In this paper we propose to take seriously the claim that at least some kinds of paraconsistent negations are subcontrariety forming operators. We shall argue that from an intuitive point of view, by considering paraconsistent negations as formalizing that particular kind of opposition, one needs not worry with issues about the meaning of true contradictions and the like, given that “true contradictions” are not involved in these paraconsistent logics. Our strategy will consist in showing that, on the one hand, the (...) natural translation for subcontrariety in formal languages is not a contradiction in natural language, and on the other, translating alleged cases of contradiction in natural language to paraconsistent formal systems works only provided we transform them into a subcontrariety. Transforming contradictions into subcontrariety shall provide for an intuitive interpretation for paraconsistent negation, which we also discuss here. By putting all those pieces together, we hope a clearer sense of paraconsistency can be made, one which may liberate us from the need to tame contradictions. (shrink)