In this dissertation, I seek to explain G.W.F. Hegel’s view that human accessible conceptual content can provide knowledge about the nature or essence of things. I call this view “Conceptual Transparency.” It finds its historical antecedent in the views of eighteenth century German rationalists, which were strongly criticized by Immanuel Kant. I argue that Hegel explains Conceptual Transparency in such a way that preserves many implications of German rationalism, but in a form that is largely compatible with Kant’s criticisms of (...) the original rationalist version. After providing background on Hegel’s relationship to the traditional rationalist theory of concepts and Kant’s challenge to it, I claim that Hegel’s central task is to provide a theory of conceptual content that allows a relationship to the objective world without being dependent on the specifically sensory aspect of the world, which Kant’s theory of concepts required. Since many interpreters deny that Hegel’s use of the term “concept” is comparable to other historical philosophers (or our own), I first show that Hegel’s critique of standard conceptions of concepts presupposes an agreement of subject matter. I then show how Hegel’s account of the “formal concept” provides the skeleton for a view of conceptual content that relies on negative relations between terms, rather than a relation to sensibility, to provide content. Hegel’s account of conceptual content is completed when he shows how a universal term is further specified so that it can determine singular objects. This occurs in its adequate form in a teleological process. I argue that Hegel’s account of teleology in the Science of Logic is an attempt to explain how and where Conceptual Transparency obtains. A teleological process is one in which a concept constitutes an object, and this means that a concept is perfectly adequate to express that thing’s nature and not merely to represent it. However, in the final chapter, I show that Hegel’s concept of teleology is meant paradigmatically to illuminate how human purposive processes have constituted a social world that is conceptually accessible to us. In this way, the primary “province” of Hegel’s rationalism is the human constructed world. (shrink)

Desde los propios tiempos de su constitución y en no poca medida todavía hasta el presente, el paradigma general del idealismo poskantiano ha sido objeto de numerosos malentendidos. La historia estándar de la Filosofía Moderna dominante sobre todo en los países de habla inglesa tiende a ver a la filosofía de Kant como el límite máximo de idealismo capaz de ser asimilado de forma consistente por la reflexión filosófica. A partir de Kant, la radicalización del motivo idealista en las filosofías (...) de Fichte, Schelling y Hegel ha sido así considerada a menudo como un abandono de los patrones viables de racionalidad. En la base de esta visión no es en modo alguno inusual encontrar la confusión del idealismo poskantiano con una forma desorbitada y excéntrica del idealismo de Berkeley. Sin embargo, el proyecto teórico de radicalización del idealismo trascendental de Kant poco tiene que ver con esta interpretación. Una de las claves principales para poder entender correctamente ese proyecto es comprender su particular teoría sobre la relación entre conocimiento sensible y conocimiento intelectual, entre intuición y concepto. En el marco teórico de un idealismo absoluto se abandona la diferenciación radical entre intuición y concepto y con ello se excluye por principio la posibilidad de resolver el problema de la referencia de la mente humana al mundo mediante una concepción empirista del conocimiento sensible. En este nuevo contexto, el problema del vínculo de lo mental y lo real debe ser resuelto en el propio plano inmanente de los conceptos. El objetivo de nuestra ponencia será justamente analizar, con ocasión de la teoría de Hegel sobre la relación entre intuición y concepto, los presupuestos teóricos que hacen plausible una concepción de la relación entre la mente y el mundo que no apela para justificar esa relación a categorías como la de receptividad y causalidad. (shrink)

This paper interprets Dilthey’s treatment of history and historical science through his engagement with Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. It focuses on Dilthey’s account of the possibility of objectivity in the Geisteswissenschaften. It finds in Dilthey a view of history as a law-governed, dynamical structure expressing the totality of human life, cast in a reworked Hegelian notion of objective spirit. The aim of historical thought is to understand the unity of this structure to the greatest extent possible, and thereby to understand (...) lived experience itself. Dilthey’s epistemological standpoint recommends beginning with concrete studies in the special human sciences, and working toward a more general representation of the regularities and patterns in the historical record. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es profundizar en el pensamiento de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel y estudiar una de las ideas centrales de su filosofía: el concepto especulativo. El concepto y la adecuación consigo mismo, es decir, la Idea, son las dos nociones capitales de la metafísica hegeliana y la base de todo el sistema. El artículo rastrea los antecedentes histórico-filosóficos del concepto hegeliano en la unidad originaria de la apercepción de Kant y el Yo absoluto de Fichte. Se adentra, (...) posteriormente, en el texto de la _Ciencia de la lógica _y de la _Enciclopedia _para estudiar y ofrecer una interpretación de la noción de concepto especulativo expuesta en ambas obras. El artículo se cierra con unas reflexiones en torno a la relación entre concepto y libertad en Hegel: el concepto, en efecto, es la libertad, y la libertad es _el _concepto. Aquí se encuentra el núcleo de la unidad entre filosofía teórica y práctica. (shrink)

Hegel’s Science of Logic is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest works of European philosophy. However, its contribution to arguably the most important philosophical problem, Pyrrhonian scepticism, has never been examined in any detail. Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel's Theory of Judgement fills a great lacuna in Hegel scholarship by convincingly proving that the dialectic of the judgement in Hegel’s Science of Logic successfully refutes this kind of scepticism. Although Ioannis Trisokkas has written the book primarily for those students of (...) philosophy who already have an interest in Hegel’s epistemology and philosophy of language and/or his Science of Logic, it will also appeal to those who investigate the problem of scepticism independently of the Hegel corpus. (shrink)

Up to now, there is a big debate, about what self-consciousness is, what inhibits it, and how this is related to work. By referring to classical theories of mind by Hegel this paper advances the thesis of an apparent congruence of self-consciousness and work as a developmental process in social relationships. This paper aims to open up a wider philosophical horizon for the criticism of current digitalization and the increasing variety of new flexible forms of work design. For example, the (...) working conditions on large digital platforms for taxi drivers tend to inhibit the development of worker`s self-consciousness for two reasons: Firstly, workers on digital platforms are not able to further develop digital tools through their work and this inhibits their intellectual creativity and secondly, the developmental process of the self-consciousness remains restricted because of the asymmetrical recognition, which only obtains by virtue of a process of recognizing and being recognized by others. Creative work and recognition are important for the development of consciousness as self-reflection in digital business, in which organizations operate and people work. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to clarify the critical role of Hegel's early logic, through an assessment of the dialectical process of sublation [Aufhebung] of the determinations of finite thinking at stake within its exposition. I want to show that the dialectical-critical work of logic has a speculative meaning for Hegel, thereby displaying the inward correspondence between critical and speculative aspects of philosophical activity. By pointing out the evidence from fragmentary texts on logic relating to Hegel's teaching activity in (...) 1801–1802, I will first put into question the idea of an introductory role of logic. In so doing I challenge a widespread reading which argues for the presence of a sharp separation between critical logic and speculative metaphysics. I will then focus on the texts on logic in the 1804–1805 Reinschrift, reading them as the worksite wherein the dawning form of a full-fledged dialectical logic is first prepared and elaborated. More generally, if this paves the way for establishing a continuity between Hegel's early and mature logic and his concept of dialectic, it is also paramount for understanding how the activity of systematic philosophy in the mature version of the system essentially constitutes an ongoing work on the forms of the finite. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss the objection of vicious circularity concerning the relation between the Phenomenology of Spiritand the Science of Logic. My argument is articulated in three stages: in the first place, I will provide a historical reconstruction of the debate and I will try to neutralize the objection of vicious circularity; in the second place, I will examine the latest positions of the Hegel-Forschungabout the issue of a possibly reciprocal presupposition between the PhG and the (...) SL; in the third place, I will analyze the meaning of a virtuous circularity, by showing its inner relation to a dynamic conception of systematicity. (shrink)

La Ciencia de la Lógica de Hegel contiene una refutación del sistema de Spinoza de cuya correcta comprensión depende el buen entendimiento del punto de vista general filosófico del idealismo hegeliano. Se señala aquí esa importancia, dónde debe buscarse la refutación en la obra y en qué sentido es de carácter lógico. Asimismo, se discuten algunas interpretaciones relativamente recientes de muchos de los pasajes decisivos, porque han fomentado confusiones sobre el modo –que verdaderamente no es el de Kant ni el (...) de Fichte– en que Hegel se opone al spinozismo. (shrink)

Se determina la posición y función primigenia del concepto de fin en Nuremberg. Además, se reconstruyen las modificaciones sistemático-arquitectónicas que dieron paso al surgimiento, en la Lógica, de la sección Objetividad y a la consecuente modificación de la posición del fin, que se insertará dentro de ésta como una forma específica de causalidad, diferenciada de los procesos mecánico-químicos. Con esta modificación, el tránsito del fin a la idea cesa de ser puro, perfilándose específicamente como un momento instrumental del concepto en (...) su proceso de realización en lo objetivo. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Hegel’s treatment of dialectical inferences, in particular of Plato’s dialectics in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, belongs to the history of the logical rule that, from Gerolamo Cardano to Bertrand Russell, is known as consequentia mirabilis. In 1906 Russell formalises it as follows: and its correspondent positive form as My paper has two parts. First, I show that dialectical inferences, for Hegel, involve sentences of the form and. Hegel, following Plato, stresses that (...) these inferences are das Wunderbare, the marvellous element of dialectical reasoning. In this sense Hegel’s view belongs to the history of CM from a perspective that is both terminological and logical. Second, I stress the peculiarity of Hegel’s CM. In a classical setting, the conditional is admissible and from we can, by CM, derive, and from, by CM, infer. However, in Hegel’s analysis it is evident that we can neither infer from, nor from. Rather, in dialectical inferences what we can vali... (shrink)

In “Violence and Metaphysics” Jacques Derrida suggests that “the only effective position to take in order not to be enveloped by Hegel would seem to be…to consider false-infinity…irreducible.” Inversely, refuting the charge of logocentrism associated with Hegelian true infinity ( wahrhafte Unendlichkeit ) would involve showing that Hegel’s speculative logic does not establish the infinity of being exempt from the negativity of the finite. This paper takes up Derrida’s challenge, and argues that true infinity is crucial to Hegel’s understanding of (...) ideality as a question of normative authority, which does not fall prey to logocentrism. Through an exposition of the dialectic of the finite and the infinite in Hegel’s Science of Logic , I argue that true infinity is not an ontological category that eliminates division, but rather refers to the metalogical standpoint involved in a philosophical account of determinacy. Although fully achieved at the end of the Logic , the metalogical standpoint that Hegel elaborates in the Seinslogik under the banner of the true infinite already clarifies that determinacy is a product of normative authority that is itself precarious. (shrink)

Resumen Se sostiene que la operación general de la silogística en la Lógica cumple con un programa trazado tempranamente por Hegel, consistente en concebir la unidad de la forma racional del silogismo y el contenido absoluto de la idea como resultado de una dialéctica inmanente a la propia forma del silogismo, mediante la cual éste abandona su carácter meramente formal y alcanza su propio concepto: ser forma objetiva o racional. Para esto se acude a la sección Subjetividad de la Doctrina (...) del Concepto, procurando reconstruir los antecedentes sistemáticos del capítulo sobre el silogismo, así como la operación específica que éste realiza en vista del tránsito a la sección Objetividad. El sentido de dicha operación consiste en la superación de un exceso que, al comienzo, la necesidad de la sustancia tiene por sobre la libertad del concepto, de lo cual resulta un exceso del concepto por sobre la sustancia. Para verificar esta operación se examinan los silogismos del estar y la necesidad, concluyendo con la determinación del tipo de objeto y de conocimiento que resulta del silogismo, y con la proyección del problema a estadios ulteriores de la Lógica, en los cuales el problema avistado adquiere un cariz marcadamente práctico.In this paper I argue that the general operation of syllogistic in the Logic fulfills a philosophical program that was early outlined by Hegel. This program conceives the unity of the rational form of the syllogism and the absolute content of the idea as a result of an immanent dialectic to the syllogism's form, by which it abandons its merely formal character and attains its own concept: being an objective or rational form. For the purposes of this argument, I analyze the Subjectivity section of the Doctrine of the Concept and reconstruct the systematic background of the chapter on syllogism, as well as the specific operation it performs in view of the transit to the Objectivity section. This operation consists in overcoming a certain excess that the necessity of the substance has, first, over the freedom of the concept, which results in an excess of the concept over the substance. To clarify this operation, I examine the syllogisms of qualitative existence and necessity. Finally, I show the determination of the type of object and knowledge that results from the syllogism and explain how this problem projects to later stages of Logic, in which the analyzed problem acquires a relevant practical aspect. (shrink)

This essay proposes to read Jean-Luc Nancy’s references to creation ex nihilo as both an intervention in the French debate concerning eventness, and as a transformative rethinking of the status of phenomenality. Nancy’s position is roughly triangulated relative to key remarks from other thinkers and, above all, its distinctive components (temporality, negativity, spatiality) are elucidated through historical glosses. Articulating the overall architecture of this theory serves to illustrate the Heideggerian access to the event debate. It also deepens aspects only elliptically (...) alluded to in Nancy’s own writing. (shrink)

O objetivo específico do presente artigo é explicar por que a quarta figura do silogismo do ser aí na doutrina do conceito da Ciência da Lógica de Hegel é denominada “silogismo matemático”. Para esse fim, pretendo proceder em três passos principais. Em primeiro lugar, elucidarei o conceito de silogismo a partir do qual o alcance e o limite do silogismo matemático devem ser avaliados. Em segundo lugar, apresentarei uma tradução e um comentário analítico do texto hegeliano sobre o silogismo matemático, (...) procurando explicitar em que consiste a necessidade de reduzir o silogismo qualitativo ao silogismo quantitativo. Em terceiro lugar, mostrarei que a matemática, com efeito, constitui um âmbito legítimo dentro do qual o silogismo da quarta figura é capaz de gerar conhecimento, mas justamente a delimitação desse âmbito torna necessária a crítica de qualquer formalização matemático-simbólica da lógica dialética. (shrink)

This article claims that Hegel’s appropriation of ancient skepticism plays a fundamental role in the formation of Hegelian systematics. This is affirmed both in relation to some methodical aspects, which anticipate some essential characteristics of speculative dialectics, and in view of Hegel’s confrontation with transcendental philosophy, such as the sublation of finite cognition in general. To this end, two gures and functions that skepticism adopts in the early phase of Hegelian thought are reconstructed. The article concludes with a reflection on (...) the general connection between skepticism and system in Hegel’s philosophy, and presents a third form of skepticism: The Phenomenology of Spirit. (shrink)

I present the arguments Hegel puts forward in favor of this rather challenging account of skepticism. In Section 2, I discuss the celebrated conception of “self-fulfilling skepticism” of the Phenomenology of Spirit that is supposed to overcome untrue types of cognition in order to promote “absolute knowing.” In Section 3, I debate Hegel’s more advanced view according to which genuine skepticism must be construed as dialectic.