- XII—Why Are Indexicals Essential?Simon Prosser - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):211-233.details
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Unified theories must explain the codependencies among perception, cognition and action.Robert W. Proctor & Addie Dutta - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):453-454.details
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Natural kinds, normative kinds and human behavior.Diana Ines Pérez & Lucia Gabriela Ciccia - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (3).details
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Motor competence as integral to attribution of goal.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1997 - Cognition 63 (2):235-242.details
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Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.details
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Intentionality: How to tell Mae West from a crocodile.David Premack - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):522.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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On the Moral Agency of Computers.Thomas M. Powers - 2013 - Topoi 32 (2):227-236.details
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We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind.Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk - 2006 - In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press. pp. 1-28.details
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We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind.Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):1-28.details
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On attributing mental states to monkeys: First, know thyself.Daniel J. Povinelli & Sandra deBlois - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):164-166.details
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Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.details
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How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):85-107.details
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Folk Psychological Models and the Metaphysics of Belief. A Reply to Curry.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):919-931.details
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Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?Krzysztof Poslajko - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):709-725.details
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The Role of Encoding Strategy in the Memory for Expectation-Violating Concepts.Michaela Porubanova - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 19 (3-4):305-321.details
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Dehumanization in theory: anti-humanism, non-humanism, post-humanism, and trans-humanism.Douglas V. Porpora - 2017 - Journal of Critical Realism 16 (4):353-367.details
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Human Goals Are Constitutive of Agency in Artificial Intelligence.Elena Popa - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1731-1750.details
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The uses and abuses of the coherence – correspondence distinction.Andrea Polonioli - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.details
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The Phylogeny of Rationality.John L. Pollock - 1993 - Cognitive Science 17 (4):563-588.details
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Popper's severity of test as an intuitive probabilistic model of hypothesis testing.Fenna H. Poletiek - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):99-100.details
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Evolution, Rationality, and Coherence Criteria.Andrea Polonioli - 2014 - Biological Theory 9 (3):309-317.details
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Unified cognition misses language.Csaba Pléh - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):451-453.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Sources of Understanding in Supervised Machine Learning Models.Paulo Pirozelli - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-19.details
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The philosophical issue in machine consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.details
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Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.details
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A meaning holistic (dis)solution of subject–object dualism – its implications for the human sciences.Tero Piiroinen - 2018 - History of the Human Sciences 31 (3):64-82.details
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Motivation, counterfactual predictions and constraints: normativity of predictive mechanisms.Michał Piekarski - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-31.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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Natural, Un-Natural and Detached Mimicry.John Pickering - 2019 - Biosemiotics 12 (1):115-130.details
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Computation without representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.details
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Sélection sémantique et sélection naturelle le rôle causal du lexique.Massimo Piaitelli-Palmarini - 1990 - Revue de Synthèse 111 (1-2):57-94.details
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Skill acquisition without representation.Albert Piacente - 2018 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 45 (3):241-258.details
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Wright et la naturalisation de l’intentionnalité. Étude critique de Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth & Objectivity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, 549 pages. [REVIEW]Patrice Philie - 2004 - Philosophiques 31 (2):417.details
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Analytic Functionalism and Mental State Attribution.Mark Phelan & Wesley Buckwalter - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):129-154.details
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Qualitative Attribution, Phenomenal Experience and Being.Mark Pharoah - 2018 - Biosemiotics 11 (3):427-446.details
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How is Sociological Realism Possible?: Sociology after Cognitive Science.Patrick Pharo - 2007 - European Journal of Social Theory 10 (3):481-496.details
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Causation and Information: Where Is Biological Meaning to Be Found?Mark Pharoah - 2020 - Biosemiotics 13 (3):309-326.details
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Species of emergence.Gregory R. Peterson - 2006 - Zygon 41 (3):689-712.details
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Reclaiming Control: Extended Mindreading and the Tracking of Digital Footprints.Uwe Peters - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (3):267-282.details
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Joint actions and group agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.details
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Group Agents are Not Expressive, Pragmatic or Theoretical Fictions.Philip Pettit - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1641-1662.details
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Do split brains listen to prozac?Gregory R. Peterson - 2004 - Zygon 39 (3):555-576.details
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Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist.Derk Pereboom - 1991 - Synthese 88 (September):341-58.details
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Simulation à la Goldman: pretend and collapse.Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435-446.details
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Exploring the “boundary” between the minds of monkeys and humans.Sidney I. Perloe - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):163-164.details
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Deciding, Planning, and Practical Reasoning: Elements towards a Cognitive Architecture.L. A. Perez-Miranda - 1997 - Argumentation 11 (4):435-461.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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Reichenbach’s philosophy of mind.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2002 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10 (3):437 – 453.details
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