This paper reflects on the establishment of an Ethics Education Programme for school pupils aged between five and sixteen years who opt out of Catholic Religious Education in Malta. It needs to be seen in the light of the changing demography of Malta and the increasing secularisation of the country, as well as to the growing racism, islamophobia and rejection of the Other to be found all over Europe. We question if the Ethics Education Programme, in its commitment to ‘totalising’ (...) western ideals of rationality, autonomy, and universal values, is itself rooted in discomfort with the Other and constitutes a form of ethical violence. The work of Emmanuel Levinas on Otherness, sameness and violence is central to this paper. (shrink)

In this paper, in general, I will present Martin Buber’s and Emmanuel Levinas’ perspectives on interpersonal relations within the main cotext of dialogue and then give my own standpoint about the issue in question: “Is asymmetry really needed for a genuine dialogue?” In the meantime, I will also propound some fundamental notions of their philosophies with the intent of displaying their viewpoints in a clearer way.

In this article I reconsider Ricoeur’s early philosophical anthropology in Fallible Man by probing its force in a current discussion on anthropology in the ethics of care. This discussion shows similarities with the intentions behind Ricoeur’s project. They are both dissatisfied with existing philosophical conceptions of human beings, in particular with their objectifying and fixing character. However, the ethics of care is a practice oriented approach while Ricoeur’s is an abstract philosophical one. In this article I will examine whether Ricoeur’s (...) philosophical approach may be of value for such a practical approach. For this purpose I analyse three aspects of Ricoeur’s approach that seem to be akin to the ethics of care: his ‘passion for the possible’ that inspires a critique of objectification; his methodological reflections that highlight the relation between philosophy and the pre-philosophical; and fragility as central anthropological category. Taking into account these aspects will give rise to the critical question of whether the anthropology in the ‘weak’ sense in which it is present in the ethics of care is able to account for the risk of objectification. Discovering the importance of this criticism reveals the relevance and topical interest of Ricoeur’s approach also for current practice-oriented philosophical reflection. (shrink)