- Different roots of human intentionality in mammalian mentality.Hubert Hendrichs - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (1):649-668.details
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Plural agents.Bennett W. Helm - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):17–49.details
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Optimality and constraint.David A. Helweg & Herbert L. Roitblat - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):222-223.details
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Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.details
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Emotions and Recalcitrance: Reevaluating the Perceptual Model.Bennett W. Helm - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):417-433.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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Is design relative or real? Dennett on intentional relativism and physical realism.Reese M. Heitner - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (2):267-83.details
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The Failure of Traditional Environmental Philosophy.Joseph Heath - 2021 - Res Publica 28 (1):1-16.details
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History, Analytic Narratives, and the Rules-in-Equilibrium View of Institutions.Cyril Hédoin - 2020 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 50 (5):391-417.details
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Practical reasoning, rule-following and belief revision: an account in terms of Jeffrey’s rule.Cyril Hédoin - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7627-7645.details
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On the compatibility of connectionist and classical models.John Hawthorne - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):5-16.details
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Do Personality Features Influence Our Intuitions of the Mind-Body Problem? A Pilot Study.Marek Havlík, Karolína Mladá, Iveta Fajnerová & Jiří Horáček - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea.John Haugeland - 1985 - Cambridge: MIT Press.details
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Radical interpretation and decision theory.Anandi Hattiangadi & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6473-6494.details
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What is the intentional stance?Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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“How monkeys see the world.” Why monkeys?A. H. Harcourt - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):160-161.details
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From Desire to Subjective Value: On the Neural Mechanisms of Moral Motivation.Daniel F. Hartner - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):1-26.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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How autistics see the world.Francesca Happé & Ulta Frith - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):159-160.details
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Recent work on propositions.Peter Hanks - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.details
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Institutional objects, reductionism and theories of persistence.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):525-562.details
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Don't stop believing: The case against eliminative materialism.Barbara Hannan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179.details
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Darwin’s Algorithm, Natural Selective History, and Intentionality Naturalized.Philip Hanson - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):53-83.details
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On the safety and danger of ‘viral’ information from the perspective of the epistemological subject.Peter Gurský - 2021 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 11 (3-4):126-141.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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Dancing Chief in the Brain or Consciousness as an Entanglement.Yukio-Pegio Gunji & Kyoko Nakamura - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (1):151-184.details
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Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism.Robert Gulick - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (3):311 - 331.details
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Sampling and information processing.Edward Gruberg - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):381-382.details
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The nervous system/behavior interface: Levels of organization and levels of approach.Paul Grobstein - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):380-381.details
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Action explanations are not inherently normative.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):60-78.details
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Real intentions?Donald R. Griffin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.details
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The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.details
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Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.details
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Attitude ascription's affinity to measurement.Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.details
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On strangerism and speciesism.J. A. Gray - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):756-757.details
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How to be realistic about folk psychology.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.details
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How to Talk about Visual Perception? The Case of the Duck / Rabbit.Paweł Grabarczyk - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Legacy of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. De Gruyter. pp. 53-70.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2017 - In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 519–535.details
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Levels, orders and the causal status of mental properties.Simone Gozzano - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):347-362.details
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In this best of all possible monkey worlds?Harold Gouzoules - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):158-159.details
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Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
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First person representations need a methodology based on simulation or theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.details
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Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
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Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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The compleat visual system: From input to output.M. A. Goodale - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):379-380.details
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El Test de Turing: Dos mitos, un dogma.Rodrigo González - 2007 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 63:37-53.details
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Second person intentional relations and the evolution of social understanding.Juan Carlos Gomez - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-130.details
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