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  1. Understanding Interests and Causal Explanation.Petri Ylikoski - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    This work consists of two parts. Part I will be a contribution to a philo- sophical discussion of the nature of causal explanation. It will present my contrastive counterfactual theory of causal explanation and show how it can be used to deal with a number of problems facing theories of causal explanation. Part II is a contribution to a discussion of the na- ture of interest explanation in social studies of science. The aim is to help to resolve some controversies (...)
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  • Scientific rationality and human reasoning.Miriam Solomon - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (3):439-455.
    The work of Tversky, Kahneman and others suggests that people often make use of cognitive heuristics such as availability, salience and representativeness in their reasoning and decision making. Through use of a historical example--the recent plate tectonics revolution in geology--I argue that such heuristics play a crucial role in scientific decision making also. I suggest how these heuristics are to be considered, along with noncognitive factors (such as motivation and social structures) when drawing historical and epistemological conclusions. The normative perspective (...)
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  • A limited defense of the pessimistic induction.Jesse Hobbs - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):171-191.
    The inductive argument from the falsity of most past scientific theories (more than 100 years old) to the falsity of most present ones is defensible, I argue, if it is modified to account for the degrees of theoreticity or observationality in such theories, and the extent to which they are hedged. The case of descriptive astronomy is examined to show that most of the true theories of the 1890s were high in observationality and/or significantly hedged. The false theories of that (...)
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  • What “Evidence” in Evidence-Based Medicine?Carlo Martini - 2021 - Topoi 40 (2):299-305.
    The concept of evidence has gone unanalysed in much of the current debate between proponents and critics of evidence-based medicine. In this paper I will suggest that part of the controversy rests on an understanding of the word “evidence” that is too broad, and therefore contains the contradictions that allow both camps to defend their position and charge their adversaries. I will argue that reconciling the different meanings of the word ‘evidence’ in “evidence-based medicine” should help put EBM in its (...)
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  • Using Meta‐Scientific Studies to Clarify or Resolve Questions in the Philosophy and History of Science.David Faust & Paul E. Meehl - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S185-S196.
    More powerful methods for studying and integrating the historical track record of scientific episodes and scientific judgment, or what Faust and Meehl describe as a program of meta‐science and meta‐scientific studies, can supplement and extend more commonly used case study methods. We describe the basic premises of meta‐science, overview methodological considerations, and provide examples of meta‐scientific studies. Meta‐science can help to clarify or resolve long‐standing questions in the history and philosophy of science and provide practical help to the working scientist.
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  • 'Explicating ways of consensus-making: Distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus.Laszlo Kosolosky & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In Martini Carlo (ed.), Experts and Consensus in Social Science. Springer. pp. 71-92.
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  • Use and Then Prove, or Prove and Then Use? Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Mental Health Professionals' Courtroom Involvement.David Faust - 1993 - Ethics and Behavior 3 (3-4):359-380.
    Psychologists' courtroom involvement and testimony should not be dictated solely by what the judge or court allows but also require the application of personal or professional standards. This article explores various standards that might be used to determine whether psychological evidence is ready for courtroom application, whether or which evaluative procedures should be performed prior to courtroom use, and the potential tensions between personal validation or impression and formal scientific evidence. Although determining just how tough our professional standards ought to (...)
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  • Experts in science: a view from the trenches.Carlo Martini - 2014 - Synthese 191 (1):3-15.
    In this paper I analyze four so-called “principles of expertise”; that is, good epistemic practices that are normatively motivated by the epistemological literature on expert judgment. I highlight some of the problems that the four principles of expertise run into, when we try to implement them in concrete contexts of application (e.g. in science committees). I suggest some possible alternatives and adjustments to the principles, arguing in general that the epistemology of expertise should be informed both by case studies and (...)
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  • Robustness and integrative survival in significance testing: The world's contribution to rationality.J. D. Trout - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):1-15.
    Significance testing is the primary method for establishing causal relationships in psychology. Meehl [1978, 1990a, 1990b] and Faust [1984] argue that significance tests and their interpretation are subject to actuarial and psychological biases, making continued adherence to these practices irrational, and even partially responsible for the slow progress of the ‘soft’ areas of psychology. I contend that familiar standards of testing and literature review, along with recently developed meta-analytic techniques, are able to correct the proposed actuarial and psychological biases. In (...)
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  • (1 other version)Herbert Simon’s Computational Models of Scientific Discovery.Stephen Downes - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (1):97-108.
    Herbert Simon’s work on scientific discovery deserves serious attention by philosophers of science for several reasons. First, Simon was an early advocate of rational scientific discovery, contra Popper and logical empiricist philosophers of science (Simon 1966). This proposal spurred on investigation of scientific discovery in philosophy of science, as philosophers used and developed Simon’s notions of “problem solving” and “heuristics” in attempts to provide rational accounts of scientific discovery (See Nickles 1980a, Wimsatt 1980). Second, Simon promoted and developed many of (...)
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  • Is history and philosophy of science withering on the Vine?Steve Fuller - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (2):149-174.
    Nearly thirty years after the first stirrings of the Kuhnian revolution, history and philosophy of science continues to galvanize methodological discussions in all corners of the academy except its own. Evidence for this domestic stagnation appears in Warren Schmaus's thoughtful review of Social Epistemology in which Schmaus takes for granted that history of science is the ultimate court of appeal for disputes between philosophers and sociologists. As against this, this essay argues that such disputes may be better treated by experimental (...)
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  • The legacy of methodological dualism.Kent Johnson - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):366–401.
    Methodological dualism in linguistics occurs when its theories are subjected to standards that are inappropriate for them qua scientific theories. Despite much opposition, methodological dualism abounds in contemporary thinking. In this paper, I treat linguistics as a scientific activity and explore some instances of dualism. By extracting some ubiquitous aspects of scientific methodology from its typically quantitative expression, I show that two recent instances of methodologically dualistic critiques of linguistics are ill-founded. I then show that there are nonetheless some divergences (...)
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  • Cliometric metatheory III: Peircean consensus, verisimilitude, and asymptotic method.Paul E. Meehl - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):615-643.
    Statistical procedures can be applied to episodes in the history of science in order to weight attributes to predict short-term survival of theories; an asymptotic method is used to show that short-term survival is a valid proxy for ultimate survival; and a theoretical argument is made that ultimate survival is a valid proxy for objective truth. While realists will appreciate this last step, instrumentalists do not need it to benefit from the actuarial procedures of cliometric metatheory. Introduction A plausible proxy (...)
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  • The Sphere of Critical Thinking in a Post-Epistemic World.Steve Fuller - 1994 - Informal Logic 16 (1).
    Just as political theorists have long argued that democracy is viable only in communities of certain sizes and shapes, perhaps epistemologists should also entertain the idea that knowledge is possible only within certain social parameters-ones which today's world may have exceeded. This is what I mean by the "postepistemic" society. I understand an "epistemic society" in Popperian terms as an environment that fosters the spirit of conjectures and refutations. After castigating analytic philosophers for their failure to see this point, I (...)
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  • New philosophies of science in north America — twenty years later.Joseph Rouse - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):71-122.
    This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and (...)
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  • To appreciate variation between scientists: A perspective for seeing science's vitality.E. David Wong - 2002 - Science Education 86 (3):386-400.
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  • Authority.Charles Arthur Willard - 1990 - Informal Logic 12 (1).
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  • The role of experts in the methodology of economics.Carlo Martini - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (1):77-91.
    Is subjective expert judgment a source of evidence in economics? In this paper, I will argue that it is, on a par with other sources like modeling, statistics, experimental, etc. I will also argue that it is not derivative, that is, reducible to the previous ones. But what is exactly the role of experts in economics? The contribution to the current methodological debate that I propose not only takes the role of expertise in economics as indispensable, but also suggests a (...)
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  • Hypothesis testing and theory evaluation at the boundaries: Surprising insights from Bayes's theorem.David Trafimow - 2003 - Psychological Review 110 (3):526-535.
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