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  1. On the Reality of the Base-Rate Fallacy: A Logical Reconstruction of the Debate.Martina Calderisi - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Does the most common response given by participants presented with Tversky and Kahneman’s famous taxi cab problem amount to a violation of Bayes’ theorem? In other words, do they fall victim to so-called base-rate fallacy? In the present paper, following an earlier suggestion by Crupi and Girotto, we will identify the logical arguments underlying both the original diagnosis of irrationality in this reasoning task under uncertainty and a number of objections that have been raised against such a diagnosis. This will (...)
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  • (1 other version)The skeptical import of motivated reasoning: A closer look at the evidence.Maarten van Doorn - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 1 (1):1-31.
    Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supported. Contrary to what’s often assumed, these phenomena need not indicate motivated irrationality, even though they are instances of belief-consistent information (...)
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  • Norm Conflicts and Epistemic Modals.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen & John Cantwell - 2023 - Cognitive Psychology 145 (101591):1-30.
    Statements containing epistemic modals (e.g., “by spring 2023 most European countries may have the Covid-19 pandemic under control”) are common expressions of epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, previous published findings (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo & Phillips, 2018) on the opposition between Contextualism and Relativism for epistemic modals are re-examined. It is found that these findings contain a substantial degree of individual variation. To investigate whether participants differ in their interpretation of epistemic modals, an experiment with multiple phases and sessions (...)
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  • Reasoning Studies. From Single Norms to Individual Differences.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Freiburg
    Habilitation thesis in psychology. The book consists of a collection of reasoning studies. The experimental investigations will take us from people’s reasoning about probabilities, entailments, pragmatic factors, argumentation, and causality to morality. An overarching theme of the book is norm pluralism and individual differences in rationality research.
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  • Arbitrating norms for reasoning tasks.Aliya R. Dewey - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-26.
    The psychology of reasoning uses norms to categorize responses to reasoning tasks as correct or incorrect in order to interpret the responses and compare them across reasoning tasks. This raises the arbitration problem: any number of norms can be used to evaluate the responses to any reasoning task and there doesn’t seem to be a principled way to arbitrate among them. Elqayam and Evans have argued that this problem is insoluble, so they call for the psychology of reasoning to dispense (...)
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  • Understanding implicit bias: A case for regulative dispositionalism.Annemarie Kalis & Harmen Ghijsen - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (8):1212-1233.
    What attitude does someone manifesting implicit bias really have? According to the default representationalist picture, implicit bias involves having conflicting attitudes (explicit versus implicit) with respect to the topic at hand. In opposition to this orthodoxy, dispositionalists argue that attitudes should be understood as higher-level dispositional features of the person as a whole. Following this metaphysical view, the discordance characteristic of implicit bias shows that someone’s attitude regarding the topic at hand is not-fully-manifested or ‘in-between’. However, so far few representationalists (...)
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  • Metacognitive control in single- vs. dual-process theory.Aliya R. Dewey - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (2):177-212.
    Recent work in cognitive modelling has found that most of the data that has been cited as evidence for the dual-process theory (DPT) of reasoning is best explained by non-linear, “monotonic” one-process models (Stephens et al., 2018, 2019). In this paper, I consider an important caveat of this research: it uses models that are committed to unrealistic assumptions about how effectively task conditions can isolate Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning. To avoid this caveat, I develop a coordinated theoretical, experimental, and modelling (...)
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  • Metaphysics of the Bayesian mind.Justin Tiehen - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (2):336-354.
    Recent years have seen a Bayesian revolution in cognitive science. This should be of interest to metaphysicians of science, whose naturalist project involves working out the metaphysical implications of our leading scientific accounts, and in advancing our understanding of those accounts by drawing on the metaphysical frameworks developed by philosophers. Toward these ends, in this paper I develop a metaphysics of the Bayesian mind. My central claim is that the Bayesian approach supports a novel empirical argument for normativism, the thesis (...)
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  • Reflections on reflection: the nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (4):383-415.
    I present a critical discussion of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making with particular attention to the nature and role of Type 2 processes. The original theory proposed...
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  • The mediating effect of reflective-analytic cognitive style on rational thought.Ralph E. Viator, Nancy L. Harp, Shannon B. Rinaldo & Blair B. Marquardt - 2020 - Thinking and Reasoning 26 (3):381-413.
    An underlying assumption of default-interventionist dual-process theory (DI-DPT) of reasoning is that humans tend to act as cognitive misers. Although miserly cognitive processing occurs when indiv...
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  • Logique, Raisonnement et Rationalité.Matías Osta-Vélez - 2014 - Dissertation, Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
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  • Norm Conflicts and Conditionals.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, David Kellen, Ulrike Hahn & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2019 - Psychological Review 126 (5):611-633.
    Suppose that two competing norms, N1 and N2, can be identified such that a given person’s response can be interpreted as correct according to N1 but incorrect according to N2. Which of these two norms, if any, should one use to interpret such a response? In this paper we seek to address this fundamental problem by studying individual variation in the interpretation of conditionals by establishing individual profiles of the participants based on their case judgments and reflective attitudes. To investigate (...)
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  • Cognitive Success: A Consequentialist Account of Rationality in Cognition.Gerhard Schurz & Ralph Hertwig - 2019 - Topics in Cognitive Science 11 (1):7-36.
    One of the most discussed issues in psychology—presently and in the past—is how to define and measure the extent to which human cognition is rational. The rationality of human cognition is often evaluated in terms of normative standards based on a priori intuitions. Yet this approach has been challenged by two recent developments in psychology that we review in this article: ecological rationality and descriptivism. Going beyond these contributions, we consider it a good moment for psychologists and philosophers to join (...)
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  • Cross-Cultural Differences in Informal Argumentation: Norms, Inductive Biases and Evidentiality.Hatice Karaslaan, Annette Hohenberger, Hilmi Demir, Simon Hall & Mike Oaksford - 2018 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 18 (3-4):358-389.
    Cross-cultural differences in argumentation may be explained by the use of different norms of reasoning. However, some norms derive from, presumably universal, mathematical laws. This inconsistency can be resolved, by considering that some norms of argumentation, like Bayes theorem, are mathematical functions. Systematic variation in the inputs may produce culture-dependent inductive biases although the function remains invariant. This hypothesis was tested by fitting a Bayesian model to data on informal argumentation from Turkish and English cultures, which linguistically mark evidence quality (...)
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  • Troubles with Bayesianism: An introduction to the psychological immune system.Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (2):141-157.
    A Bayesian mind is, at its core, a rational mind. Bayesianism is thus well-suited to predict and explain mental processes that best exemplify our ability to be rational. However, evidence from belief acquisition and change appears to show that we do not acquire and update information in a Bayesian way. Instead, the principles of belief acquisition and updating seem grounded in maintaining a psychological immune system rather than in approximating a Bayesian processor.
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  • Conditionals, Counterfactuals, and Rational Reasoning: An Experimental Study on Basic Principles.Leena Tulkki & Niki Pfeifer - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):119-165.
    We present a unified approach for investigating rational reasoning about basic argument forms involving indicative conditionals, counterfactuals, and basic quantified statements within coherence-based probability logic. After introducing the rationality framework, we present an interactive view on the relation between normative and empirical work. Then, we report a new experiment which shows that people interpret indicative conditionals and counterfactuals by coherent conditional probability assertions and negate conditionals by negating their consequents. The data support the conditional probability interpretation of conditionals and the (...)
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  • The cognitive reflection test revisited: exploring the ways individuals solve the test.B. Szaszi, A. Szollosi, B. Palfi & B. Aczel - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (3):207-234.
    Individuals’ propensity not to override the first answer that comes to mind is thought to be a crucial cause behind many failures in reasoning. In the present study, we aimed to explore the strategies used and the abilities employed when individuals solve the cognitive reflection test, the most widely used measure of this tendency. Alongside individual differences measures, protocol analysis was employed to unfold the steps of the reasoning process in solving the CRT. This exploration revealed that there are several (...)
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  • Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative review.Steve Guglielmo - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Against a normative view of folk psychology.Meredith R. Wilkinson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • From is to ought, and back: how normative concerns foster progress in reasoning research.Vincenzo Crupi & Vittorio Girotto - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • TTB vs. Franklin's Rule in Environments of Different Redundancy.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:15-16.
    This addendum presents results that confound some commonly made claims about the sorts of environments in which the performance of TTB exceeds that of Franklin's rule, and vice versa.
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  • Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From.Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.
    Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions, in spite of their central role in analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing, cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a skilled, practiced, component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical context of (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Outlandish, the Realistic, and the Real: Contextual Manipulation and Agent Role Effects in Trolley Problems.Natalie Gold, Briony Pulford & Andrew Colman - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology: Cognitive Science 5.
    Hypothetical trolley problems are widely used to elicit moral intuitions, which are employed in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments. The scenarios used are outlandish, and some philosophers and psychologists have questioned whether the judgments made in such unrealistic and unfamiliar scenarios are a reliable basis for theory-building. We present two experiments that investigate whether differences in moral judgment due to the role of the agent, previously found in a standard trolley scenario, persist when (...)
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  • Can quantum probability provide a new direction for cognitive modeling?Emmanuel M. Pothos & Jerome R. Busemeyer - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):255-274.
    Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the (...)
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  • New paradigm psychology of reasoning: An introduction to the special issue edited by Elqayam, Bonnefon, and Over.Shira Elqayam & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):249-265.
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  • Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.
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  • Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings.Edward J. N. Stupple, Linden J. Ball & Daniel Ellis - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (1):54 - 77.
    (2013). Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings. Thinking & Reasoning: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 54-77. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.735622.
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  • Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning.Shira Elqayam & David Over - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):27-40.
    In recent years, the psychology of reasoning has been undergoing a paradigm shift, with general Bayesian, probabilistic approaches replacing the older, much more restricted binary logic paradigm. At the same time, dual processing theories have been gaining influence. We argue that these developments should be integrated and moreover that such integration is already underway. The new reasoning paradigm should be grounded in dual processing for its algorithmic level of analysis just as it uses Bayesian theory for its computational level of (...)
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  • How (not) to draw philosophical implications from the cognitive nature of concepts: the case of intentionality.Kazuki Iijima & Koji Ota - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:799.
    Philosophers have often appealed to intuitive judgments in various thought experiments to support or reject particular theses. Experimental philosophy is an emerging discipline that examines the cognitive nature of such intuitive judgments. In this paper, we assess the methodological and epistemological status of experimental philosophy. We focus on the Knobe effect, in which our intuitive judgment of the intentionality of an action seems to depend on the perceived moral status of that action. The debate on the philosophical implications of the (...)
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  • When nomenclature matters: Is the “new paradigm” really a new paradigm for the psychology of reasoning?Markus Knauff & Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (3):341-370.
    For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical “old” paradigm, before the new developments emerged, and that the alleged new (...)
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  • Rethinking Rationality.Emmanuel M. Pothos & Timothy J. Pleskac - 2022 - Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (3):451-466.
    Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 451-466, July 2022.
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  • The normative decision theory in economics: a philosophy of science perspective. The case of the expected utility theory.Magdalena Małecka - 2019 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (1):36-50.
    This article analyses how normative decision theory is understood by economists. The paradigmatic example of normative decision theory, discussed in the article, is the expected utility theory. It...
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  • A Dialogical Account of Deductive Reasoning as a Case Study for how Culture Shapes Cognition.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2013 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 13 (5):459-482.
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  • Alleviating the concerns with the SDT approach to reasoning: reply to Singmann and Kellen.Dries Trippas, Michael F. Verde & Simon J. Handley - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Dual processes, probabilities, and cognitive architecture.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):15-26.
    It has been argued that dual process theories are not consistent with Oaksford and Chater’s probabilistic approach to human reasoning (Oaksford and Chater in Psychol Rev 101:608–631, 1994 , 2007 ; Oaksford et al. 2000 ), which has been characterised as a “single-level probabilistic treatment[s]” (Evans 2007 ). In this paper, it is argued that this characterisation conflates levels of computational explanation. The probabilistic approach is a computational level theory which is consistent with theories of general cognitive architecture that invoke (...)
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  • The stability of syllogistic reasoning performance over time.Hannah Dames, Karl Christoph Klauer & Marco Ragni - 2022 - Thinking and Reasoning 28 (4):529-568.
    How individuals reason deductively has concerned researchers for many years. Yet, it is still unclear whether, and if so how, participants’ reasoning performance changes over time. In two test sessions one week apart, we examined how the syllogistic reasoning performance of 100 participants changed within and between sessions. Participants’ reasoning performance increased during the first session. A week later, they started off at the same level of reasoning performance but did not further improve. The reported performance gains were only found (...)
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  • Motivational Reasons for Biased Decisions: The Sunk-Cost Effect’s Instrumental Rationality.Markus Domeier, Pierre Sachse & Bernd Schäfer - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:320037.
    The present study describes the mechanism of need regulation, which accompanies the so-called “biased” decisions. We hypothesized an unconscious urge for psychological need satisfaction as the trigger for cognitive biases. In an experimental study (N = 106), participants had the opportunity to win money in a functionality test. In the test, they could either use the solution they had developed (sunk cost) or an alternative solution that offered a higher probability of winning. The selection of the sunk-cost option was the (...)
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  • Towards a Practice-based Philosophy of Logic: Formal Languages as a Case Study.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2012 - Philosophia Scientiae 16 (1):71-102.
    Au cours des dernières décennies, les travaux portant sur les pratiques humaines réelles ont pris de l'importance dans différents domaines de la philosophie, sans pour autant atteindre une position dominante. À ce jour, ce type de tournant pratique n'a cependant pas encore pénétré la philosophie de la logique. En première partie, j'esquisse ce que serait (ou pourrait être) une philosophie de la logique centrée sur l'étude des pratiques, en insistant en particulier sur sa pertinence et sur la manière de la (...)
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  • Two minds rationality.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):129-146.
    I argue that views of human rationality are strongly affected by the adoption of a two minds theory in which humans have an old mind which evolved early and shares many features of animal cognition, as well as new mind which evolved later and is distinctively developed in humans. Both minds have a form of instrumental rationality—striving for the attainment of goals—but by very different mechanisms. The old mind relies on a combination of evolution and experiential learning, and is therefore (...)
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  • Critique of pure Bayesian cognitive science: A view from the philosophy of science.Vincenzo Crupi & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (3):1-17.
    Bayesian approaches to human cognition have been extensively advocated in the last decades, but sharp objections have been raised too within cognitive science. In this paper, we outline a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the prevalent strand of Bayesian cognitive science (here labelled pure Bayesian cognitive science), relying on selected illustrations from the psychology of reasoning and tools from the philosophy of science. Bayesians’ reliance on so-called method of rational analysis is a key point of our discussion. We (...)
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  • Normativity in social accounts of reasoning: a Rylean approach.Annemarie Kalis - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-18.
    In recent years, the philosophy and psychology of reasoning have made a ‘social turn’: in both disciplines it is now common to reject the traditional picture of reasoning as a solitary intellectual exercise in favour of the idea that reasoning is a social activity driven by social aims. According to the most prominent social account, Mercier and Sperber’s interactionist theory, this implies that reasoning is not a normative activity. As they argue, in producing reasons we are not trying to ‘get (...)
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  • Modulating the Activity of vmPFC Regulates Informational Social Conformity: A tDCS Study.Yuzhen Li, Jinjin Wang, Hang Ye & Jun Luo - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • A Neural Network Framework for Cognitive Bias.Johan E. Korteling, Anne-Marie Brouwer & Alexander Toet - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:358644.
    Human decision making shows systematic simplifications and deviations from the tenets of rationality (‘heuristics’) that may lead to suboptimal decisional outcomes (‘cognitive biases’). There are currently three prevailing theoretical perspectives on the origin of heuristics and cognitive biases: a cognitive-psychological, an ecological and an evolutionary perspective. However, these perspectives are mainly descriptive and none of them provides an overall explanatory framework for the underlying mechanisms of cognitive biases. To enhance our understanding of cognitive heuristics and biases we propose a neural (...)
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  • The uses and abuses of the coherence – correspondence distinction.Andrea Polonioli - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?Ulrike Hahn - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • How to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences.Katinka Quintelier - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • (1 other version)The skeptical import of motivated reasoning: a closer look at the evidence.Maarten van Doorn - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (4):548-578.
    Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supported. Contrary to what’s often assumed, these phenomena need not indicate motivated irrationality, even though they are instances of belief-consistent information (...)
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  • Motivation, counterfactual predictions and constraints: normativity of predictive mechanisms.Michał Piekarski - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-31.
    The aim of this paper is to present the ontic approach to the normativity of cognitive functions and mechanisms, which is directly related to the understanding of biological normativity in terms of normative mechanisms. This approach assumes the hypothesis that cognitive processes contain a certain normative component independent of external attributions and researchers’ beliefs. This component consists of specific cognitive mechanisms, which I call normative. I argue that a mechanism is normative when it constitutes given actions or behaviors of a (...)
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  • Knowledge, behaviour, and policy: questioning the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking.Magdalena Małecka - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5311-5338.
    The aim of this article is to question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers’ goals. This paper argues (...)
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  • Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):453-470.
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