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Plural agents

Noûs 42 (1):17–49 (2008)

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  1. Responsibility Without Identity.David Shoemaker - 2012 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132.
    Many people believe that for someone to now be responsible for some past action, the agent of that action and the responsible agent now must be one and the same person. In other words, many people that moral responsibility presupposes numerical personal identity. In this paper, I show why this platitude is false. I then suggest an account of what actual metaphysical relationship moral responsibility presupposes instead.
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  • The Moral Agency of Group Agents.Christopher Thompson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):517-538.
    Christian List and Philip Pettit have recently developed a model of group agency on which an autonomous group agent can be formed, by deductive inference, from the beliefs and preferences of the individual group members. In this paper I raise doubts as to whether this type of group agent is a moral agent. The sentimentalist approach to moral responsibility sees a constitutive role for moral emotions, such as blame, guilt, and indignation, in our practices of attributing moral responsibility. These moral (...)
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  • Emotional sharing and the extended mind.Felipe León, Thomas Szanto & Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4847-4867.
    This article investigates the relationship between emotional sharing and the extended mind thesis. We argue that shared emotions are socially extended emotions that involve a specific type of constitutive integration between the participating individuals’ emotional experiences. We start by distinguishing two claims, the Environmentally Extended Emotion Thesis and the Socially Extended Emotion Thesis. We then critically discuss some recent influential proposals about the nature of shared emotions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we motivate two conditions that an account of shared emotions (...)
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  • Extended emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
    Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis. In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the (...)
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  • Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations from the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.
    Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To explore this issue we contrast the concept (...)
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  • (1 other version)Plural Action.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):25-54.
    In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpretation of an individual's behavior has to be given in (...)
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  • The weak collective agential autonomy thesis.David Botting - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (31):215 - 234.
    Can a collective be an agent in its own right? Can it be the bearer of moral and other properties that we have traditionally reserved for individual agents? The answer, as one might expect, is ‘In some ways yes, in other ways no.’ The way in which the answer is ‘Yes’ has been described recently by Copp; I intend to discuss his position and defend it against objections. This describes a fairly weak form of autonomy that I will claim does (...)
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  • Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...)
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  • The reality of friendship within immersive virtual worlds.Nicholas John Munn - 2012 - Ethics and Information Technology 14 (1):1-10.
    In this article I examine a recent development in online communication, the immersive virtual worlds of Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs). I argue that these environments provide a distinct form of online experience from the experience available through earlier generation forms of online communication such as newsgroups, chat rooms, email and instant messaging. The experience available to participants in MMORPGs is founded on shared activity, while the experience of earlier generation online communication is largely if not wholly dependent on (...)
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  • Friendship.Bennett W. Helm - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Friendship, as understood here, is a distinctively personal relationship that is grounded in a concern on the part of each friend for the welfare of the other, for the other's sake, and that involves some degree of intimacy. As such, friendship is undoubtedly central to our lives, in part because the special concern we have for our friends must have a place within a broader set of concerns, including moral concerns, and in part because our friends can help shape who (...)
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  • Echo Chambers and Friendship.Alper Güngör - forthcoming - Episteme:1-13.
    Are the members of echo chambers blameworthy for their beliefs? If we follow Sarah Stroud's account of friendship, we end up with the following conclusion: if echo chambers involve friendship, then the individuals have strong reasons not to live up to epistemic demands or ideals when the friendships are formed in the echo chambers they are members of. This result stands in striking contrast with the received view, according to which the members of echo chambers are blameworthy for their epistemic (...)
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  • Hate, Identification, and Othering.Bennett W. Helm - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):289-310.
    This paper argues that hate differs from mere disliking in terms of its “depth,” which is understood via a notion of “othering,” whereby one rejects at least some aspect of the identity of the target of hate, identifying oneself as not being what they are. Fleshing this out reveals important differences between personal hate, which targets a particular individual, and impersonal hate, which targets groups of people. Moreover, impersonal hate requires focusing on the place hate has within particular sorts of (...)
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  • A Pluralist Approach to Joint Responsibility.Nicolai K. Knudsen - 2023 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 51 (2):140-165.
    Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 51, Issue 2, Page 140-165, Spring 2023.
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  • Trauma, Alienation, and Intersubjectivity: a phenomenological account of post-traumatic experience.Lillian Wilde - 2022 - Dissertation, University of York
    Traumatic experiences do not merely impact on the individual’s body and psyche, they alter the way we experience others, our interpersonal relationships, and how we make sense of the world. In my dissertation, I integrate work in phenomenology, psychopathology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychiatry, and trauma studies, and draw on trauma testimonies ob- tained in an online questionnaire. I engage analytically with the question of what constitutes a trauma, whether psychological trauma is necessarily pathological, and what the causal and (...)
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  • Vices of Friendship.Arina Pismenny & Berit Brogaard - 2022 - In Arina Pismenny & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Love. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 231-253.
    In this paper, we argue that the neo-Aristotelian conception of “friendships of character” appears to misrepresent the essential nature of "genuine", or "true", friendship. We question the neo-Aristotelian imperative that true friendship entails disinterested love of the other “for their own sake” and strives at enhancing moral virtue. We propose an alternative conception of true friendship as involving affective and motivational features which we call closeness, intimacy, identity, and trust. Even on this minimal construal, however, friendship can turn vicious when (...)
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  • Interpersonal and Collective Affective Niche Construction: Empirical and Normative Perspectives on Social Media.Michiru Nagatsu & Mikko Salmela - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1169-1196.
    This paper contributes to the interdisciplinary theory of collective affective niche construction, which extends the extended mind (ExM) thesis from cognitive to affective phenomena. Although theoretically innovative, the theory lacks a detailed psychological account of how collective affectivity is scaffolded. It has also been criticized for its uncritical assumption of the subject qua the autonomous user of the affective scaffolding as disposable resources, abstracting away from embedded subjectivity in particular techno-political arrangements. We propose that the social motivation hypothesis, an account (...)
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  • Team Reasoning and Collective Moral Obligation.Olle Blomberg & Björn Petersson - 2024 - Social Theory and Practice 50 (3):483-516.
    We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to view their situation from the group’s perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it does not imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight (...)
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  • (1 other version)Towards a Taxonomy of Collective Emotions.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (1):31-42.
    Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 31-42, January 2022. This paper distinguishes collective emotions from other phenomena pertaining to the social and interactive nature of emotion and proposes a taxonomy of different types of collective emotion. First, it emphasizes the distinction between collective emotions as affective experiences and underpinning mechanisms. Second, it elaborates on other types of affective experience, namely the social sharing of emotion, group-based emotions, and joint emotions. Then, it proposes a working definition of collective emotion via (...)
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  • Completeness, Self-Sufficiency, and Intimacy in Seneca’s Account of Friendship.Carissa Phillips-Garrett - 2021 - Ancient Philosophy Today 3 (2):200-221.
    Examining Seneca’s account of friendship produces an interpretative puzzle: if the good of the Stoic sage is already both complete and self-sufficient, how can friendship be a good? I reject the solution that friendship is simply a preferred indifferent instead of a good and argue that though Seneca’s account can consistently explain both why friendship’s nature as a good does not threaten the completeness or the self-sufficiency of the sage, Stoic friends must choose between intimate friendships that leave them vulnerable (...)
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  • On the Possibility and Permissibility of Interpersonal Punishment.Laura Gillespie - 2017 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    In the dissertation, I consider the permissibility of a familiar set of responses to wrongdoing in our interpersonal relationships—those responses that constitute the imposition of some cost upon the wrongdoer. Some of these responses are, I argue, properly considered punishing, and some of these instances of punishing are in turn permissible. Punishment as I understand it is a broad phenomenon, common in and to all human relationships, and not exclusively or even primarily the domain of the state. Personal interactions expressive (...)
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  • Das Böse an Augustinus’ Birnendiebstahl.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (4):517-538.
    In the second book of theConfessions, Augustine flabbergasts his interpreters by exaggerating an adolescent escapade (a pear theft) and making it a monstrosity. He conjectures that the pear thieves might have commited the theft purely for the sake of thieving, and thus, that they displayed a kind of evil that is not even presented by the arch-villain of Ciceronian antiquity, the conspirer Catilina. Following Aquinas’ interpretation this comparison has been considered a reductio in most of the relevant literature up to (...)
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  • Intercorporeity and the first-person plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2019 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.
    A theory of the first-person plural occupies a unique place in philosophical investigations into intersubjectivity and social cognition. In order for the referent of the first-person plural—“the We”—to come into existence, it seems there must be a shared ground of communicative possibility, but this requires a non-circular explanation of how this ground could be shared in the absence of a pre-existing context of communicative conventions. Margaret Gilbert’s and John Searle’s theories of collective intentionality capture important aspects of the We, but (...)
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  • Unifying Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:517-544.
    Various social epistemologists employ what seem to be rather distinct notions of group rationality. In this essay, I offer an account of group rationality that is able to unify the dominant notions present in the literature under a single framework. I argue that if we employ a teleological account of epistemic rationality, and then allow that there are many different epistemic goals that are worth pursuing for various groups and individuals, we can then see how those seemingly divergent understandings of (...)
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  • How does it really feel to act together? Shared emotions and the phenomenology of we-agency.Mikko Salmela & Michiru Nagatsu - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):449-470.
    Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused on the sense of agency and control in joint action, leaving aside questions on how it feels to act together. This paper tries to fill this gap in a way consistent with the existing theories of joint action and shared emotion. We first reconstruct Pacherie’s account on the phenomenology of agency for joint action, pointing out its two problems, namely the necessary trade-off between the sense of self- (...)
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  • Love.Bennett W. Helm - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This essay focuses on personal love, or the love of particular persons as such. Part of the philosophical task in understanding personal love is to distinguish the various kinds of personal love. For example, the way in which I love my wife is seemingly very different from the way I love my mother, my child, and my friend. This task has typically proceeded hand-in-hand with philosophical analyses of these kinds of personal love, analyses that in part respond to various puzzles (...)
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  • Morality, Friendship, and Collective Action.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2024 - Journal of Social Ontology 10.
    This paper uses the tools of experimental philosophy to examine the nature of interpersonal normativity in collective action, focusing on cases of immoral collective action and collective action by friends. The results of our two studies, which expand on recent empirical interventions into longstanding debates in social ontology, demonstrate that according to our everyday judgments there are interpersonal obligations in cases of collective action, even when immoral, and that, while friendship elicits judgments of togetherness, it does not affect the norms (...)
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  • Intuitions about joint commitment.John Michael & Stephen Butterfill - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    ABSTRACT In what sense is commitment essential to joint action, and do the participants in a joint action themselves perceive commitment as essential? Attempts to answer this question have so far been hampered by clashes of intuition. Perhaps this is because the intuitions in question have mostly been investigated using informal methods only. To explore this possibility, we adopted a more formal approach to testing intuitions about joint action, sampling naïve participants’ intuitions about experimentally controlled scenarios. This approach did reveal (...)
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  • On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action.John Michael & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):89–120.
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which uncertainty (...)
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  • Becoming closer to one another: Shared emotions and social relationships.Vivian Puusepp - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Many authors acknowledge that people share emotions in various social contexts. However, the deeper role of social relationships for shared emotions is poorly understood. I argue that shared emotions are affected by the social relationships in which they emerge. Moreover, shared emotions help people to bond. In order to do so, emotional experiences involve an intentional component that tracks the state of our social relationships. I introduce some new terminology that helps us to clearly distinguish between different kinds of emotional (...)
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  • Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):997-1015.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based (...)
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  • Voting in Bad Faith.Joanne C. Lau - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):281-294.
    What is wrong with participating in a democratic decision-making process, and then doing something other than the outcome of the decision? It is often thought that collective decision-making entails being prima facie bound to the outcome of that decision, although little analysis has been done on why that is the case. Conventional perspectives are inadequate to explain its wrongness. I offer a new and more robust analysis on the nature of voting: voting when you will accept the outcome only if (...)
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  • Romantic love and the first-person plural perspective.Felipe León - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    On the assumption that romantic partners tend to act from a first-person plural perspective, how should the love that binds them be understood? This paper approaches this question by focusing on romantic practical integration, understood as the tendency of romantic partners to integrate their practical perspectives in such a way that allows them to have ‘reasons-for-us’: reasons for action that apply to them as a group, in a collective and non-distributive sense (Westlund Citation2009). After dispelling some reservations about the connection (...)
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  • Collective emotions and the distributed emotion framework.Gerhard Thonhauser - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    The main aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of the distributed emotion framework and to conceptualize collective emotions within that framework. According to the presented account, dynamics of mutual affecting and being affected might couple individuals such that macro-level self-organization of a distributed cognitive system emerges. The paper suggests calling a distributed self-organizing system consisting of several emoters a “collective.” The emergence of a collective with a distributed affective process enables the involved individuals to enact emotions (...)
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  • (1 other version)Towards a Mechanistically Neutral Account of Acting Jointly: The Notion of a Collective Goal.Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):1-29.
    Many of the things we do are, or could be, done with others. Mundane examples favoured by philosophers include painting a house together (Bratman 1992), li.
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  • (1 other version)Towards a Taxonomy of Collective Emotions.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2022 - Sage Publications: Emotion Review 14 (1):31-42.
    Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 31-42, January 2022. This paper distinguishes collective emotions from other phenomena pertaining to the social and interactive nature of emotion and proposes a taxonomy of different types of collective emotion. First, it emphasizes the distinction between collective emotions as affective experiences and underpinning mechanisms. Second, it elaborates on other types of affective experience, namely the social sharing of emotion, group-based emotions, and joint emotions. Then, it proposes a working definition of collective emotion via (...)
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  • Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity.Thomas Szanto & Joel Krueger - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):153-162.
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  • (1 other version)Motor representation in acting together.Corrado Sinigaglia & Stephen A. Butterfill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-16.
    People walk, build, paint and otherwise act together with a purpose in myriad ways. What is the relation between the actions people perform in acting together with a purpose and the outcome, or outcomes, to which their actions are directed? We argue that fully characterising this relation will require appeal not only to intention, knowledge and other familiar philosophical paraphernalia but also to another kind of representation involved in preparing and executing actions, namely motor representation. If we are right, motor (...)
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  • (1 other version)Joint Improvisation, Minimalism and Pluralism about Joint action.Saint-Germier Pierre, Paternotte Cédric & Canonne Clément - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):97-118.
    This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by highly unspecific goals and the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman’s rule them (...)
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  • (1 other version)Joint Improvisation, Minimalism and Pluralism about Joint action.Pierre Saint-Germier, Cédric Paternotte & Clément Canonne - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):97-118.
    This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by highly unspecific goals and the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman’s rule them (...)
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  • Hope for intellectual humility.Aaron D. Cobb - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):56-72.
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  • Collective Emotions, Normativity, and Empathy: A Steinian Account.Thomas Szanto - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):503-527.
    Recently, an increasing body of work from sociology, social psychology, and social ontology has been devoted to collective emotions. Rather curiously, however, pressing epistemological and especially normative issues have received almost no attention. In particular, there has been a strange silence on whether one can share emotions with individuals or groups who are not aware of such sharing, or how one may identify this, and eventually identify specific norms of emotional sharing. In this paper, I shall address this set of (...)
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  • Extended cognition, personal responsibility, and relational autonomy.Mason Cash - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.
    The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC)—that many cognitive processes are carried out by a hybrid coalition of neural, bodily and environmental factors—entails that the intentional states that are reasons for action might best be ascribed to wider entities of which individual persons are only parts. I look at different kinds of extended cognition and agency, exploring their consequences for concerns about the moral agency and personal responsibility of such extended entities. Can extended entities be moral agents and bear responsibility for (...)
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  • Emotions and Recalcitrance: Reevaluating the Perceptual Model.Bennett W. Helm - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):417-433.
    One central argument in favor of perceptual accounts of emotions concerns recalcitrant emotions: emotions that persist in the face of repudiating judgments. For, it is argued, to understand how the conflict between recalcitrant emotions and judgment falls short of incoherence in judgment, we need to understand recalcitrant emotions to be something like perceptual illusions of value, so that in normal, non-recalcitrant cases emotions are non-illusory perceptions of value. I argue that these arguments fail and that a closer examination of recalcitrant (...)
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  • (1 other version)Negative Emotionen und Kultur.Rastko Jovanov - 2020 - Filozofija I Društvo 31 (4):588-599.
    Der Beitrag diskutiert die Beziehung und gegenseitige Beeinflussung zwischen negativen Emotionen und Kultur. Es werden Argumente vorgebracht, auf Grund deren sich die negativen von den positiven Emotionen unterscheiden lassen. Es wird argumentiert, dass der Unterschied in der für die negativen Emotionen charakteristischen Intentionalität liegt, die auf das Subjekt selbst gerichtet ist und es zu ihrer Geisel macht. Obwohl es auf den ersten Blick intuitiv falsch erscheinen mag, wird argumentiert, dass sich die negativen Emotionen positiv auf das soziale Leben auswirken und (...)
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  • Helping others in interaction.Alessandro Salice & Glenda Satne - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (4):608-627.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership.Titus Stahl - 2013 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 229-244.
    Collective intentionality is one of the most fundamental notions in social ontology. However, it is often thought to refer to a capacity which does not presuppose the existence of any other social facts. This chapter critically examines this view from the perspective of one specific theory of collective intentionality, the theory of Margaret Gilbert. On the basis of Gilbert’s arguments, the chapter claims that collective intentionality is a highly contingent achievement of complex social practices and, thus, not a basic social (...)
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  • Reasonable Trust.Evan Simpson - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):402-423.
    Establishing trust among individual agents has defined a central issue of practical reasoning since the dawning of liberal individualism. Hobbes was convinced that foolish self-interest always threatens to defeat uncompelled cooperation when one can gain by abandoning a joint effort. Against this philosophical background, scientific studies of human beings display a surprisingly cooperative species. It would seem to follow that biologically inherited characteristics impair our reason. The response proposed here distinguishes rationality and reasonableness as two forms of good reasoning. One (...)
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  • Philosophy of ‘Truth Ethics’: Love/Friendship through Kurosawa Films and Badiou’s Philosophy.Serdar Öztürk & Waseem Ahad - 2024 - Philosophies 9 (4):113.
    Alain Badiou in his philosophy on ethics underscores four fields of truth procedures—love, politics, art, and science—that seek to break with the existing order or conventional flow of things. These four fields indicate both collective (politics, art, and science) as well as individual (love) instances of the subject’s relationships and actions. The individual realm of ‘love’, which is the central focus of this study, however, as a generic, complex category does not clearly explicate the significance of the associated concept, friendship. (...)
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  • On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools.John Michael & Elisabeth Pacherie - unknown
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which uncertainty (...)
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  • Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? [REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):137-146.
    Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? Content Type Journal Article Pages 137-146 DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0062-3 Authors Stephen A. Butterfill, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK Natalie Sebanz, Centre for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, & Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158 Journal Volume Volume 2 Journal Issue Volume 2, Number 2.
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