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  1. Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox.Michael Campbell - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):151-173.
    In a series of articles Christopher Cowie has provided what he calls a ‘Master Argument’ against the Companions in Guilt defence of moral objectivity. In what follows I defend the CG strategy against Cowie. I show, firstly, that epistemic judgements are relevantly similar to moral judgements, and secondly, that it is not possible coherently to deny the existence of irreducible and categorically normative epistemic reasons. My argument for the second of these claims exploits an analogy between the thesis that epistemic (...)
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  • A New Reliability Defeater for Evolutionary Naturalism.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):538-564.
    The author identifies the structure of Sharon Street's skeptical challenge to non-naturalist, normative epistemic realism as an argument that NNER is liable to reliability defeat and then argues that Street's argument fails, because it itself is subject to reliability defeat. As the author reconstructs Street's argument, it is an argument that the normative epistemic judgments of the realist could only be probabilistically sensitive to normative epistemic truths by sheer chance. The author then recaps Street's own naturalist translation of normative epistemic (...)
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