Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution.

Expressivism’s central idea is that normative sentences bear the same relation to non-cognitive attitudes that ordinary descriptive sentences bear to beliefs: the expression relation. Allan Gibbard teIls us that “that words express judgments will be accepted by almost everyone” - the distinctive contribution of expressivism, his claim goes, is only a view about what kind of judgments words express. But not every account of the expression relation is equally suitable for the expressivist’s purposes. In fact, what I argue in this (...) paper, considering four possible accounts of expression, is that how suitable each account is for the expressivist’s purpose varies in proportion to how controversial it is. So Gibbard is wrong - if expression is to get expressivism off the ground, then it will be enormously controversial whether words do express judgments. And thus expressivism is committed to strong claims about the semantics of non-normative language. (shrink)

The Manifestation Requirement, advanced by Dummett in his critique of semantic realism, has been criticized for being behavioristic, and the responses have been made that the critics are mistaken. However, the dispute has failed to exhibit the point of the Requirement. In this paper, I shall argue (1) that, in the light of Anscombe's theory of practical knowledge, knowledge of linguistic meaning is to be seen as the knowledge-how that forms the basis of the practical knowledge that an agent has (...) of his own intentional actions, (2) that such knowledge of linguistic meaning is to be based on mutual agreements in a community, and (3) that the Manifestation Requirement is a condition for the possibility of such mutual agreements. As a result, the Manifestation Requirement finds its basis on the idea that language and linguistic acts are tools that we use while continually improving them. (shrink)

Uno de los principales aportes de Michael Dummett a la filosofía contemporánea fue la idea de que ciertas disputas tradicionales de la metafísica podían ser replanteadas a través de una caracterización semántica del realismo y el antirrealismo. Apoyándose en esta caracterización, Dummett propuso una aproximación ascendente a esas disputas. Dicha aproximación buscaba resolver los desacuerdos metafísicos entre realistas y antirrealistas mediante la formulación de teorías semánticas para ciertos conjuntos de enunciados. En este artículo argumentamos que la caracterización de Dummett no (...) captura las disputas metafísicas tradicionales y que, como consecuencia de ello, dicha caracterización no constituye un buen sustento para la aproximación ascendente. (shrink)

Starting from John MacFarlane's recent survey of answers to the question ‘What is assertion?’, I defend an account of assertion that draws on elements of MacFarlane's and Robert Brandom's commitment accounts, Timothy Williamson's knowledge norm account, and my own previous work on the normative status of logic. I defend the knowledge norm from recent attacks. Indicative conditionals, however, pose a problem when read along the lines of Ernest Adams' account, an account supported by much work in the psychology of reasoning. (...) Furthermore, there seems to be no place for degrees of belief in the accounts of belief and assertion given here. Degrees of belief do have a role in decision‐making, but, again, there is much evidence that the orthodox theory of subjective utility maximization is not a good description of what we do in decision‐making and, arguably, neither is it a good normative guide to how we ought to make decisions. (shrink)

Asserting is the act of claiming that something is the case—for instance, that oranges are citruses, or that there is a traffic congestion on Brooklyn Bridge (at some time). We make assertions to share information, coordinate our actions, defend arguments, and communicate our beliefs and desires. Because of its central role in communication, assertion has been investigated in several disciplines. Linguists, philosophers of language, and logicians rely heavily on the notion of assertion in theorizing about meaning, truth and inference. -/- (...) The nature of assertion and its relation to other speech acts and linguistic phenomena (implicatures, presuppositions, etc.) have been subject to much controversy. This entry will situate assertion within speech act theory and pragmatics more generally, and then go on to present the current main accounts of assertion. (shrink)

The fallibility of deduction is the thesis that a thoughtful speaker-reasoner can wrongly believe that an inference is deductively valid. The author presents an argument to the effect that the fallibility of deduction is incompatible with the widespread view that deduction is epistemically unfruitful (the conclusion is contained in the premises, and the transition from premises to conclusion never extends knowledge). If the fallibility of deduction is a fact, the argument presented is a refutation of the doctrine of the unfruitfulness (...) of deduction. But its relevance goes further, because the argument reveals a connection between two different problems: a solution to the problem of fruitfulness (how can deductive inferences increase our knowledge?) is a starting point for a solution to the problem of fallibility (how can deductive inferences be wrong?). To solve the problem of fruitfulness, Michael Dummett proposed some general ideas concerning meaning and inference. Starting from these meaning-theoretical ideas, one can develop an explanation of the fallibility of deduction. The general explanatory strategy does not depend on the choice between a theory of meaning centered on truth, verification, inferential role, or on other key notions. (shrink)

We outline a class of term-languages for epistemic grounding inspired by Prawitz’s theory of grounds. We show how denotation functions can be defined over these languages, relating terms to proof-objects built up of constructive functions. We discuss certain properties that the languages may enjoy both individually and with respect to their expansions. Finally, we provide a ground-theoretic version of Prawitz’s completeness conjecture, and adapt to our framework a refutation of this conjecture due to Piecha and Schroeder-Heister.