Posner & Raichle's book presents methods and data that increase support for mind-brain unity and provide a method for studying and verifying brain dysfunction objectively. Their incorporation into the assessment technology of neuropsychology should accordingly constitute a major advance. In addition, these techniques may help clarify longstanding controversies in cognitive psychology such as whether perception is multimodal or amodal.

Encoding articulate speech is widely accepted as the principal (or sole) role of the frontal operculum. Clinical observations of speech apraxia have been confirmed by brain-imaging studies of speech production. We present evidence that the frontal operculum also programs limb movements. We argue that this area is a ventral counterpart of the dorsal premotor area. The two are functionally distinguished by specialization for somatic and visual space, respectively.

Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one‐to‐one structure‐function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience‐based arguments against multiple realization go wrong. *Received October 2009; revised December 2009. †To contact the author, (...) please write to: Department of Philosophy, 260 English‐Philosophy Building, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242; e‐mail: carrie‐[email protected]. (shrink)

A methodological problem may distort the implications derived from the metabolism scans of the brain, but Posner & Raichle may have found neural networks which underlie the analytical and synthetical hemispheric data processing mechanism. This methodological problem is that a large regional consumption of energy, detected by the PET technique, is not necessarily related to more data processing. It may be related to the inefficiency of the neural system at this region.

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. (...) We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed. (shrink)

Images of mindmarks a new era in human cognitive neuroscience. Despite the difficult conceptual problems associated with using group-averaged data and paired subtractions, human PET images converge well with existing data from other areas of cognitive neuroscience while opening up new theoretical and experimental possibilities. However, greater attention to individual differences might prove necessary in the study of culturally driven adaptations such as literacy.

Three issues are addressed in this commentary. (1) Wilkins & Wakefield are commended for placing the complex behavior they discuss within an evolutionary matrix. (2) They err on a number of points in regard to their treatment of this complex behavior. These involve (a) their emphasis on the evolution of conceptual structure rather than language, (b) their equation of meaning with reference, (c) their minimalist view of learning theory, and (d) their separation of the evolution of speech from that of (...) language. (3) They adopt a framework for neural preconditions that has been clearly discredited on both behavioral and neuroanatomical grounds. Finally, recent research involving modern neuroimaging techniques casts further doubt on the authors' postulated functions for the neural areas they discuss. (shrink)

Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of (...) establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

Complete URL to this document: http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/93-Principles.html.

This article provides a critical examination of a controversial issue that has theoretical and practical importance to a broad range of academic disciplines: Are religious experiences localized within the brain? Research into the neuroscience of religious experiences is reviewed and conceptual and methodological challenges accompanying the neurotheology project of localizing religious experiences within the brain are discussed. An alternative theory to current reductive and mechanistic explanations of observed mind–brain correlations is proposed — a mediation theory of cerebral action — that (...) has the potential for addressing what Chalmers called the “hard problem” of consciousness. (shrink)

Scientific concepts are defined by metaphors. These metaphors determine what atten- tion is and what count as adequate explanations of the phenomenon. The authors analyze these metaphors within 3 types of attention theories: (a) --cause-- theories, in which attention is presumed to modulate information processing (e.g., attention as a spotlight; attention as a limited resource); (b) --effect-- theories, in which attention is considered to be a by-product of information processing (e.g., the competition meta- phor); and (c) hybrid theories that combine (...) cause and effect aspects (e.g., biased- competition models). The present analysis reveals the crucial role of metaphors in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the efforts of scientists to find a resolution to the classic problem of cause versus effect interpretations. (shrink)

The ability to image the human brain has provided a new perspective for neuropsychologists in their efforts to understand, diagnose, and treat insults to the human brain that might occur as the result of stroke, tumor, traumatic injury, degenerative disease, or errors in development. These new ®ndings are the major theme of this special issue. In our article, we consider brain networks that carry out the functions of attention. We outline several such networks that have been studied in normal and (...) pathological states. These include networks for orienting to sensory stimuli, for maintaining the alert state, and for orchestrating volitional control. (shrink)