- The Scientific Explanation of Colour Qualia.Jeff Foss - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):479.details
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Subjekt und selbstmodell. Die perspektivität phänomenalen bewußtseins vor dem hintergrund einer naturalistischen theorie mentaler repräsentation.Thomas K. Metzinger - 1999 - In 自我隧道 自我的新哲学 从神经科学到意识伦理学.details
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Computationalism and the locality principle.David Longinotti - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):495-506.details
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On the Phenomenon of “Dog- Wise Arrangement”.Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132–155.details
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Patterns.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.details
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The Appearance of Things.Andrew Brook - 2002 - In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 41.details
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Bodies and minds, heaps and syllables.Erik Goodwyn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8831-8855.details
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May Conscious Mind Give a “Scientific Definition” of Consciousness?Bignetti Enrico - 2019 - Open Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):439-451.details
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It's All in the Brain : A Theory of the Qualities of Perception.Jesper Östman - 2013 - Umeå Studies in Philosophy 11:168.details
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Embodied mind and phenomenal consciousness.Venieri Maria - 2015 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 5 (1):9-24.details
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Answering questions about consciousness by modeling perception as covert behavior.Gustav Markkula - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.details
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CHAPTER 1. Mental Causation and Consciousness: Our Two Mind-Body Problems.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - In Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 7-31.details
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A Passion of the Soul: An Introduction to Pain for Consciousness Researchers.C. Richard Chapman & Yoshio Nakamura - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):391-422.details
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Consciousness is king of the neuronal processors.William A. MacKay - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):687-688.details
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In defense off the pineal gland.Robert Teghtsoonian - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):224-225.details
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Closing the Cartesian Theatre.Andy Young - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):233-233.details
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The Cartesian Theater stance.Bruce Glymour, Rick Grush, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Brian Keeley, Joe Ramsey, Oron Shagrir & Ellen Watson - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):209-210.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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Direct assessment of qualia in a blindsight participant.Navindra Persaud & Hakwan Lau - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):1046-1049.details
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Qualia and representations.Elisabeth Pacherie - 1999 - In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. pp. 119--144.details
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Eliminativism and indeterminate consciousness.Glenn Braddock - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.details
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More qualia trouble for functionalism: The Smythies TV-Hood analogy.Edmond L. Wright - 1993 - Synthese 97 (3):365-82.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Is consciousness integrated?Max Velmans - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):229-230.details
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Qualifying Qualia Through the Skyhook Test.Tere Vadén - 2001 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):149-169.details
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Qualia realism.Amy Kind - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (2):143 - 162.details
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Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties.Matthew Tugby - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1-16.details
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What can neuroscience explain?John Symons - 2001 - Brain and Mind 2 (2):243-248.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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Isn't the first-person perspective a bad third-person perspective?W. Schaeken & G. D'Ydewalle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-693.details
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Heterophenomenology and phenomenological skepticism.Jean-Michel Roy - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):1-20.details
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Qualia and Materialism: Introduction.Don Ross & John Thorp - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):435.details
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Content and conformation: Isomorphism in the neural sway.Mark Rollins - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):219-220.details
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(1 other version)Dennettian Panpsychism: Multiple Drafts, All of Them Conscious.Luke Roelofs - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):323-340.details
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A limitation of the reflex-arc approach to consciousness.J. Steven Reznick & Philip David Zelazo - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-692.details
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Reasons for doubting the existence of even epiphenomenal consciousness.Georges Rey - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):691-692.details
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(1 other version)Mental Concepts as Natural Kind Concepts.Diana I. Pérez - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):201-225.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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The Moral Cognition/Consciousness Connection.Mark Phelan & Adam Waytz - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):293-301.details
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(A laconic exposition of) a method by which the internal compositional features of qualitative experience can be made evident to subjective awareness.Mark Pestana - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):767-783.details
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Absent Qualia and Categorical Properties.Brendan O’Sullivan - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):353-371.details
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(1 other version)Property Dualism, Epistemic Normativity and the Limits of Naturalism.Christian Onof - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):60-85.details
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Qualia im knotenpunkt zwischen Leib und seele: „Argumentatives“ dilemma in der gegenwärtigen diskussion über die subjektivität mentaler zustände. [REVIEW]Georg Northoff - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (2):269 - 295.details
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Chaos and qualia.David Newman - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-21.details
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The How and Why of Consciousness?Tim S. Meese - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Hill on phenomenal consciousness.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):851-860.details
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UnCartesian materialism and Lockean introspection.William G. Lycan - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):216-217.details
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Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.details
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