- Intuitions as evidence : an introduction.Marc A. Moffett - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
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Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge.Steve Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.details
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Intuitions in Experimental Philosophy.Joachim Horvath - 2023 - In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 71-100.details
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Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-Fitting: A methodological argument for JTB?Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2017 - In Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Moderate scientism in philosophy.Buckwalter Wesley & John Turri - 2018 - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & Rene van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Women and ‘the philosophical personality’: evaluating whether gender differences in the Cognitive Reflection Test have significance for explaining the gender gap in Philosophy.Christina Easton - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):139-167.details
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The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.details
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Arguments over Intuitions?Tomasz Wysocki - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):477-499.details
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The Methodological Necessity of Experimental Philosophy.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2015 - Discipline Filosofiche 25 (1):23-42.details
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The experimental critique and philosophical practice.Tinghao Wang - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):89-109.details
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Compatibilism can be natural.John Turri - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:68-81.details
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Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.details
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Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):575-594.details
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Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.details
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Response to the Compatibility of Evolution and Design.Bethany N. Sollereder - 2022 - Zygon 57 (4):1083-1094.details
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Philosophical Expertise and Philosophical Methodology.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):110-129.details
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Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1263-1281.details
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Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):592-608.details
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Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141 (C):127-137.details
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How not to test for philosophical expertise.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.details
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Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.details
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Empirical research on folk moral objectivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (5).details
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Variations in ethical intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Jennifer L. Zamzow - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 368-388.details
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Philosophical Expertise.Jennifer Nado - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):631-641.details
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Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.details
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Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknowndetails
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How To Think About Philosophical Methodology.Jennifer Nado - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):447-463.details
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Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):52-64.details
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Interpreting intuition: Experimental philosophy of language.Jeffrey Maynes - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):260-278.details
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Response to Akagi, Hughes, and Springle. [REVIEW]Edouard Machery - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):608-623.details
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Twenty years of experimental philosophy research.Jincai Li & Xiaozhen Zhu - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):29-53.details
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The experience machine and the expertise defense.Guido Löhr - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):257-273.details
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Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2017 - Cognition 169 (C):139-146.details
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The brittleness of expertise and why it matters.Daniel Kilov - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3431-3455.details
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Pundits and Possibilities: Philosophers Are Not Modal Experts.Daniel Kilov & Caroline Hendy - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):824-843.details
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What is a philosophical effect? Models of data in experimental philosophy.Bryce Huebner - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3273-3292.details
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Ordering effects, updating effects, and the specter of global skepticism.Zachary Horne & Jonathan Livengood - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1189-1218.details
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Intuitivní zahradník: Epistemický status morálních intuic.Jan Horský - 2014 - Pro-Fil 2014 (S1):15-35.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359.details
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Experimental philosophy and the method of cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.details
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Judgements, Expertise, and Counterfactuals.Sören Häggqvist - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):741-754.details
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Pundits and Possibilities: Philosophers Are Not Modal Experts.Caroline Hendy & Daniel Kilov - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):824-843.details
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Skepticism about Meta-skepticism: Meditations on Experimental Philosophy.Michael Hannon - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):213-231.details
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Philosophical Expertise.Sven Ove Hansson - 2020 - Theoria 86 (2):139-144.details
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For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures.Ivar R. Hannikainen, Edouard Machery, David Rose, Stephen Stich, Christopher Y. Olivola, Paulo Sousa, Florian Cova, Emma E. Buchtel, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniûnas, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas López, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Hrag A. Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang & Jing Zhu - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - forthcoming - Synthese 197:1-18.details
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Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8289-8306.details
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Philosophers' linguistic expertise: A psycholinguistic approach to the expertise objection against experimental philosophy.Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt & Aurélie Herbelot - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-33.details
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Virtue or consequences: The folk against pure evaluational internalism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):702-717.details
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