I argue that sports clubs should be punished for bad behaviour by their fans in a way that affects the club’s sporting success: for example, we are justified in imposing points deductions and competition disqualifications on the basis of racist chanting. This is despite a worry that punishing clubs in such a way is unfair because it targets the sports team rather than the fans who misbehaved. I argue that this belies a misunderstanding of the nature of sports clubs and (...) of the nature of sporting success. Further, I argue that fans should want to be held responsible in such a way because it vindicates the significant role that they play in the life of their club. (shrink)

J.S. Russell, Stephen Mumford, and Randolph Feezell have criticized my view that zealous partisans of a particular team are superior to purists, who derive an esthetic pleasure from good play by any team. All three philosophers extol the virtues of purism and Russell defends a pluralistic view that rejects the very idea of an ideal type of fan. In response, I renounce the claim that partisans are superior to purists and instead propose a more modest defense of partisanship. Moderate partisan (...) fans, who constrain their support by moral and esthetic criteria, exhibit admirable concern for their team’s wellbeing, have unique opportunities to display moral virtue, and are necessary for the welfare of competitive sport. Partisans’ choice of team is influenced by arbitrary factors but arbitrariness is built into the very nature of sport and applies equally to purists’ admiration of athletic excellence. It diminishes neither the value of athletic excellence nor the value of partisans’ devotion to their team. (shrink)

In Watching Sport, Stephen Mumford distinguishes two ways in which sport can be seen. A purist sees it aesthetically while a partisan sees it competitively. But this overlooks the obvious point that most sports fans are neither entirely purist nor entirely partisan. The norm will be some moderate position in between with the purist and partisan as ideal limits. What is then the point of considering these pure aesthetic and pure competitive ways of seeing? In this discussion note, I consider (...) possible accounts of the way in which the moderate spectator watches. After rejecting what I call a pure perception theory and a mixed view, I defend an oscillation theory. This means that the moderate sports fan is one who switches, sometimes rapidly, between the aesthetic and competitive perceptions of sport. A pay-off of this account is that we do not need a further, third way of perceiving sport in order to account for the moderate. It has been explained in terms of our original two forms of perception. This fills a lacuna in Mumford's account. (shrink)

Beginning from an earlier claim of mine that there was really no such area of study as the philosophy of sport, Part One of the paper reconsiders the place previously given to David Best’s distinction between purposive sports and aesthetic sports. In light of a famous cricketing event in the 1977 contest between England and Australia (‘The Ashes’), in which Derek Randall turned a cartwheel after taking the winning catch, the paper clarifies that not all aesthetically-pleasing events taking place in (...) sporting competitions can be understood as the aesthetic in sport. Then, in Part Two, the force of the claim that philosophy is one subject is explored. The conclusion is that a focus just on the philosophy of sport is necessarily inappropriate, since it will present the student with only cases from sport to then apply to sport. Rather, one’s understanding must be informed by (much of) the breadth of philosophy. Charles Travis’s view of occasion-sensitivity provides a clear example of appropriately contextual appeal. Part Three of the paper returns to the need for an institutional account of sport, one recognizing that there is no one occasion on which a particular sport is played; and hence no single set of conditions which can uniquely identify that sport. Thus, soccer played with one’s children typically differs from elite soccer: but both are (genuinely) soccer. When one turns to the appreciation of sport (in the light of Stephen Mumford’s excellent Watching Sport: Aesthetics, Ethics and Emotion [2012a]), one recognizes that, in order to genuinely appreciate sport, one cannot detach oneself from the outcome as completely as Mumford’s extreme purist seems to. But reflection on that case may also return us to contextualism by moving us away from attachments to the complete or the exceptionless in our accounts of spectating as of sport: maybe there is no one thing that occurs in all the relevant cases. (shrink)

There are many ways that we can watch sport but not all of them are philosophically interesting. One can watch it enthusiastically, casually, fanatically or drunkenly. One might watch only because one has bet on the outcome. Some watch a friend or relative compete and have a narrow focus on one individual's performance. A coach or scout on the lookout for new talent may have completely different interests to a supporter of a team. But what of the ways of watching (...) sport that are of philosophical interest? (shrink)

A familiar debate in the philosophy of sport concerns the question of whether fans should seek to be partisans (those who support particular teams or individuals) or whether they should instead adopt the impartial attitude of the purist. More recently, Kyle Fruh et al. have argued in defense of fair-weather fandom, which they understand as a form of fandom that involves adopting temporary allegiances in response to non-sporting considerations. This paper will add a new form of fandom to this discussion: (...) the foul-weather fan. While fair-weather fans adopt temporary allegiances or strengthen existing allegiances for teams when things are going well, foul-weather fans do so when things are going badly. We will argue that foul-weather fandom can be both instrumentally valuable, as it helps to protect valuable sporting institutions, and non-instrumentally valuable, as these fans display concern, empathy, or support for sporting individuals or teams that are going through tough times. We finish by discussing how a specific form of foul-weather fandom may be associated with a distinctive moral danger in putting people in positions where they may become complicit in a club’s immorality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT After initially pitting partisans against purists, the literature on the ethics of fandom has coalesced around a pluralist position: purists and partisans each have their own merits, and there is no ideal form of fandom. In this literature, however, the fair-weather fan continues to be viewed with dismissal and derision. While some fair-weather fans may earn this contempt, many fair-weather fans, we argue, are not only acceptable, they have important advantages over partisans and purists, and as such are in (...) a better position to navigate some of the moral complexities inherent in modern sports. We develop this argument first by clarifying the nature of the fair-weather fan. We then examine challenges that fans face in many modern sports, first owing to their economic nature and, second, due to the morally tainted status of many of them. We argue that the fair-weather fan meets these challenges in ways that the partisan and purist cannot replicate. (shrink)

Sport is a producer of both emotional and aesthetic experiences. But how do these relate? Does a spectator’s emotional engagement in sport enhance or hinder it as an aesthetic experience? And does the aesthetic perception of sport enhance or hinder the emotional experiences? These questions will be addressed with particular reference to the distinction that can be drawn between partisan and purist watchers of sport, and making use of thinking in contemporary aesthetics and philosophy of emotion. There are some reasons (...) to think that emotion and aesthetics pull in opposite directions, in both sport and wider life. Does a purist miss out on the essence of sport if they adopt a detached aesthetic attitude? If that were the case, it would suggest that the sports spectator might have to choose between the two: experiencing one or the other but not both at the same time. Emotions and aesthetics would be a trade-off but I argue for some significant exceptions to this conclusion. (shrink)

How should sport deal with prematurely ended seasons? This question is especially relevant to the current COVID-19 inter- ruption that threatens to leave many leagues without cham- pions. We argue that although there can be no winners, in certain situations there should be champions. Relevant to the current situation, we argue that Liverpool FC—currently with a 22+ point lead—should be crowned champions of the English Premier League. However, things are not as simple as simply handing the championship to whoever was (...) in the lead when a season is prematurely ended. Through analogy with a fictional decathlon competition—and with the understanding that sporting seasons are themselves a type of game—we identify three reasons why leading at the moment of cessation is insufficient to be crowned a victor (of an individual event) or a champion (of a season-long competition): doing so fails to respect some valuable skills, fails to allow for luck to play out in an interesting way that affects competitions, and fails to respect competitive strategies. This discussion can then inform determining what, if any, end-of-season accolades are relevant, such as championships, relegation, or promotion. No team can win in a league that has failed to be completed, but there can still be a champion. (shrink)

An attempt is made to articulate what is seen as a ?thin? interpretation of justice in sport and how this is understood in terms of ?thick? interpretations in various sociocultural settings. In this way, it is argued, sport can be better understood as a dynamic social practice. First, a thin interpretation of justice is formulated. Sport's structural goal is to measure, compare and rank competitors according to their performances. The rule systems of sport are based on more general norms that (...) describe how this goal can be reached in reliable and valid ways. A thin interpretation consists of norms for equal opportunity to perform and meritocratic norms that describe what inequalities are to be measured in sport and how they are to be rewarded. Secondly, various socio-cultural understandings of the thin interpretation are discussed. Five ideal-typical thick interpretations are given: the purist, the cynic, the rationalist, the supporter and the consumer. These positions represent different and to a certain extent contradictory interpretations of the thin justice scheme. Some positions even seem to reject it. This scheme indicates potentially radical changes in sport as we know it. (shrink)

Rooting, defined as a spectator’s demonstrative encouragement of a contestant’s effort, ideally has the morally positive aspects of benevolent concern and helpfulness but in practice strains against reasonable standards of conduct by being rude, excessively biased, exploitative, fanatical, and superstitious. Rooting may activate an atavistic, morally cogent sense of fighting for one’s group that is at odds with the universalism of civilized morality. The ‘merely play’ excuse can cut both ways, deflecting moral objections but also removing moral credit from rooting. (...) Although rooting is often not humane, humane rooting can occur and is supported by humane commentary by sports participants, broadcasters, and journalists. Humane rooting supports the premise of benevolence theories (Mengzi, Hutcheson) that morally ideal benevolence has a foothold in an innate general benevolence – seen in this area especially in benevolence toward efforts. Being partisan, excited, and demonstrative, rooters cannot perfectly embody ‘universal calm benevolence’, but they can consciously minimize the inhumane aspects of rooting and achieve a more fully prosocial satisfaction. (shrink)

Although football is often referred to as ‘the beautiful game’, to take that idea very seriously — by aestheticizing the target of spectating — is to misunderstand a purposive sport such as football. Yet such a view seems required by Stephen Mumford’s endorsement of the purist spectator, in contrast to the partisan, as attending to ‘… only aesthetic aspects of sport’. But, first, not all non-purposive appreciation is thereby aesthetic appreciation, as Mumford assumes. And, second, while a technical understanding of (...) the aesthetic includes both positive and negative aesthetic concerns, an everyday version addresses only positive aesthetic value. Now, there are concepts of grace, line and so on, applicable to football: that is, concepts suitable to aesthetic appreciation. And sometimes, for instance, in TV’s ‘Goal of the Month’ competition, such appreciation sets aside the purposive dimension of such sports. Yet that dimension is fund.. (shrink)

. This article presents and examines four different reconstructions of Ronald Duska’s argument for the thesis that employees’ loyalty to their employers is misguided. One of them is the reconstruction presented by John Corvino in this journal. The remaining three revolve around, respectively, employers’ failure to reciprocate employees’ (attempts at) loyalty, the commercial character of employment, and the instrumental character of employment. The result of the examination is that the argument does not withstand scrutiny in any of the four reconstructions. (...) The failure of Duska’s argument, however, does not mean that employee loyalty is justified, because the burden of proof is on the defenders of the loyalty. Moreover, a different argument, which is also presented in the article, shows that the loyalty of most present-day employees to their employers is bound to be significantly limited, because of the radical changeability of corporations with publicly traded stock. (shrink)

What is it for someone to be part of a game? While significant work has been done on the concept of playing a game, less has been done on the concept of being part of a game. This paper looks at how someone’s status of being part of a game can be distinguished from their status of playing a game, and then introduces a new taxonomy for the different ways in which someone can be part of a game.

Philosophers of sport have debated whether supporting one team over others is commendable or morally suspect. We show how Stoicism sheds light on this controversy. Several caricature views of Stoic sportsmanship are studied. Stoics learn how to enjoy the blessings that come their way without mistakenly judging challenges to be hardships that detract from their happiness. Stoic sportsmen celebrate the successes of their teams while exercising the virtues of patience, endurance, loyalty, and appreciation of athletic excellence when their teams flounder. (...) The Stoic ideal is not to be an indifferent, disinterested spectator, but rather a calm, polite, and engaged sportsman. (shrink)

In this paper I look at the reasons for implementing VAR and the effect that it has had on the fans of soccer (football) in particular. I begin with a discussion of why VAR has been adopted in sports in general and in soccer specifically. I then discuss the notion of ‘flow sports’ and try to develop at taxonomy for classifying sports in terms of the relative importance of flow. Following this, I discuss the effect of VAR implementation on flow (...) sports in general before examining the effect of VAR on the fan experience in soccer, a game which I characterize as one of the purist examples of team flow sports. Finally, I discuss the effect of VAR on the fan experience of flow when watching sports. My main contention is that VAR, at least in its current forms, represents an erosion of the flow experience in matches which impoverishes the fan experience. In light of the perceived benefits of VAR for match officiating, I doubt that it will be going away anytime soon. The best that we can hope for is that it evolves so as to cause minimal disruption to the flow in flow sports. (shrink)

Why do sports fans sometimes (often?) go crazy at sporting events and then afterwards proceed with their day as if nothing much happened? If something of genuine significance happened, something that warranted the emotional ups and downs the fan experienced during the game, why don’t its effects linger? These questions pose a version of the puzzle of sports fandom. Others have applied Kendall Walton’s theory of fiction to solve the puzzle, but Walton’s account of sports fandom fiction is unacceptably thin. (...) Recent attempts by Nathan Wildman and Joseph Moore to address this thinness problem fail. We answer the thinness objection by explaining how sports fandom is a collaboratively authored fiction, constructed by fans, sponsors, players, teams, media commentators, and more. The stories of sports fandom fiction are passed to new generations of fans in a way more reminiscent of The Iliad or The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Sports fandom fiction is more like folklore, and less like a novel. (shrink)

This is a book symposium on Why It’s OK to Be a Sports Fan, by Alfred Archer and Jake Wojtowicz, with contributions from Adam Kadlac, Joe Slater, Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt, and Nina Windgätter. The discussion covers a range of topics, including the form of love involved in fandom, the epistemic status of fans, fictionalism, and the role of communities in fandom.

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Volume 6, Issue 3, Page 401-406, August 2012.

Given current studies in moral psychology and following recent cases of wrong behaviour occurred in elite sporting events ? e.g. the racist chants scandals in the English Premier League or the events following Mourinho's poke in the eye scandal ? I shall analyse the extent to which supporters' brain make-up is determining them to behave in an ?unfair way?. Yet this paper is not just a work on descriptive ethics, but a normative ethics work. Therefore, once I have developed the (...) ?psycho-biological account of sports supporters?, I shall explore whether or not a more virtuous account of sports supporting can be drawn. In order to fulfil this normative task I shall appeal to the concept of ?fair play?. The common view of fair play defines it as ?the act of abiding by the rules?. However, my account of fair play is more complex and it is based on the moral principle of respecting others. This is the reason why fair play is not just something related to athletes but to supporters as well. To conclude, I shall sketch the boundaries of fair-play-based supporting behaviour in order to propose some policies or strategies that can help us to promote a ?healthy? and virtuous behaviour among fans. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay argues that within competitive sport zero-sum logic and the theory of mutualism are compatible and complementary. Drawing on Robert Simon’s theory of mutualism and Scott Kretchmar’s argument for zero-sum logic, this article shows how athletes can strive for a clear-cut victory and shared benefits such as athletic excellence fully and wholeheartedly at the same time. This paper will also consider how acknowledgment of this dynamic could advance understandings for ethical theories for sport. It will then conclude by describing (...) a subjective approach that will make the affinity of zero-sum logic and mutualism more accessible for sports people. (shrink)

Critical commentaries on the burgeoning industry of sports betting have focused on either its potential (i) to promote problem gambling or (ii) to encourage betting-related corruption. In this paper we explore a third and distinct line of inquiry according to which sports betting is of considerable moral concern insofar as it undermines the ideals of sport by transforming the manner and modes in which spectators engage with and value sports. Technological, cultural and legal changes have led to greater integration between (...) many sporting leagues and gambling practices. Elite sport has long been commodified; however, we argue that such integration should be understood as a form of ‘hypercommodification’. By analysing sports betting as a form of hyper-commodification, we argue that it may promote objectionable instrumental modes of regard towards sport among individual spectators and fans. We also argue that increasing integration between sports and gambling practices may undermine the social conditions required to express appropriate modes of valuation towards sport. (shrink)

The purist/partisan distinction has dominated recent discussions of sport spectatorship and sport aesthetics. The focus of such discussions, however, has been sport in general or, often implicitly, team sports in particular. Here, using mixed martial arts (MMA) as a case study, we argue that specific aspects of the sport in question can significantly affect how the purist/partisan distinction plays out for viewers. MMA’s status as an individual combat sport mitigates, in illuminating ways, the partisanship displayed so prominently among fans of (...) team sports. We also examine the role of external attitudes – in both the betting subculture of MMA and purist attitudes toward individual combat sports and martial arts – in shaping MMA spectatorship. (shrink)

Given current studies in moral psychology and following recent cases of wrong behaviour occurred in elite sporting events—i.e. the racist chants scandals in the English Premier League or the events following Mourinho’s poke in the eye scandal—, I shall analyze the extent to which supporters’ brain makeup is biasing them to behave in an “unfair way”. Yet, this paper is not just a work on descriptive ethics, but a normative ethics work. Therefore, once I have developed the “psycho-biological account of (...) sports supporters”, I shall explore whether or not a more virtuous account of sports supporting can be drawn. To conclude, I shall utilize such neuroethical analysis of the sport supporter in order to propose some policies or strategies that can help us to promote a “healthy” and virtuous behaviour among fans. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the relationship between competitive sports and the phenomenon of sports fandom as a unique symbiosis that qualitatively changes the nature of sport and reveals new aspects of human play in general. I note that spectators as consumers transform sport, in addition to indirectly and directly influencing and intervening in sports practice. As a result of this versatile involvement—from the initial form of competitive, formalized and unproductive game—sport can evolve through four successive stages: professional sport → (...) sports show → ‘meta-play’ → “meta-sport “. The first of them has been sufficiently studied from two points of view, mainly: (a) control of training progress, effective coaching, and maximalised performance, and (b) management and marketing. The second form, sports show, is very rarely studied separately from the first stage (e.g.). Here I separate them. The third and fourth stages are proposed and studied here anew by a philosophical analysis of current and possible future developments and changes in the sports show. I analyse all these changes from a dialectical perspective and support it using the paradigm of tension between positive and negative freedom. From this point of view, all the mentioned transformations—from professional sport to meta-sport—are caused by changes (from synergy to tension and conflict) in the positive and negative freedom of spectators and sports organizations in a ‘dialectical symbiosis’. These are followed by the tensive contradiction between the principal freedom of human play and the self- and institutional restriction of freedom in the stage by stage evolving frames of game, sport, and professional sport. ‘Dialectical symbiosis’ is considered here as the fusion of entities, as a result of which one of them, at least, is transformed into a new quality. (shrink)