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Unsafe reasoning: a survey

Dois Pontos 6 (2):185-20 (2009)

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  1. Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-Reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents.Emiliano Boccardi - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):1-31.
    ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege’s puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege’s data apply to natural languages, are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates for (...)
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  • A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  • El debate entre externistas e internistas acerca de la racionalidad inferencial.Mauel Perez Otero - 2010 - Análisis Filosófico 30 (2):162-186.
    Se han presentado diversos argumentos contra el externismo sobre el contenido. Abordo aquí uno de esos argumentos, que -como algunos otros- procede de Boghossian. Se relaciona con nuestra racionalidad inferencial. Según su razonamiento, la aprioridad de nuestras habilidades lógicas es inconsistente con ciertas asunciones externistas. Esa conclusión no está justificada. El problema que señala Boghossian constituye un reto importante para cualquier teoría del contenido, no sólo para el externismo. Además, cuando examinamos qué pueden proponer los internistas para resolver el problema, (...)
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  • Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows.Paulo Faria - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (3):5-14.
    In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the 'a priority of our logical abilities'. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic (...)
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  • Dangerous Liaisons.Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira - 2019 - Ratio 32 (3):192-204.
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  • Boghossian’s Inference Argument Against Content Externalism Reversed.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):159-181.
    I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to our inferential rationality (to use his term). According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. (...)
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  • Reply to Otero's “Boghossian's Inference Argument Against Content Externalism Reversed”.Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):182-184.
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