Two readings of the much-discussed περιτροπή argument of "Theaetetus" 170c-171c have dominated the literature. One I call "the relativity reading". On this reading, the argument fails by ignoratio elenchi because it "carelessly" omits "the qualifications 'true for so-and-so' which [Protagoras'] theory insists on" (Bostock 1988: 90). The other reading I call "the many-worlds interpretation". On this view, Plato's argument succeeds in showing that "Protagoras' position becomes utterly self-contradictory" because "he claims that everyone lives in his own relativistic world, yet at (...) the same time he is forced by that very claim to admit that no one does" (Burnyeat 1976b: 48). I discuss and criticise both readings, and present a third, according to which the point of the argument is, very roughly, that Protagoras is committed to equating truth and truth-for, and so, further, to their intersubstitutability. This further commitment proves fatal to his argument. (shrink)

On the basis of careful textual exegesis and philosophical analysis, and contrary to the received view, Mark R. Wheeler demonstrates that Aristotle presents and systematically explicates his definition of the essence of the truth in the Metaphysics. Aristotle states the nominal definitions of the terms "truth" and "falsehood" as part of his arguments in defense of the logical axioms. These nominal definitions express conceptions of truth and falsehood his philosophical opponents would have recognized and accepted in the context of dialectical (...) argument. On the basis of these nominal definitions, Aristotle develops his definitions of the essences of truth and falsehood--his "real" definitions of truth and falsehood. Aristotle's methodical exposition of his essential definitions of truth and falsehood in the Metaphysics serves as a well-developed example of how his philosophical inquiry starts with nominal definitions and ends with real definitions. Wheeler also argues for the novel claim that Aristotle defines the most fundamental kind of truth in terms of accurate measurement. Aristotle's metrical conception of truth serves as the theoretical basis for specifying the truth conditions of various assertions, for identifying the sorts of beings implicated in these truth conditions, and for explaining the nature of approximate truth and falsehood. Far from offering us a minimal account of truth, Wheeler shows how Aristotle offers us a sophisticated and metrical theory of truth. (shrink)

This book collects six unpublished and published academic studies on the thought of Francisco Suárez, which is addressed through accurate textual analyses and meticulous contextualization of his doctrines in the Scholastic debate. The present essays aim to portray two complementary aspects coexisting in the work of the Uncommon Doctor: his innovative approach and his adherence to the tradition. To this scope, they focus on some pivotal, but often neglected, topics in Suárez’s metaphysics and psychology – such as his theories of (...) cognition and truth, angelology, continuous quantity – thereby developing an original inquiry into a crucial moment in the development of Western philosophy. (shrink)

La exposición y crítica de las doctrinas antiguas tiene un lugar importante en los escritos de Aristóteles. Sin embargo, ciertas dudas se han vuelto corrientes acerca de la confiabilidad de sus descripciones. Más aún, se ha sostenido que Aristóteles deforma la comprensión histórica a través de la introducción de conceptos y términos propios. En este libro se aborda el problema a través de un análisis de las críticas que Aristóteles dirige a la teoría platónica de las Ideas, que permite explicar (...) la constitución y desarrollo de importantes conceptos aristotélicos a partir de la confrontación dialéctica con las doctrinas de su maestro. En efecto, las dificultades genuinas que Aristóteles descubre en el platonismo constituyen el motor para gestar nuevos conceptos, que no son ajenos, sino que surgen como implicaciones del examen crítico. Así, la imposición de términos propios no debe interpretarse como distorsión, sino como el modo que Aristóteles adopta para exhibir su particular solución a los problemas que los filósofos anteriores dejaron sin solución. (shrink)

This paper argues for the presence in Plato’s work of a conception of thinking central to which is what I call the Transparency View. According to this view, in order for a subject to think of a given object, the subject must represent that object just as it is, without inaccuracy or distortion. I examine the ways in which this conception influences Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics and explore some ramifications for contemporary views about mental content.

En este trabajo defenderé que los erísticos del Eutidemo se dedican a la sofística tal como esta es definida en el Sofista. Propondré que en tanto la quinta y la séptima definición se sirven del concepto de ἀντιλογικός, ambas son capaces de capturar el componente dialéctico y refutativo de la práctica erística. Preferiré indentificarlos con la séptima no sólo porque constituye la definición final del sofista, sino también porque esta incluye entre sus determinaciones el empleo engañoso de tal forma de (...) argumentación, rasgo que se ajusta más a la erística que el cobro de dinero, elemento principal de la quinta. (shrink)

El presente artículo propone una lectura del Eutidemo de Platón a partir de la escena que tiene lugar en el prólogo del diálogo, en el cual un personaje misterioso critica a Sócrates y a los hermanos erísticos por la conversación que acaba de tener lugar. Defenderé que esta figura anónima esconde a Isócrates, quien en Contra los sofistas y Encomio de Helena había atacado a todos los discípulos de Sócrates por dedicarse a un tipo de actividad intelectual a su juicio (...) volcada a la pura disputa y sin utilidad para la vida cívica. Propondré que el Eutidemo constituye una respuesta a dicha crítica, en tanto que los dos modelos protrépticos de la obra le permiten a Platón distinguir su forma de emplear la dialéctica de la de otros de sus condiscípulos, principalmente los megáricos, así como sentar las bases de su proyecto filosófico-político fundado en el concepto de conocimiento. (shrink)

RESUMEN Una interpretación extendida del Eutidemo sostiene que la práctica erística de la cual Platón busca distanciarse en el diálogo constituye una referencia velada a la dialéctica desarrollada por el socrático Euclides y sus seguidores megáricos. No obstante, los expertos reconocen que la segunda demostración erística pone en boca de Eutidemo y Dionisodoro dos posiciones que fueron defendidas por Antístenes, según las cuales no es posible decir falsedades ni contradecir. Este trabajo busca analizar las refutaciones de dicha sección y confrontarlas (...) con los testimonios sobre Antístenes a fin de evaluar hasta qué punto nos encontramos en presencia de los mismos argumentos. Defenderé que si bien las refutaciones del Eutidemo poseen una inspiración antisténica, principalmente respecto de las tesis que buscan sostener, las mismas se basan en una serie de supuestos ambiguos que responden más a los lineamientos de la práctica erística que a los fundamentos del pensamiento antisténico. Argumentaré, asimismo, que esta diferencia podría explicarse a partir del hecho de que el Eutidemo puede ser leído como una respuesta al Encomio de Helena de Isócrates, en donde este ataca a los socráticos por dedicarse a la erística y al desarrollo de doctrinas paradójicas, entre las cuales incluye las tesis de Antístenes. ABSTRACT A widespread interpretation of the Euthydemus claims that the Eristic practice from which Plato seeks to distance himself in the dialogue constitutes a veiled reference to the dialectics developed by the Socratic Euclid and his Megarian followers. However, experts acknowledge that the second Eristic demonstration puts two positions in the mouth of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus which were defended by Antisthenes, according to which it is not possible to say falsehoods nor to contradict. This work seeks to analyze the refutations of this section and compare them with the testimonies about Antisthenes in order to evaluate to what extent they are the same arguments. I will defend that although the refutations of the Euthydemus have an Antisthenic inspiration, mainly with respect to the theses they seek to support, these are based on a series of ambiguous assumptions that correspond more to the principles of Eristics than to the grounds of Antisthenic thought. I will also argue that the difference could be explained by the fact that the Euthydemus can be understood as a response to Isocrates ’ Encomium of Helen, where he attacks the whole Socratic circle for devoting to Eristics and to the development of paradoxical doctrines, including the theses of the Antisthesis. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of Plato's Cratylus 427d1-431c3 that supports a reading of the dialogue as a whole as concluding in favour of a conventionalist account of naming. While many previous interpretations note the value of this passage as evidence for Platonic investigations of false propositions, this paper argues that its demonstration that there can be false (or incorrect) naming in turn refutes the naturalist account of naming; that is, it shows that a natural relation between name and nominatum (...) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for reference. Socrates secures this outcome by using demonstratives and their concomitants to show how any putative natural imitative link between name and object may be overridden. Furthermore, Socrates' employment of demonstratives and context-dependent statements in his case-studies of false naming speaks in favour of a reading of this passage as primarily focussing on naming rather than on propositions in general. (shrink)

Recent rhetorical critiques of philosophy and science assume a contrast between rational argument and rhetoric that is inherited from an antirhetorical tradition in philosophy. This article rejects that assumption. Rhetoric is compatible with reasoned discourse in a strong sense originally outlined by Aristotle. Rhetorical analysis reveals the inadequacy of purely demonstrative accounts of rational argument and cognitive accounts of the conditions for rational assent to propo sitions. Social studies of the rhetoric of science, and in particular of credibility claims, need (...) not fall into the forms of relativism and global antirealism with which they have become associated. (shrink)

ABSTRACT At the centre of Plato’s Euthydemus lie a series of arguments in which Socrates’ interlocutors, the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus propose a radical account of truth (‘chopped logos’) according to which there is no such thing as falsehood, and no such thing as disagreement (here ‘counter-saying’). This account of truth is not directly refutable; but in response Socrates offers a revised account of ‘saying’ focussed on the different aspects of the verb (perfect and imperfect) to give a rich account (...) of saying, of truth and of knowledge. I argue that Socrates’ response has much to offer, notably in its amplification of the process of saying and cognition, and the development of virtue. (shrink)

The complex way Meno's paradox is presented in the Meno forces reflection on both the external conditions on inquiry—its objects—and its internal conditions—the state of mind of the person who inquires. The theory of recollection does not fully account for the internal conditions—as Plato makes clear in the critique of Meno's puzzle to be found in the Euthydemus. I conclude that in the Euthydemus Plato is inviting us to reject the externalist account of knowledge urged on Socrates by the sophists (...) in favour of a more richly internalist epistemology. (shrink)

Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share the view that discursive thought is internal speech. However, there has been little work to clarify or substantiate this reading. In this paper I show Plato and Aristotle share some core commitments about the relationship of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways. Plato and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process that moves from a set of doxastic states to a final doxastic state. The resulting judgments (...) can be true or false. Norms govern these final judgments and, in virtue of that, they govern the process that arrives at those judgments. The principal norm is consistency. However, the philosophers differ on the source of this norm. For Plato, persuasiveness and accuracy ground non-contradiction because internal speech is dialogical. For Aristotle, the Principle of Non-Contradiction grounds a Doxastic Thesis that no judgment can contradict itself. For Aristotle, metaphysics grounds non-contradiction because internal speech is monological. (shrink)

The advent of logical positivism contributed to the sharp definitional demarcation between what we consider mythical (mythos) and what we take to be a true account (logos). This essay attempts to go back to one of the sources of such a supposed distinction. By analyzing the Gorgias, I will show that even Plato did not make such a distinction. In fact, Plato even constructed a theory of justice that made use of myth as its medium. The Platonic Myth in the (...) Gorgias was used as true logos in order to justify Socrates’ use of the myth as the paradigm of a life that is philosophical in contrast to that of his accusers who espoused mere sophistry. By using the concept of historia in relation with the concept of mythos, Plato regarded the futuristic afterlife in the myth as a sufficient condition to live a just life. This sufficient condition exemplified by the Myth in the Gorgias is a measuring rod by which we can compare our present system of justice. (shrink)

Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the (...) last 2300 years this basic idea has been expressed in many ways, resulting in a rather extended family of views, theories, and theory sketches. The members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences. (shrink)