Wer der Frage nachgeht, was jemand tut, der geht – wenigstens implizit – auch der Frage nach, wer da etwas tut. Handlungen schreiben wir normalerweise Personen zu. Handeln zu können ist eine derjenigen Eigenschaften, die Personen auszeichnet. Die Analyse menschlichen Handelns geht mit der Frage einher, was menschliche Personen sind. Folgender Beitrag befasst sich mit dem Verhältnis von Handlung und Person innerhalb der kausalen Theorie des Handelns. Durch eine eingehende Analyse dieses weitverbreiteten Ansatzes zur Erklärung und Deutung menschlichen Handelns sollen (...) Implikationen für den Begriff des Handelnden herausgearbeitet werden. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases shows this thesis to be false. In order to account for such cases we have to ascribe to agents the capacity to actively determine the goals at which their actions aim. I refer to this capacity as the agent’s “will”. Agents endowed with (...) a will are capable not only of determining their own behavior but also their motives. I conclude that the existence of multiple-incentives cases shows that agents have this capacity. RESUMO É comumente sustentado que os fins visados por uma ação são especificados pelos pares atitude/crença à luz dos quais a ação parece atrativa para o agente. Eu argumento que a existência de casos de múltiplos incentivos mostra que essa tese é falsa. De maneira a dar conta desses casos devemos atribuir a agentes a capacidade de determinar ativamente os fins visados por suas ações. Refiro-me a essa capacidade como a “vontade” do agente. Agentes dotados de vontade são capazes não apenas de determinar seu próprio comportamento mas também seus motivos. Concluo que a existência de casos de incentivos múltiplos mostra que agentes têm essa capacidade. (shrink)

Donald Davidson opens ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ by asking, ‘What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?’ His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of the explanation of action, one that, though (...) minimal and formal, preserves the proper role for the agent's own reasons for acting. (shrink)