Using the phenomenological perspective provided by the concept of embodiment, this article shows that in Cuenca, Ecuador, knowledge about the body is fluid and during illness women can seek reassurance and explanations from multiple knowledge systems, including locally understood subordinate ones. Employing the concept of `character', as described by Ricoeur, as an explanation for why some women are more vulnerable to illness than others, the author argues that gender ideologies and notions of self-identity intersect in Ecuadorian conceptions of weakness and (...) illness. Women's narrative descriptions of themselves and their experiences with envy illness (envidia) indicate that the experience of illness is an extremely powerful one and that women's interpretations of it cross typical social class divisions. Embodied illness creates a place and moment for revealing that which is often hidden. (shrink)

The concept of multiplicity describes the fluid nature of identity and experience in the wake of postmodernity. Yet the question of how we negotiate and maintain our identities, despite our multiplicities, requires phenomenological clarification. I suggest that recognition of multiplicity needs to be combined with an acknowledgement of continuity, however minimal. I maintain that this continuity is evidenced in our pre-reflective self-awareness, embodiment and habitual activities. Our authorship of life narratives and our ability to deliberate and shape our identities takes (...) place against the background of our lived, prereflective experience. I develop the notion of prereflective self-awareness using the work of Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. I suggest that prereflective self-awareness, embodiment and habitual activity are themselves shaped by our participation in sociocultural frameworks that give meaning to our lives. (shrink)

This article analyses the micro dynamics of agency represented in the life story of a Mexican right-wing female politician — particularly how agency manifests itself in the way she repeats the rhetorical structures of her party’s discourse. Although claiming to be a modern woman, a high ranking political participant, she repeatedly refers to the traditional ideal of motherhood that also figures prominently in the right-wing party to which she belongs. Still, at some point, she goes beyond merely repeating the dominant (...) discourse in constructing her own political subjectivity. In tracking her life story, the micro dynamics of her agency are explored through text and discourse analysis in which intertextuality and intersectionality of gender are instrumental. An attempt is made to overcome framing agency in the dichotomy between compliance and resistance. In doing so, the article also engages in recent debate on agency in European Journal of Women’s Studies. (shrink)

Nichols and Bruno claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations, the folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity, but instead rely on different concepts of ‘person’, ‘identity’, and ‘individual’. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no longer categorized as persons. Second, we provide new empirical evidence suggesting (...) that the folk do not consider psychological continuity to be necessary for an individual to be categorized as a person or for ascribing identity over time and through transformations. In this, we assume, along with Nichols and Bruno, that folk judgments about identity can be read off the use of proper names. Furthermore, we raise some doubts about the ability of current experimental designs to adequately distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity jud.. (shrink)