In an engaging and provocative paper, Linda Trevino and Gary Weaver spell out the differences between the methodological approach characteristic of the natural sciences on the one hand and that of normative inquiry on the other (Trevino and Weaver, 1991). Near the end of their paper they raise a haunting question that will have increasing significance as the management literature in ethics evolves: namely, “Can the two approaches be integrated?”As C. P. Snow (1962) noted, no one can deny either the (...) stark differences between the two worlds of normative and empirical inquiry, or the mutual suspicion shown by their inhabitants. The methodology of natural science implies a non-normative, thoroughly descriptive vision of the world in which reality awaits discovery by the scientist prepared to use increasingly sophisticated techniques. In contrast, the methodology of normative inquiry, i.e., that of traditional moral philosophy, implies a world-vision in which most important issues are allocated to ethics, where empirical pursuits are frequently trivial and always require ethical guidance, and where empirical theories contain normative presuppositions unrecognized as normative even by their scientific adherents. (shrink)

There is a social or collective sense of ‘knowledge’, as used, for example, in the phrase ‘the growth of scientific knowledge’. In this paper I show that social knowledge does not supervene on facts about what individuals know, nor even what they believe or intend, or any combination of these or other mental states. Instead I develop the idea that social knowing is an analogue to individual knowing, where the analogy focuses on the functional role of social and individual knowing.

Kroeber’s "The Superorganic" (1917) stands as the first extreme statement of cultural holism. Some have compared it to Durkheim, the majority to Boas; some have denied any evolutionary message, others read in it a theory of "emergent evolution" arising from his transcendental holism. What was it, exactly? When understood as part of a trilogy comprising two other articles (one from 1915, the other from 1919), it emerged that his extreme brand of cultural holism was a necessary tool to carry out (...) a relatively hidden evolutionary agenda. This led me to rethink his evolutionism, to deny that he was a cultural determinist, to understand this part of his anthropology in terms of "epistemological obstacles" (Bachelard 1938), and show that it reemerges in Appadurai’s understanding of globalization (1996). (shrink)

Pour que la pratique filmique se constitue en outil d’analyse parmi la panoplie des sciences sociales actuelle, il importe de s’interroger sur son apprentissage. Or, comparé aux entretiens, aux statistiques et à la documentation écrite, imprimée ou photographique, on constate ici la très faible place accordée à l’instrument filmique dans les formations de sociologie ou même d’anthropologie. Il est alors rendu compte de l’expérience de l’apprentissage audiovisuel mené, depuis plusieurs années, auprès d’étudiants en licence à l’université de Tours.

What is it for a group to believe something? A summative account assumes that for a group to believe that p most members of the group must believe that p. Accounts of this type are commonly proposed in interpretation of everyday ascriptions of beliefs to groups. I argue that a nonsummative account corresponds better to our unexamined understanding of such ascriptions. In particular I propose what I refer to as the joint acceptance model of group belief. I argue that group (...) beliefs according to the joint acceptance model are important phenomena whose aetiology and development require investigation. There is an analogous phenomenon of social or group preference, which social choice theory tends to ignore. (shrink)

A philosophical account of personal identity - in terms of the maintenance of fundamental beliefs, principles and commitments by spatiotemporally continuous particulars - is sketched, an account which is able to incorporate a social and relational conception of personal identity, and thus serve as the basis for a social psychological theory of personal identity - in terms of the pursuit of identity projects’within social collectives. Some implications of this theory are developed, concerning the relation between identity and individualism, responsibility and (...) social labeling. The theory develops an account of the social constitution of personal identity that is consistent with a realist conception of social psychological theories of identity: as objective theoretical descriptions of the social dimensions of identity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article questions Metz’s purification of the evaluative subject, and wishes to pose the theological question concerning the meaning of life from a normative and social conception of subjectivity. Before asking whether or not God is indispensable to the meaning of life, it is first necessary to identify the ways in which God is hidden in the fundamental evaluations that the contemporary subject makes in the globalized capitalist world.

Democratic governance is under increasing scrutiny as a result of waning trust in political institutions, and a widening gap between public aspirations and government performance. The purpose of this paper is to address what is currently diagnosed as a democratic deficit by calling into question the notion of consent, procedures advocated in its pursuit, and its relationship with democracy. To this purpose, the paper reviews seminal works that have investigated the nexus of democracy and consent over time: The Calculus of (...) Consent, The Engineering of Consent and Manufacturing Consent. In this, it presents different understandings of the processes whereby consent is arrived at, and questions whether they support or undermine democratic aspirations. (shrink)

Marquée à juste titre par le mouvement des Annales, l’historiographie française a intériorisé lidée qu’avant 1929 dominait ce que Henri Berr avait stigmatisé sous le nom d’ « histoire traditionnelle » : une histoire politique et individualiste ne tenant pas compte des déterminations collectives, sociales ou mentales. La fameuse Introduction aux études historiques de Langlois et Seignobos (1898) serait l’expression de ce «positivisme» qu’aurait initié Gabriel Monod, fondateur de la Revue historique en 1876. Cette vision traditionnelle de l’histoire de la (...) discipline est globalement remise en cause dans cet article qui montre que les années 1870-1930 sont au contraire un moment central dans l’historiographie tant au plan institutionnel qu’au plan intellectuel, qui nous intéresse surtout ici. C’est en effet dès cette époque que s’est cristallisée laspiration à faire de l’histoire une science sociale, ce qui se comprend aisément dès lors qu’on contextualise cette histoire et que l’on replace cette discipline dans l’ensemble du champ des sciences sociales. Les années 1890–1914 voient même se développer fortement une histoire économique et une histoire sociale. 1929 apparaît alors moins comme une révolution que comme une accélération dans une direction déjà marquée. (shrink)

Social ontology is the study of the nature and properties of the social world. It is concerned with analyzing the various entities in the world that arise from social interaction. -/- A prominent topic in social ontology is the analysis of social groups. Do social groups exist at all? If so, what sorts of entities are they, and how are they created? Is a social group distinct from the collection of people who are its members, and if so, how is (...) it different? What sorts of properties do social groups have? Can they have beliefs or intentions? Can they perform actions? And if so, what does it take for a group to believe, intend, or act? -/- Other entities investigated in social ontology include money, corporations, institutions, property, social classes, races, genders, artifacts, artworks, language, and law. It is difficult to delineate a precise scope for the field (see section 2.1). In general, though, the entities explored in social ontology largely overlap with those that social scientists work on. A good deal of the work in social ontology takes place within the social sciences (see sections 5.1–5.8). -/- Social ontology also addresses more basic questions about the nature of the social world. One set of questions pertains to the constituents, or building blocks, of social things in general. For instance, some theories argue that social entities are built out of the psychological states of individual people, while others argue that they are built out of actions, and yet others that they are built out of practices. Still other theories deny that a distinction can even be made between the social and the non-social. -/- A different set of questions pertains to how social categories are constructed or set up. Are social categories and kinds produced by our attitudes? By our language? Are they produced by causal patterns? And is there just one way social categories are set up, or are there many varieties of social construction? -/- The term ‘social ontology’ has only come into wide currency in recent years, but the nature of the social has been a topic of inquiry since ancient Greece. As a whole, the field can be understood as a branch of metaphysics, the general inquiry into the nature of entities. (shrink)

Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept ofeffort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for anexplicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at thisdefinition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and arguesthat few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues thatsuch a definition is (...) now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whosefirst step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made acrosssciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effortfrom research on effort so far:primitive-feelings accounts,comparator-based accounts,resource-based accountsandforce-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking abouteffort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: re-source-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why force-based accounts should be regarded as more fundamental than resource-basedaccounts -/- . (shrink)

Some practical criteria for free-will are suggested where free-will is a matter of degree. It is argued that these are more appropriate than some extremely idealised conceptions. Thus although the paper takes lessons from philosophy it avoids idealistic approaches as irrelevant. A mechanism for allowing an agent to meet these criteria is suggested: that of facilitating the gradual emergence of free-will in the brain via an internal evolutionary process. This meets the requirement that not only must the choice of action (...) be free but also choice in the method of choice, and choice in the method of choice of the method of choice etc. This is directly analogous to the emergence of life from non-life. Such an emergence of indeterminism with respect to the conditions of the agent fits well with the `Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis' which posits that our intelligence evolved (at least partially) to enable us to deal with social complexity and modelling `arms races'. There is a clear evolutionary advantage in being internally coherent in seeking to fulfil ones goals and unpredictable by ones peers. To fully achieve this vision several other aspects of cognition are necessary: open-ended strategy development; the meta-evolution of the evolutionary process; the facility to anticipate the results of strategies; and the situating of this process in a society of competitive peers. Finally the requirement that reports of the deliberations that lead to actions need to be socially acceptable leads to the suggestion that the language that the strategies are developed within be subject to a normative process in parallel with the development of free-will. An appendix outlines a philosophical position in support of my position. (shrink)

Postmodernist thinkers have often claimed that there is something like a `modernist' model of theory and metatheory in the social sciences which is objectivistic, dogmatic, and generally over-ambitious, aiming to dominate the theoretical landscape like a modernist skyscraper. This paper suggests that there is little to support such a view, and that most sociologists and social anthropologists, and many other social scientists, have been much more cautious and tentative in their claims than postmodernists have claimed. The alleged distinctiveness of postmodern (...) social science is therefore itself open to question. The paper includes a discussion of reflection and reflexivity in realist philosophy of science and in the social theory of Habermas and Bourdieu. (shrink)

While in medicine, comparison of the data supplied by a clinical syndrome with the data supplied by the biological system is used to arrive at the most accurate diagnosis, the same cannot be said of financial economics: the accumulation of statistical results that contradict the Brownian hypothesis used in risk modelling, combined with serious empirical problems in the practical implementation of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the benchmark theory of mathematical finance founded on the Brownian hypothesis, has failed to change the Brownian (...) representation, which has endured for more than fifty years despite the extent of its invalidation by experience. Without any statistical foundations, one mathematical representation has become the established approach, acting in the minds of practitioners as a “prenotion” in the sense the word is used by Durkheim, i.e. a “schematic, summary representation” which has produced a kind of spontaneous epistemology. The question arises of the persistence of this mathematical representation, which has been the basis for every financial risk modelling approach: how can its long life be explained? How was this spontaneous epistemology formed, and why did it prove to be so persistent? To address this question and offer an answer, I will test the various dynamics of scientific knowledge used with reference to financial modelling. All these dynamics are specific ways of describing the relationship between knowledge of a phenomenon and the phenomenon itself. Observing that it is impossible for the positivist approach to solve the financial puzzle, I turn to the three principal postpositivist dynamics, developed by Kuhn, Lakatos and Quine. I shall try to make to speak these representations of science for financial research, in order to reflect on the dominance of the Brownian representation in finance. We shall see that none of the epistemologies examined can explain why the Brownian representation continues to be used in mathematical finance research. I shall then propose an alternative hypothesis, concerning a significant pervading mental model that has irrigated both academics and practitioners in the financial sector: the “principle of continuity” introduced into economics by Marshall in. I consider that this principle of continuity has become a “persistent idea” in the form of a viral approach to representations, and I give this persistent idea the metaphorical name of the “Brownian virus”. Then, to explain the spread of this Brownian virus through the financial sector, the contamination of financial practices by this mental representation founded on the principle of continuity, I introduce the concept of the “financial Logos”, a discourse that structures practices and organisations, calculations, prudential regulations and accounting standards, leading to a general financialisation of society from the 1980s onwards. (shrink)

Resumen: La diferencia entre juicios de hecho y juicios de valor fundamenta, al mismo tiempo, la neutralidad de las descripciones y el inherente compromiso del investigador, y ello sin devaluar la validez de los juicios de valor y del compromiso. Es importante reconocer la diferencia entre aquello que funda un juicio de hecho y aquello que funda un juicio de valor. Lo que es inaceptable -tanto como juicio de hecho como juicio de valor- es la pretensión de derivar recomendaciones neutrales (...) solo desde los hechos, la idea tecnocrática de una intervención que no requiere compromiso. No existe tal cosa como una acción neutral y el reino de la neutralidad se reduce solo a la descripción.: The distinction between facts judgments and value judgments is the basis, at the same time, of both the neutrality of descriptions and the inherent commitment of the researcher, without devaluing the validity of value judgments. It is relevant to acknowledge the difference between what grounds a fact judgment from what grounds a value judgment. What is invalid -as fact judgment and as value judgment- is the attempt to generate neutral recommendations only from facts, the technocratic idea of an intervention that do not involves commitment. There is no such thing as a neutral action, and the real of neutrality is reduce only to description. (shrink)

The term exaptation, describing the phenomenon that an existing trait or tool proves to be of new adaptive value in a new context, is flourishing in recent literature from cultural evolution and cognitive archaeology. Yet there also exists an older literature from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which studied more or less systematically the phenomenon of “change of function” in culture and tool use. Michel Foucault and Ludwig Noiré, who devoted themselves to the history of social institutions and material tools, (...) respectively, occupy an important place among them. This article offers a brief overview of this literature and attempts to show that it provided ideas that remain relevant to current approaches to cognitive archaeology, in particular regarding attempts to understand the impact of technological evolution on the human mind. (shrink)

Through an examination of French organicism–one of the models proposed for the nascent science of sociology in the late 19th century–this article argues two main points: that organicism was crucial in the establishment of ‘society’ as a scientific object; and that the specific characteristics of this new object were retained by later sociology long after the organic analogies and evolutionary views that justified them had been explicitly abandoned. Organicism played a significant role in establishing a strong notion of society as (...) a concrete, real entity–a notion that had a lasting impact on sociological theory and became one of the most important ‘categories of thought’ of the 20th century. (shrink)

Popper's methodological individualism and the social sciences. Popper's philosophy of social sciences poses a dilemma that arises out of the two theses of methodological individualism and situational logic. In order to find a way out of this dilemma, one must raise the question concerning the epistemological and methodological status of the `laws' of the human sciences. There are indeed `rules' from which human actions depart mostly to a negligible extent, but they remain valid or stay in effect without exception only (...) as far as they are not re-evoked or re-emerge in the consciousness of the agents. The element of truth of methodological individualism lies in the person's capacity to revoke, in principle, the validity of the rules concerning oneself. Situational logic and methodological individualism can thus be reconciled. (shrink)

This article is an analysis of a collection of articles published by Gilles Deleuze in 1953 under the direction of Georges Canguilhem. This collection, which has been little read and commented upon, sheds light on the intellectual trajectory of its author by underlining the theoretical hesitations that were his. I show that Deleuze then outlined an ambitious “psycho-sociological” project that he never fully realized. To do this, I reconstitute the psychological and ethological subtext of the book by following his sources; (...) I thus bring to light real theoretical positions often unnoticed in his work (in particular with respect to Henri Bergson, Jakob von Uexküll, and gestaltpsychology). I then argue that the difficulties linked to the theory of perception lead Deleuze to turn away from this project in order to devote himself to more specifically ontological problems. However, I suggest that these difficulties persist throughout Deleuze's works, where notions such as “sign” and “semiotics” both cover and avoid specifically perceptual problems. (shrink)

A fundamental methodological problem is the relevance of an antagonism of capitalism. This needs to be classified in light of the developmental stage of the means of production: far too little attention is paid to the contradictory character of individualization and socialization. This brings us to Karl Polányi’s main argument of disembedding. He also deals with a shift from the socially integrated individual to the utilitarian market citizen. The French regulationist theory offers a major step toward understanding new forms of (...) societal embedding linked to this “new personality.” It will also allow us to move beyond the misleading juxtaposition or dichotomization of individualization-socialization. Investigating five major tensions, it ventilates the possible meaning of the digital revolution and the challenges for monitoring development. The main aim of the article, however, is to bring the economy back in and to go beyond the traditional duality between economics and politics. (shrink)

We present here a new method for bioethics: systemic modelling. In this method, the complex phenomenon being studied (e.g. personalized medicine, genetic testing, gene therapy, genetically modified organisms) is modelled as a whole, to shed light on its organization and functioning, and major (bio)ethical issues and solutions for their resolution are then identified. This systemic modelling method is ideal for use in the identification of solutions, rather than their validation, with other methods then used to test the solutions found. We (...) provide a description and reproducible instructions for the application of systemic modelling in bioethics, together with a brief example of the application of this method to the study of the impact of personalized medicine on French society. (shrink)

The philosophical assumptions that organize moral sociology as practical philosophy are the outcome of a secular quest to investigate the principles, norms and values behind the constitution of society. As a protracted response to the whole utilitarian-atomistic-individualistic tradition that systematically deemphasizes the constitutive role that morality plays in the structuration of self and society, the sociological tradition has continued, by its own means, the tradition of moral and practical philosophy in theoretically informed empirical research of social practices. Going back to (...) classic moral philosophy, I want to show in this article how social theory is involved in the quest for ‘the good life with and for the others in just institutions’ (Ricoeur). (shrink)

In this article I undertake an analysis of erotic sexual intercourse - commonly, and more accurately, designated as love-making - in the spirit of Durkheim's social analysis of religion. Thus, based on a phenomenological semiotic analysis of the peculiar things we do and feel in the course of making love, I propose, first, to uncover the implicit `logic' that generates and governs these distinctly sociable doings and sociable feelings. Second, I proceed to suggest that the sameself logic, albeit in an (...) attenuated version, also generates and governs the broad class of `social occasions proper', and that this homology calls for gathering erotic and social occasions under one and the same rubric, which I propose to call the `socio-erotic' (since the term `social' has been denatured through overuse). Third, I conclude with a discussion of how socio-erotic domains fit into a larger world structured and governed mainly by interest-driven and power-driven conflictual fields. (shrink)

In his lectures on pragmatism presented in the academic year 1913—14 at the Sorbonne, Durkheim argued that James’s pragmatist theory of truth, due to its emphasis on individual satisfaction, was unable to account for the obligatory, necessary and impersonal character of truth. But for Durkheim to make this charge is only to raise the question whether he himself could account for the morally obligatory or normative character of truth. Although rejecting individualism may be necessary for explaining the existence of norms, (...) it is not sufficient. I argue that Durkheim never succeeded in providing a full account of normativity. Of course, this is a problem that remains unresolved today. Nevertheless, Durkheim took an important step beyond James in recognizing the insufficiency of his individualist account of truth. (shrink)

L’universitarisation des formations au travail social est souvent pensée comme le remède à la reproduction tendancielle des savoirs et des pratiques dues à un système où domine fortement la formation par les pairs. Face à des transformations et des processus de réingénierie pédagogique s’étant développés dans le champ des formations au travail social, en France depuis les années 2010, comprenant notamment leur entrée dans le système européen des formations supérieures, et l’adjonction de matières académiques dans les parcours de formation, il (...) convient de s’interroger sur les enjeux et la portée d’une universitarisation qui en découlerait. Faute d’un cadrage théorique clair et de concepts permettant de penser l’action sociale d’accompagnement individuel et de transformation collective, les futurs travailleurs sociaux s’exposent aux dissonances cognitives. La sociologie d’intervention, entre autres disciplines, peut fournir les matériaux théoriques, conceptuels et méthodologiques de nature à éviter ces dissonances. (shrink)

I argue that the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim of science are both knowledge. The ‘aim of belief’, understood as the correctness conditions of belief, is to be identified with the product of properly functioning cognitive systems. Science is an institution that is the social functional analogue of a cognitive system, and its aim is the same as that of belief. In both cases it is knowledge rather than true belief that is the product of proper functioning.

The paper elaborates an endeavor on applying the algorithmic information-theoretic computational complexity to meta-social-sciences. It is motivated by the effort on seeking the impact of the well-known incompleteness theorem to the scientific methodology approaching social phenomena. The paper uses the binary string as the model of social phenomena to gain understanding on some problems faced in the philosophy of social sciences or some traps in sociological theories. The paper ends on showing the great opportunity in recent social researches and some (...) boundaries that limit them. (shrink)

L’histoire officielle de la discipline veut que la psychologie sociale française, née et morte aussitôt à la fin du XIXe siècle, ait connu une longue éclipse pour renaître seulement dans les années 1950 sous influence américaine. Cette disparition dans la première moitié du XXe siècle serait due à la domination de la sociologie durkheimienne qui passe pour être hostile à la psychologie. Cet article remet en cause cette vision traditionnelle. Il montre que la sociologie durkheimienne s’est elle-même définie comme une (...) psychologie collective et qu’elle a su, à partir des années 1910 environ, ouvrir un véritable dialogue avec les psychologues au sein de l’université. L’idée durkheimienne que les catégories les plus fondamentales de la pensée sont déjà des constructions sociales provoqua chez les psychologues une véritable petite révolution intellectuelle. Elle les obligea en effet à sortir du champ étroit de la psychophysiologie qu’avaient promu depuis 1870 les fondateurs tels Taine et Ribot, en réaction contre le spiritualisme. Cette nouvelle psychologie sociale a influencé la plupart des grands psychologues de l’époque (Blondel, Dumas, Janet, Meyerson, Wallon), mais le temps et les hommes lui ont manqué pour s’institutionnaliser. De fait, elle disparaît avec la mort de ses principaux artisans (Blondel et Halbwachs) et l’oubli parfois volontaire pratiqué par leurs successeurs. (shrink)

The thesis asserting the mental dependence of institutional entities is particularly debated in social ontology. One of its implications is the infallibility thesis, according to which the existence of institutional entities requires that some of their properties be known. What are these properties? After presenting the Searlian conception of institutional entities and the kind of mental dependence they manifest, I specify the content of the infallibility thesis. I then show that these properties are the deontic powers associated with these entities, (...) and that the mental attitude towards deontic powers must take the form of practical knowledge. Finally, I show that this interpretation is compatible with the existence of at least some naturalized institutional entities. (shrink)

Resumen: La aproximación que Durkheim esboza en Las Reglas es en la actualidad más bien criticada: sería una visión conservadora, que olvida la importancia de los agentes y una sociología de lo social que solo observa el orden establecido. Sin embargo, una lectura atenta de Las Reglas muestra que sus afirmaciones básicas -que es un hecho social, que debe ser visto como una cosa, y que debe buscarse su explicación a través de otros hechos sociales- son correctas y pueden integrar (...) los elementos válidos de las críticas realizadas. Detrás del rechazo a Durkheim aparece el rechazo a una afirmación radical de Las Reglas que nos resulta más bien intolerable: que la imposición es parte natural de la vida social.: The approach that Durkheim delineates in The Rules of Sociological Method is currently criticized: it is a conservative view that forgets the relevance of agents and it is a social sociology that only observes established order. However, an intensive reading of The Rules shows that their basic statements -about what is a social fact, that they should be treated as things, and that their explanation should be searched in other social facts- are correct one and they can integrate the correct elements argued by its critics. Behind the rejection to Durkheim there is the rejection to a radical statement in The Rules, one that is unbearable for us: that coercion is a natural part of social life. (shrink)

Cet article se penche sur la notion de pluralité dans l’œuvre d’Emile Durkheim. Il commence par préciser le sens du concept de pluralisme, qui fait l’objet de débats depuis plusieurs années. Selon cet article, la question de la pluralité se pose à plusieurs niveaux. On peut distinguer entre 1) la question ontologique de la nature de la réalité elle‐même ; 2) la question philosophico-anthropologique de la constitution de la personne humaine ; 3) la question sociologique de la diversité des opinions (...) cohabitant au sein d’une même entité sociale ; 4) la question historique de la stabilité dans le temps des configurations politiques et sociales ; 5) la question socio‐anthropologique de la variabilité des formes d’organisation sociale. Cet article montre que sur chacun de ces sujets Durkheim, contrairement à une lecture répandue qui le perçoit comme un penseur de l’unanimité et de l’harmonie sociales, croit en l’existence d’une forte pluralité. De plus la pluralité, à son avis, à des effets positifs sur la vie sociale moderne, car elle confère à l’individu une plus grande autonomie. (shrink)

The relationship between consciousness and brain, subject and body, appears today far away from being elucidated. All attempts to reduce consciousness and subject to the brain end up abolishing the subject, i.e., what is evidently most relevant for each one of us. Luigi Giussani proposes a method to investigate human consciousness based on the analysis of oneself personal experience, verifiable by every human being. He is very attentive to avoiding during the experiential analysis interference of prejudices, ideological conceptions, and conjectures. (...) His method remains perfectly coherent and open to all contributions from neuroscience and scientific discoveries. He leaves completely open the major question about the relationship between brain physical-chemical functioning and subjective experience, individual consciousness. A comparison between Giussani’s method and the starting point and the fundamental assumption that lays the basis of various modern neuroscientific conceptions of consciousness is conducted. A discussion about the assumption that stays at the basis of the various neuroscientific currents appears necessary and the method proposed by Giussani may constitute a common and acceptable by everyone background for future development and advances in studying the greatest problem of our culture, the relation between brain and human consciousness. (shrink)

This comparison between Boudon and Mises focuses on the main tenets of their respective conceptions of social science. It covers action theory, the theory of belief, the epistemology of social science, and also addresses the topic of liberalism.

The paper critically reconstructs the crowd psychological heritage in phenomenological and social science emotion research. It shows how the founding figures of phenomenology and sociology uncritically adopted Le Bon’s crowd psychological imagery as well as what I suggest calling the disease model of emotion transfer. Against this background, it can be examined how Le Bon’s understanding of emotional contagion as an automatic, involuntary, and uncontrollable mechanism has remained a dominant force in emotion research until today. However, a closer look at (...) phenomenological descriptions and empirical investigations of how emotion’s spread shows that there is little evidence supporting Le Bon’s crowd psychological framework. Thus, I suggest that the disease model should be dismissed in favor of more plausible approaches to interpersonal emotion dynamics. (shrink)

The French sociological tradition has long regarded the ‘individual’ as a reality situated outside its area of intellection and investigation. According to Durkheim, the individual is a psychological object par excellence. Sociology has thus long favored the study of collectives (groups, classes, categories, institutions, microcosms), suggesting that the individual was a reality which, in itself, fell short of the social. The article discusses a method from the mid-1990s of researching sociology at an individual scale. This approach is essentially embedded in (...) the French sociological tradition, from Durkheim to Bourdieu via Halbwachs, despite the inflections and criticisms it might have of this tradition, while also drawing on the main theoretical knowledge of Norbert Elias’ relational and process-focused sociology. From empirical realization in methodological and theoretical reflexivity, this research program has progressed in dialog with various types of scientific knowledge more classically oriented toward the individual and their mental realities, such as cultural psychology, psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology or the neurosciences. (shrink)

‘Institution’ as a concept has a particular resonance in the collaborative work of Deleuze and Guattari. Looking at institutional psychotherapy and the way in which it traverses the works of Deleuze and Guattari, this article will attempt to offer some ways that the concept of institution can be put to work. To do so, it will begin with two statements about institutional psychotherapy made by the psychiatrist Jean Oury: ‘Institutional psychotherapy is perhaps the putting in place of all kinds of (...) means to struggle, each day, against all that might make the whole of the “collective” topple over towards a segregative or concentrationary structure’, and ‘The establishment is a building and a contract agreed with the State, a price per day. The institution, when it exists, is a labour, a strategy to avoid a whole load of people fermenting, like a jar of jam with a poorly closed lid.’ These statements will open the door to a deeper exploration of what an institution can do and how it was activated in Guattari’s clinical practice and in the collaborative philosophy developed with Deleuze. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 207 Seiten: 327-368.

Is there a distinction between social theory and sociology? Perhaps one of the most general features in sociological thinking is that it is an inquiry to develop holistic explanations for social reality. In this sense, there is a kind of universality of social knowledge in its scientific and philosophical dimensions, and is one of its main purposes for the operation of sociology as a "science of modernity". Next, I will develop a brief reconstruction of meaning which is attributed to science (...) in the modern world, followed by the emergence of an specialized explanation of social reality under the name of social theory, as a result of philosophical conclusions that finish it with Hegel on the one side, and it focuses on a differentiated scientific knowledge as a product of modernity itself, on the other hand. Finally, and following this, I will establish the specific role played by sociology and social theory in this context, by considering that the first describes itself as a science of society-modernity and the second has a critical direction to sociability answers and is specifically linked with political-normative approaches. ¿Existe una diferencia entre teoría social y sociología? ¿Se trata de aproximaciones diferentes a un mismo problema o de problemas con tradiciones diferentes que suelen confundirse? Probablemente el elemento que más caracteriza al pensar sociológico sea su búsqueda o pretensión por desarrollar explicaciones holísticas de la realidad. En este sentido la universalidad en el conocimiento sobre lo social en particular resulta uno de los temas de base para el operar de la sociología en tanto ciencia de la sociedad. A continuación y a través de la observación de pasajes específicos de la tradición inaugurada con Hegel, se desarrollará, por un lado, una breve reconstrucción del sentido que se le atribuye a la ciencia en el mundo moderno, seguido, por otro, de la emergencia de un saber especializado de la realidad social bajo el nombre de teoría social de una parte y sociología de otra. Siguiendo lo anterior, se establecerá el papel específico que juega la sociología y la teoría social, entendiendo que a la primera se le entrega el apelativo de ciencia de la sociedad-modernidad y a la segunda una orientación más marcada a las preguntas por la sociabilidad y específicamente vinculada a orientaciones político-normativas. (shrink)

Selon la façon dont on l’envisage et l’origine du regard qui se pose sur elle, l’autorité ne paraît pas représenter la même chose. Pour certains elle est l’expression d’un principe abstrait, atemporel, relatif au jeu des places qu’organisent les rapports sociaux, en l’occurrence les places spécifiques qu’occupent les parents par rapport à l’enfant. Pourtant, pour d’autres approches, notamment les approches psychanalytiques, l’autorité n’est pas un principe neutre, elle a un sexe, de préférence masculin. Que peut-on dire d’une telle affirmation à (...) notre époque de reconfiguration des relations non seulement entre les sexes mais aussi entre les générations, et plus globalement de l’ensemble des relations privées, si ce n’est des rapports entre le public et le privé? Je m’essaie ici à une analyse sociologique, alimentée de références psychologiques et historiques, de la signification de cette question et des réponses qu’il est possible de lui apporter. (shrink)

In the contemporary epistemological debate on social reality, characterized by the crisis of post-modern theories and the emergence of new forms of realism, are there any approaches not acknowledging some specific ontological character to the construction of social objects? The question is apparently rhetorical, but the implication of this problem are not obvious. In the sociological literature the opposition between reality and construction is not clearly defined. Sometimes it is considered a dichotomy, in other situations the synthesis of alternative theses (...) in a dialectical horizon. The more systematic attempt considers reality and construction as analytical macro-dimensions where the relation between social ontology and epistemology operates. From this stance, the acknowledgement of the role of social construction in a wider realist horizon is the true overtaking of postmodern philosophy. If it is true that facts exist beyond representations, it is also true that representations themselves have a specific effect on reality, who continually re-structures itself around specific relations of emergent power. Stating that reality is socially constructed is an evident limit of postmodern theories. On the other hand, stating that only facts exist constitute an impoverishment of realism and its replacement in neo-positivism. Social phenomena are real because they are based on specific properties of the inter-subjective construction of social reality. This thesis represents the revitalization of an advanced, anti-positivistic realism and the definition of the specificity of social objects. The aim of this essay is to search for a specific place of construction within the development of realist social ontology. (shrink)