- Confirmation, Coherence and the Strength of Arguments.Stephan Hartmann & Borut Trpin - 2023 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 45:1473-1479.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.details
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Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.Ian Wells - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):429-457.details
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Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.details
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Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
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Realizing Newcomb’s Problem.Peter Slezak - unknowndetails
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Clark Glymour’s responses to the contributions to the Synthese special issue “Causation, probability, and truth: the philosophy of Clark Glymour”.Clark Glymour - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1251-1285.details
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Regret and instability in causal decision theory.James M. Joyce - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):123-145.details
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Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):95-122.details
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Arntzenius on ‘Why ain’cha rich?’.Arif Ahmed & Huw Price - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):15-30.details
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Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):813-829.details
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(1 other version)Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Crupi Vincenzo, Fitelson Branden & Tentori Katya - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182-199.details
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Dependency equilibria.Wolfgang Spohn - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):775-789.details
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Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?Jonah N. Schupbach - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):13-27.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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Deliberational equilibria.Brian Skyrms - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):59-67.details
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Against causal decision theory.Huw Price - 1986 - Synthese 67 (2):195 - 212.details
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(1 other version)How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006). Springer. pp. 247--275.details
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Newcomb's problem, prisoners' dilemma, and collective action.S. L. Hurley - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):173 - 196.details
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Some counterexamples to causal decision theory.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114.details
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A foundation for causal decision theory.Brad Armendt - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):3-19.details
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Newcomb’s Problem and Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemmas.Christoph Schmidt-Petri - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1160-1173.details
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Logic and probability.Colin Howson - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):517-531.details
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Preference-based arguments for probabilism.David Christensen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.details
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No regrets, or: Edith piaf revamps decision theory.Frank Arntzenius - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):277-297.details
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Probabilistic Arguments in the Epistemological Approach to Argumentation.Christoph Lumer - 2011 - In Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, David Godden & Gordon Mitchell (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Rozenberg / Sic Sat. pp. 1141-1154.details
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A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.details
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Truth Evaluability in Radical Interpretation Theory.Eleni Manolakaki - 2000 - Dissertation, Philosophydetails
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Decision-theoretic paradoxes as voting paradoxes.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.details
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Decision theory, intelligent planning and counterfactuals.Michael John Shaffer - 2008 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):61-92.details
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Causality.Jessica M. Wilson - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge. pp. 90--100.details
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(1 other version)Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.details
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(2 other versions)How to confirm the disconfirmed. On conjunction fallacies and robust confirmation.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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Are theories of rationality empirically testable?Howard Smokler - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):297 - 306.details
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Choice and conditional expected utility.Piers Rawling - 1993 - Synthese 94 (2):303 - 328.details
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Non-bayesian foundations for statistical estimation, prediction, and the ravens example.Malcolm R. Forster - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (3):357 - 376.details
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(1 other version)Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.details
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Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Causal Decision Theory is Safe from Psychopaths.Timothy Luke Williamson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):665-685.details
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Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.details
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A Deliberative Approach to Causation.Fernandes Alison Sutton - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):686-708.details
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Bayesian Convergence and the Fair-Balance Paradox.Bengt Autzen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):253-263.details
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The 5 Questions.Wolfgang Spohn - 2005 - In Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons (eds.), Formal Philosophy. Automatic Press/VIP.details
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Standard and non-standard newcomb problems.W. J. Talbott - 1987 - Synthese 70 (3):415 - 458.details
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When is it selectively advantageous to have true beliefs? Sandwiching the better safe than sorry argument.Christopher L. Stephens - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):161-189.details
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(1 other version)Objective probability theory theory.Ellery Eells - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):387 - 442.details
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(2 other versions)How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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Absence of evidence and evidence of absence: evidential transitivity in connection with fossils, fishing, fine-tuning, and firing squads.Elliott Sober - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):63-90.details
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