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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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Appetitive besires and the fuss about fit.Steven Swartzer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):975-988.details
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Indeterminacy in recent theories of content.Donna M. Summerfield & Pat A. Manfredi - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):181-202.details
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Phenomenological Naturalism.David Suarez - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):437-453.details
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The Semantic Shuffle: Shifting Emphasis in Dretske's Account of Representational Content.David Sturdee - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (1):89-103.details
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Mental causation and the paradoxes of explanation.Karsten R. Stueber - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.details
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Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):419-436.details
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What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it.Rowland Stout - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):135-148.details
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Aesthetics and cognitive science.Dustin Stokes - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.details
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Intentionality and naturalism.Stephen P. Stich & Stephen Laurence - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):159-82.details
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Connectionism, Realism, and realism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):531.details
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The Structures of Social Structural Explanation: Comments on Haslanger’s What is (Social) Structural Explanation?.Rachel Katharine Sterken - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (50):173-199.details
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Spinoza on Human Purposiveness and Mental Causation.Justin Steinberg - 2011 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 14 (1):51-70.details
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Processes, Continuants, and Individuals.Helen Steward - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):fzt080.details
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Dna, inference, and information.Ulrich E. Stegmann - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):1-17.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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Actions as processes.Helen Steward - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):373-388.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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Continuities and Discontinuities Between Humans, Intelligent Machines, and Other Entities.Johnny Hartz Søraker - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):31-46.details
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Review of William M. Ramsey Representation Reconsidered.Mark Sprevak - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):669-675.details
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Two Kinds of Information Processing in Cognition.Mark Sprevak - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):591-611.details
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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Consequentialism or deontology?Georg Spielthenner - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):217-235.details
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Two Forms of Dualism.David Sosa - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):307-313.details
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Natural selection and distributive explanation: A reply to Neander.Elliott Sober - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):384-397.details
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Considering Causalisms.Andrew Sneddon - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):343.details
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Action: On Cause and Constitution.Andrew Sneddon - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):157-.details
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Styles of computational representation.M. P. Smith - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):530.details
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Representation and knowledge are not the same thing.Leslie Smith - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):784-785.details
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Why philosophers should be designers.Aaron Sloman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):529.details
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Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory: Hutto and Satne on Naturalizing Content.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.details
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Conscious intending as self-programming.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):94-113.details
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Discrimination without indication: Why Dretske can't lean on learning.Carol Slater - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):163-80.details
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Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.details
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Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.Paul Skokowski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):287-299.details
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Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief.Paul Skokowski - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):362-369.details
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Networks with Attitudes.Paul Skokowski - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3):461-470.details
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Networks with attitudes.Paul Skokowski - 2009 - AI and Society 23 (4):461-470.details
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Observing a superposition.Paul Skokowski - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7107-7129.details
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Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain?Paul Skokowski - 2007 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):58-71.details
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Can computers carry content "inexplicitly"?Paul G. Skokowski - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (3):333-44.details
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Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):639-662.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):321-342.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
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Reward Prediction Error Signals are Meta‐Representational.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):314-341.details
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Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.details
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Neural signalling of probabilistic vectors.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):902-913.details
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