Groups behave in a variety of ways. To show that this behavior amounts to action, it would be best to fit it into a general account of action. However, nearly every account from the philosophy of action requires the agent to have mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Unfortunately, theorists are divided over whether groups can instantiate these states—typically depending on whether or not they are willing to accept functionalism about the mind. But we can avoid this debate. (...) I show how a more general view of action captures what is central to action without mentioning mental states, and I argue that a group’s members can fulfill the role in group action that mental states play in our actions. Group behavior is explicable in terms of reasons, regardless of whether the group itself cognizes those reasons. After discussing the kind of reasons at issue and arguing that groups can act in light of them without minds, I assess how this account bears on the question of group responsibility. (shrink)

During the past ten years Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) has become part of the repertoire of specialized decision-oriented theories in the business ethics literature. The intention here is to (1)␣provide a brief overview of the structure and strengths of ISCT; (2) identify recurring themes in the extensive commentary on the theory including brief mention of how ISCT has been applied outside the business ethics literature; (3) describe where research appears to be headed; and (4) specify challenges faced by those (...) who seek to reform ISCT. Key themes in the critiquing literature relate to (a) the identification process for hypernorms; (b) justification of the recognition of hypernorms; (c) proposals for considering meso or meta norms; (d)␣clarification of the relationship between stakeholder concepts and ISCT; (e) problems with potentially unoccupied moral free space; (f) sources of ethical obligation within the ISCT framework; and (g) the potential role for concepts of stakeholder dialogue and engagement. (shrink)

This essay provides a critical overview of the debate about corporate moral responsibility. Parties to the debate address whether corporations are the kinds of entities that can be blamed when they cause unjustified harm. Proponents of CMR argue that corporations satisfy the conditions for moral agency and so they are fit for blame. Their opponents respond that corporations lack one or more of the capacities necessary for moral agency. I review the arguments on both sides and conclude ultimately that what (...) divides the two is not so much competing conceptions of the corporation as it is disagreement about what moral agency requires. Homing in on the real site of contention will, it is hoped, allow future participants in the debate to focus their efforts more productively. (shrink)

Many theoretical developments in the business and society field do not pay enough attention to the policy environment in which business functions and through which corporate behavior is largely shaped to respond to social problems. Part of this problem may be due to the lack of a firm philosophical foundation for public policy providing legitimacy for the concept in relation to the market system. American pragmatism offers such a foundation and overcomes many of the tensions between the market and public (...) policy by puffing the concept of the individual and community in proper perspective. (shrink)

Proponents of corporate moral responsibility take certain corporations to be capable of being responsible in ways that do not reduce to the responsibility of their members. If correct, one follow-up question concerns what leads corporations to fail to meet their obligations. We often fail morally when we know what we should do and yet fail to do it, perhaps out of incontinence, akrasia, or weakness of will. However, this kind of failure is much less discussed in the corporate case. And, (...) where it is discussed, the view is that corporations are less prone to weakness. Here, I argue that proponents of corporate responsibility should say that corporations can and often do instantiate weakness of the will, and that this is important to recognize. Weakness of the will requires certain capacities that these proponents typically take corporations to have. And once this is appreciated, we can assess how corporate weakness might proceed differently than how it does for individuals. We can also begin a conversation about how best to meet the distinctive challenges for recognizing and correcting corporate weakness, using a number of resources from management scholarship. (shrink)

Are corporate codes of ethics necessarily ethical? To challenge this notion, an initial set of universal moral standards is proposed by which all corporate codes of ethics can be ethically evaluated. The set of universal moral standards includes: (1) trustworthiness; (2) respect; (3) responsibility; (4) fairness; (5) caring; and (6) citizenship. By applying the six moral standards to four different stages of code development (i.e., content, creation, implementation, administration), a code of ethics for corporate codes of ethics is constructed by (...) which companies can be ethically audited for compliance. The newly proposed code of ethics for corporate codes of ethics was then applied to four large Canadian companies representing a variety of industries: telecommunications; banking, manufacturing, and high technology. The ethical audit of the four companies' ethics programs based on the proposed code indicates that all four companies have room to improve the ethical nature of their codes of ethics (i.e., content, creation, implementation, administration). (shrink)

Four international codes of conduct (those of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations) are analyzed to determine the ethical bases of the behaviors they prescribe for multinational enterprises (MNEs). Although the four codes emphasize different aspects of business behavior, there is substantial agreement regarding many of the moral duties of MNEs. It is suggested that MNEs are morally bound to recognize the codes (...) and to take them into account when engaging in international business. (shrink)

The book Private Management and Public Policy by Lee E. Preston and James E. Post has had a major impact on the business and society field. The authors introduced the concept of public policy into the field as an alternative way of thinking about social issues that was different from the concept of social responsibility that was so popular in the early years of the field. The concept of interpenetrating systems theory they developed attempted to provide theoretical support for business's (...) involvement in public policy and to deal with the problem of atomic individualism that has only recently been recognized. The field is indebted to the authors for developing the broad outlines of an alternative theory of the firm in society that offers the possibility of overcoming traditional dichotomies that have plagued the field since its inception. (shrink)

In the years since Enron corporate social responsibility, or “CSR,” has become a ubiquitous phenomenon in both research and business practice. CSR is used as an umbrella term to describe much of what is done in terms of ethics-related activities in firms around the globe to such an extent that some consider it a “tortured concept” (Godfrey and Hatch 2007, Journal of Business Ethics 70, 87–98). Addressing this skepticism, I argue in this article that the focus on CSR is indeed (...) problematic for three main reasons: (1) the term carries a lot of historical baggage – baggage that is not necessarily conducive to the clarity of the concept; (2) it is the object of increasing ethical instrumentalism; and (3) given the multiple ethical challenges that corporations face, and given the fact that the “social” responsibilities of business are but one set of corporate responsibilities, a suitable term would have to be more inclusive and integrative. I therefore suggests moving instead toward a sound definition of corporate integrity and aim in this article to develop a working definition by fleshing out “7 Cs” of integrity: commitment, conduct, content, context, consistency, coherence, and continuity. I then discuss how these 7 Cs impact our understanding of CSR or, more broadly, corporate responsibility in general. (shrink)

Contractual moralists, such as Bowie and Donaldson, have argued that contractual agreement explains why corporations have a moral obligation towards the society in which they operate. They argue that a corporation’s moral obligation emerges from a hypothetical social contract that establishes its legitimacy to operate in society. Their assumption appears to indicate a logically necessary relationship between a corporation’s moral obligation and contractual agreement that establishes the corporation. We argue that there is no such relationship: a corporation’s moral obligation does (...) not necessarily emerge from a social contract. We suggest that instead of assuming that a corporation’s moral obligation emerges from a social contract, it should be said that a corporation’s moral obligation is sustained by a social contract. This helps answer the question of why corporations have a moral obligation towards the society where they operate in a better light. (shrink)

This article reviews Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee's new book Ties That Bind. The article argues that the book is a helpful elaboration of Donaldson and Dunfee's Integrative Social Contracts Approach, particularly with regard to their specification of hypernorms. The article also presents Donaldson and Dunfee's argument with regard to how the hypernorm of necessary social efficiency applies to bribery and raises questions about the extent to which human moral behavior might be hardwired.