- Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey.Florian Cova & Yasuko Kitano - 2014 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22:17-37.details
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(1 other version)Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy.Jennifer Nagel & Kaija Mortensen - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 53-70.details
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Frankfurt and the folk: An experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases.Jason S. Miller & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):401-414.details
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Virtue in Business: Morally Better, Praiseworthy, Trustworthy, and More Satisfying.E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz - forthcoming - Journal of Organizational Moral Psychology.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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Perspective in intentional action attribution.Adam Feltz, Maegan Harris & Ashley Perez - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):673-687.details
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Individual differences in theory-of-mind judgments: Order effects and side effects.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):343 - 355.details
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Philosophical temperament.Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Adam Feltz, Richard Scheines & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):313-330.details
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Extraversion and compatibilist intuitions: a ten-year retrospective and meta-analyses.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):388-403.details
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Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis.Adam Feltz & Florian Cova - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30 (C):234-246.details
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Adaptive diversity and misbelief.Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):516.details
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On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
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False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.details
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Predicting Philosophical Disagreement.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):978-989.details
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Questioning the free will comprehension question.E. Cokely & A. Feltz - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 2440--2445.details
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Actor-observer differences in intentional action intuitions.A. Feltz, M. Harris & A. Perez - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.details
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Models of Moral Cognition.Jeffrey White - 2010 - In Lorenzo Magnani, Walter Carnielli & Claudio Pizzi (eds.), MODEL-BASED REASONING IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. Springer. pp. last 20.details
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Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments.David Colaço, Wesley Buckwalter, Stephen Stich & Edouard Machery - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):199-212.details
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The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.details
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Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):528-554.details
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Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions.Adam Feltz - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36 (C):113-130.details
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Virtue or consequences: The folk against pure evaluational internalism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):702-717.details
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