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Switch to: References
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In her paper, “True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defense of Evidentialism,” Katherine Dormandy argues against the view that there is a partiality norm on faith. Dormandy establishes this by showing that partiality views can’t give the right responses to encounters with stubborn counter evidence. Either they (anti-epistemic-partiality views) recommend flouting the evidence altogether in order hold on to positive beliefs about the object of faith or they (epistemic-partiality views) lower the epistemic (...) |
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A prominent view in religious epistemology, which I call divine-help epistemology, says that people of faith are epistemically gifted by God, whereas non-believers are subject to the noetic effects of a fallen world. This view aims to show how religious beliefs for people of faith can be epistemically justified. But I argue that it makes such people prone to a cluster of epistemic vices that I call epistemic phariseeism. Divine-help epistemology is especially apt to promote these vices because its normativity (...) |
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I argue that faith is a type of trust. It is also part of a relationship in which both parties are called on to be faithful, where faithfulness is a type of trustworthiness. What distinguishes faith relationships from trust relationships is that both parties value the faith relationship intrinsically. I discuss how faith on this account can, and cannot, be rational when it goes beyond a person’s evidence. It turns out that faith has the same rationality conditions as trust, differing (...) |
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Advancing our understanding of one of the most influential 20th-century philosophers, Robert Vinten brings together an international line up of scholars to consider the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas to the cognitive science of religion. Wittgenstein's claims ranged from the rejection of the idea that psychology is a 'young science' in comparison to physics to challenges to scientistic and intellectualist accounts of religion in the work of past anthropologists. Chapters explore whether these remarks about psychology and religion undermine the frameworks (...) |
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Wittgenstein’s “Lectures on Religious Belief” (LRB) provide a source for as yet unexplored connections to religious ideas as treated in Robert N. McCauley’s book Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not (2013), and to other CSR scholars who focus attention on how “cognitively speaking it is religion that is natural and science that is largely unnatural.” Tensions are explored in this paper between our “maturationally natural” religious inclinations to adopt religious ideas and the “unnatural” demands sometimes made upon people, (...) |
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ABSTRACT In this paper I seek to retain many of Dormany's central claims about the excellent-making features of faith, without accepting her direct application of evidentialism to faith. In order to achieve that goal, I argue that we have to distinguish between the non-conflicting norms of epistemology and pistology. We also have to distinguish the often conflicting norms of epistemic and practical rationality. |
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This is a commentary on Neil Van Leeuwen's Religion as make‐believe focusing on the normative aspects of this book. According to Van Leeuwen, religious credences are not factual beliefs, and they are held to different standards of rationality than factual beliefs. Hence, religious believers are able to track and represent those states of affairs that govern their practical lives while also holding views that deviate significantly from it, such as divine omnipotence. Here, I examine whether this reasonable compartmentalization in religious (...) |
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What distinguishes the philosophies of education advanced by pragmatists? Does pragmatism have something distinctive to offer contemporary philosophy of education? This paper applies these questions, which Randall Curren asks in “Pragmatist Philosophy of Education” (2009), to a more specific current debate in philosophy of education: the debate over educating for critical thinking, and/or for intellectual virtues. Which, if either, should be given priority in higher education, and why? This paper develops a Deweyan approach to these questions, inviting character content but (...) |
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