(2003). History in place: A response to Thomas Alexander and Woody Holton. Philosophy & Geography: Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 247-262.

Donald T. Campbell outlines an epistemological theory that attempts to be faithful to evolution through natural selection. He takes his position to be consistent with that of Karl R. Popper, whom he credits as the primary advocate of his day for natural selection epistemology. Campbell writes that neither he nor Popper want to give up the goal of objectivity or objective truth, in spite of their evolutionary epistemology. In discussing the conflict between an epistemology based on natural selection and objective (...) truth, Campbell cites an article by the German sociologist and philosopher Georg Simmel entitled 'On a Connection of Selection Theory to Epistemology', as presenting the issue in a notably forthright manner.The present essay summarizes Simmel's article, with the purpose of clarifying, in terms that Campbell apparently finds satisfactory, the conflict that Campbell acknowledges between an evolutionary epistemology and ultimate truth; the essay then examines the responses of Campbell and Popper to Simmel's position. While Campbell and Popper acknowledge the work of Simmel, their responses suggest something less than a full consideration of Simmel's position. (shrink)

A new ethics of human finitude developed through three experimental essays. As ethical beings, we strive for lives that are meaningful and praiseworthy. But we are finite. We do not know, so we hope. We need, so we trust. We err, so we forgive. In this book, philosopher John T. Lysaker draws our attention to the ways in which these three capacities—hope, trust, and forgiveness—contend with human limits. Each experience is vital to human flourishing, yet each also poses significant personal (...) and institutional challenges as well as opportunities for growth. Hope, Trust, and Forgiveness explores these challenges and opportunities and proposes ways to best meet them. In so doing, Lysaker experiments with the essay as a form and advances an improvisational perfectionism to deepen and expand our ethical horizons. (shrink)

This article discusses Habermas’s project of reformulating Critical Theory through a pragmatic philosophy of communication, while defending post-metaphysical reason and commitment to grounded critique. Habermas’s use of pragmatics is contrasted with Rorty, who argues for a non-foundational pragmatism that eschews the idea of science as the only site of reason and social progress. The argument moves through three stages. First, it outlines Habermas’s project of recovering critical activity with particular attention to his debt to pragmatic philosophy and the departures from (...) earlier Critical Theory that this entailed. Second, it examines his theory of communicative action and identifies some key areas of contestation with sceptical approaches. Finally, it identifies some of the problems and limitations in Habermas’s pragmatic turn, suggesting that his quasi-transcendental critique is developed at the expense of a pragmatic commitment to grounding in embodied agency-in-the-world. It concludes that the spirit of pragmatism, rather than its detail, might help Critical Theory focus on political analysis and resistances to domination. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Gert Biesta astutely criticizes thepolitics of learning through which learning has been popularized and exalted. He offers a valuable critical diagnostics of this politics, but, I argue, his conclusions about ‘going beyond learning’ incriminate learning wholesale. Through a close reading of one of Biesta’s related articles, I show that he sweepingly indicts learning per se, and not only its politics in the ‘learning age’. Biesta departs from current theoretical underpinnings of learning but deep down accepts too much of the (...) conventional semantics of learning. His advancing a denaturalization of learning and his dismissing the assumption that learning is omnipresent and inextricable from living make unnecessary and unintended concessions to the hegemonic idiom and politics of learning. Instead of attaching undue weight to ‘beyond learning’ and to ‘refusing the learner identity’, I defend a theorization of learning in plural that complicates both the self-understandings and the critiques of the era. (shrink)

In the current global push to examine the diverse and complex approach in which classroom culture contributes to the shaping of students’ learning cultural identity. Classroom culture plays a fundamental role in constructing students’ learning competencies, perceptions and behaviors. Thus, this study conceptualizes and contextualizes a collective individualism learning model to explicate a specific learning model in classroom culture at Chinese particular context historically and traditionally. The collective individualism model is identified as the individualized learning style of students in Chinese (...) classroom culture characterized by nine symbolic objects, including a textbook, an exercise book, a pen, a blackboard, a screen, a computer, a table, a chair and platform in a Chinese collective class. In addition, two core components of formal collectivism and substantive individualism derived from constructive learning theory, social learning theory, Mezirow’s transformative learning theory and Kolb’s experiential learning theory. The implications for examining the collective individualism model of Chinese classroom culture are likewise linked to innovative talent cultivation and fulfillment of ‘Four Good Teachers’ goal. Both the discussion and conclusion led to the construction of promising classroom culture at Chinese context practically. (shrink)

Enrique Dussel and John Dewey share commitments to philosophical theory and practice aimed at addressing human problems, democratic modes of inquiry, and progressive social reform, but also maintain productive differences in their fundamental starting point for political philosophy and their use of the social sciences. Dussel provides a corrective to Dewey’s Eurocentrism and to his tendency to underplay the challenges of incorporating marginalized populations by insisting that social and political philosophy begin from the perspective of the marginalized and excluded. Simultaneously, (...) Dewey encourages a modest experimental and fallibilist approach to social transformation that promises more feasible social reforms than Dussel’s approach rooted in phenomenology and the critical social sciences. (shrink)

Responding to Silvia Stoller's comments on “Domination and Dialogue in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception”, I argue that while phenomenology has much to offer feminism, feminists should be wary of Merleau-Ponty's notion of projective intentionality because of the ethical solipsism that it tends to involve. I also take the opportunity to clarify the concept of hypothetical construction introduced in the earlier paper, in particular the transformative relationship that it has to pre-reflective experience.

It is argued here that understanding John Dewey's thought as that of a prodigal liberal or a fellow traveller does not capture the complexity of his work. It is also important to recognise the portion of his work that is historie morale. In the very best sense it is epic, encapsulating the hopes and dreams of a history of the American people in the early 1900s. It is a work that simultaneously pursues modernity and the past — for the sake (...) of coping with the present. It also calls attention to an unnoticed element in his work 'inexperience'. (shrink)

Using both Confucian texts and the work of American pragmatist John Dewey, this book offers a distinctly Confucian model of democracy.

Scholars like Alison Kadlec, Melvin Rogers and R.W. Hildreth have recently confronted the claim that Dewey’s pragmatism lacks resources to approach issues of power, but they have not given a unified account of what theoretical framework Dewey’s pragmatism provides to grapple with such issues and to articulate standards for social criticism. In this article, I explore one such framework: Dewey’s outline of a social philosophy developed in his Lectures in China. Here, Dewey derives immanent standards for social criticism through sociological (...) and historical perspectives. Such standards are articulated in terms of social relationships of mutuality and recognition in and between groups; on such standards, social institutions and practices are to be criticized in so far as they embody relationships of domination disabling individual development and social and political participation. Dewey’s critical project extends to cultural sources of normative authority, and I further explore his social philosophy in terms of an ‘immanent cultural criticism’. (shrink)

In 1929, John Dewey said that “the problem of restoring integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of human life.” Using this as its theme, this article begins with an examination of Gilbert Harman's reasons for denying the existence of moral facts. It then presents an alternative account of the relationship between science and ethics, making use of (...) the writings of Dewey and Henry David Thoreau. For both Dewey and Thoreau, the dichotomy between a scientific approach to the world and an ethical approach to the world is a false one. The article explores the reasons for believing that the dichotomy is a false one, agreeing with Thoreau that there “is no exclusively moral law—there is no exclusively physical law.”. (shrink)

Moral ideals should not be seen as simple and purely personal, but as complex values with a social dimension that transcend attempts to formulate or realize them. Orientation towards ideals needs a realistic component: people should identify with the quest for an ideal, not with the ideal itself, and consider the possibility of negative consequences of their pursuit. Such realism about ideals includes acknowledging that ideals are not the only, nor the most important, motivating force of morality.

In my response to the comments of Vincent Colapietro, Charlene Seigfried, and Gail Weiss on Living Across and Through Skins , I explain pragmatist feminism as an ecological ontology that understands bodies and environments as dynamically co-constitutive. I then discuss the relationship of pragmatist feminism to phenomenology, psychoanalysis, Nietzschean genealogy, and Darwinian evolutionary theory. Some of the specific concepts I examine include the anonymous body, the bodying organism, truth as transactional flourishing, and the preservation of racial and ethnic categories.

The New Fuzziness: Richard Rorty and Education is an examination of the works of Richard Rorty, focusing on his impact on education. Richard Rorty is "one of the most provocative and influential of contemporary thinkers writing in English." This unpublished manuscript is written by Dr. Philip E. Devine, Professor of Philosophy at Providence College.

Este artículo presenta un análisis, a partir del pensador pragmatista John Dewey, en torno a cómo los principales enemigos de la democracia son la defensa de la verdad absoluta y, por ende, la legitimación de una guía autoritaria. Para tal fin, se muestra cómo la democracia no sólo es un régimen político sino una forma de vida, que se soporta en el debate público de los puntos de vista como expresión de la experiencia individual y del sentido auténtico de la (...) inteligencia libre; pero también del adecuado flujo de la información y del funcionamiento de las instituciones encargadas de la educación. Así, el rescate de la individualidad como nota constitutiva de la democracia queda justificado en la medida que, es condición para enriquecer la variedad de perspectivas sobre el mundo y lograr el florecimiento humano. (shrink)