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  1. Personal persistence.H. E. Baber - 2024 - Theoria 90 (3):335-351.
    According to perdurantist accounts of persistence, transtemporal aggregates of stages, ‘worms’, are ‘the referents of ordinary terms, members of ordinary domains of quantification, subjects of ordinary predications, and so on…on the stage view…it is instantaneous stages rather than worms that play this role’. I argue the stage theory should be preferred as an account of personal persistence. I consider the way in which four‐dimensionalist accounts of personal persistence are organized and the conditions which, arguably, any plausible account of personal persistence (...)
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  • Hornets, pelicans, bobcats, and identity: the problem of persistence of temporal abstract objects.Strahinja Đorđević - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1373-1393.
    This paper introduces a persistence puzzle involving two sports clubs with a somewhat intertwined history. As one might assume, the implications of the puzzle go far beyond a mere plea for a precise metaphysical analysis of certain perplexing quandaries regarding sports clubs and represents a challenge for our everyday understanding of social groups. To overcome the supposed impediment to the puzzle, as a starting point, I will accept the assumption that these entities are both social groups and abstract artifacts and (...)
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  • What We Owe Past Selves.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (5):936-950.
    Some say that we should respect the privacy of dead people. In this article, I take this idea for granted and use it to motivate the stronger claim that we sometimes ought to respect the privacy of our past selves.
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  • What We Owe Past Selves.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (5):936-950.
    Some say that we should respect the privacy of dead people. In this article, I take this idea for granted and use it to motivate the stronger claim that we sometimes ought to respect the privacy of our past selves.
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  • What Justifies Our Bias Toward the Future?Todd Karhu - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):876-889.
    A person is biased toward the future when she prefers, other things being equal, bad events to be in her past rather than her future or good ones to be in her future rather than her past. In this paper, I explain why both critics and defenders of future bias have failed to consider the best version of the view. I distinguish external time from personal time, and show that future bias is best construed in terms of the latter. This (...)
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  • Do Lefty and Righty Matter More Than Lefty Alone?Johan E. Gustafsson & Petra Kosonen - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1921-1926.
    Derek Parfit argues that fission is prudentially better for you than ordinary death. But is having more fission products with good lives prudentially better for you than having just one? In this paper, we argue that it is. We argue that, if your brain is split and the halves are transplanted into two recipients (who both have good lives), then it is prudentially better for you if both transplants succeed than if only one of them does (other things being equal). (...)
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  • Is Psychology What Matters in Survival?Johan E. Gustafsson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):504-516.
    According to the Psychological-Continuity Account of What Matters, you are justified in having special concern for the well-being of a person at a future time if and only if that person will be psychologically continuous with you as you are now. On some versions of the account, the psychological continuity is required be temporally ordered, whereas, on other versions, it is allowed to be temporally unordered. In this paper, I argue that the account is implausible if the psychological continuity is (...)
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  • Love and Fission.Ben Blumson & Jeremiah Joven Joaquin - manuscript
    According to a traditional conception, romantic love is both constant - if someone loves another, they continue to love them - and exclusive - if someone loves another, they love only the other. In this paper, we argue that the essentiality of constancy and exclusivity is incompatible with the possibilities of fission - roughly speaking, of one person becoming two - and fusion - roughly speaking, of two people becoming one. Moreover, if fission or fusion are possible, then constancy and (...)
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