapter, I argue that we can make sense of moral norms against consensual, adult incest by appealing to the value of familial relationships and the potential for sex to damage them. Viewing sex as unconscionable between family members helps to enable the loving intimacy normally associated with family relationships. Therefore, there is good reason for incest, even when consensual and between adults, to remain taboo. That being said, I argue that there is insufficient legal justification for all consensual, (...)
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  3.  58
    Sexual Jealousy and Sexual Infidelity.Natasha McKeever & Luke Brunning - 2022 - In David Boonin (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Sexual Ethics. pp. 93-110.
    In this chapter, Natasha McKeever and Luke Brunning consider (sexual) jealousy in romantic life. They argue that jealousy is best understood as an emotional response to the threatened loss of love or attention, to which one feels deserving, because of a rival. Furthermore, the general value of jealousy can be questioned, and jealousy’s instrumental value needs to be balanced against a range of potential harms. They assess two potential ways of managing jealousy (which are not mutually exclusive)—firstly by adopting a (...)
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  4.  14
    Friends with Benefits: Is Sex Compatible with Friendship?Natasha McKeever - forthcoming - In Diane Jeske (ed.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Friendship. New York, NY, USA: pp. 347-358.
    Natasha McKeever argues that prima facie, a friends-with-benefits relationship can be, at the same time, a good friendship. This is because sex is compatible with friendship in that it can complement and potentially even strengthen the three core characteristics of friendship: mutual liking, mutual caring, and mutual sharing. She acknowledges that, by generating uncertainty and having the potential to generate feelings of romantic love, sex does pose risks to friendship. However, she argues that while these risks are significant considerations, they (...)
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  5. Love: What's Sex Got to Do with It?Natasha McKeever - 2016 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2):201-218.
    It is usually taken for granted that romantic relationships will be sexual, but it seems that there is no necessary reason for this, as it is possible for romantic relationships to not include sex. Indeed, sometimes sex is a part of a romantic relationship for only a relatively short period of it. Furthermore, scientific explanations of the link between sex and love don’t seem fully satisfying because they tell us only about the mechanics of sex, rather than its meaning or (...)
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