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Introductory Ethics

Prentice-Hall (1978)

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  1. Harm and the concept of medical disorder.Neil Feit - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (5):367-385.
    According to Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder, the inability of some internal part or mechanism to perform its natural function is necessary, but not sufficient, for disorder. HDA also requires that the part dysfunction be harmful to the individual. I consider several problems for HDA’s harm criterion in this article. Other accounts on which harm is necessary for disorder will suffer from all or almost all of these problems. Comparative accounts of harm imply that one is harmed (...)
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  • False Negatives of the Categorical Imperative.Richard McCarty - 2015 - Mind 124 (493):177-200.
    The categorical imperative can be construed as a universalization test for moral permissibility. False negatives of the categorical imperative would be maxims failing this test, despite the permissibility of their actions; maxims like: ‘I’ll withdraw all my savings on April 15th’. Examples of purported false negatives familiar from the literature can be grouped into three general categories, and dispatched by applying category-specific methods for proper formulation of their maxims, or for proper testing. Methods for reformulating failing maxims, such as the (...)
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  • Cultural Relativism and Tolerance.John J. Tilley - 1994 - Lyceum 6 (1):1-11.
    This was a class handout that I turned into a publication. As its title indicates, it's about the relation (or non-relation) of (ethical) cultural relativism to tolerance. Core elements of the paper were later absorbed into sections 5K, 6M, and 7K of my paper "Cultural Relativism" (2000), which is listed (and downloadable) on my PhilPapers page.
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  • A New Kantian Response to Maxim-Fiddling.Andrew Sneddon - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (1):67-88.
    There has long been a suspicion that Kant's test for the universalizability of maxims can be easily subverted: instead of risking failing the test, design your maxim for any action whatsoever in a manner guaranteed to pass. This is the problem of maxim-fiddling. The present discussion of this problem has two theses: 1] That extant approaches to maxim-fiddling are not satisfactory;2] That a satisfactory response to maxim-fiddling can be articulated using Kantian resources, especially the first two formulations of the categorical (...)
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  • Taking Egoism Seriously.Keith Burgess-Jackson - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):529-542.
    Though utilitarianism is far from being universally accepted in the philosophical community, it is taken seriously and treated respectfully. Its critics do not dismiss it out of hand; they do not misrepresent it; they do not belittle or disparage its proponents. They allow the theory to be articulated, developed, and defended from criticism, even if they go on to reject the modified versions. Ethical egoism, a longstanding rival of utilitarianism, is treated very differently. It is said to be “refuted” by (...)
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  • Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality.Sharon Ryan - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):99-112.
    After surveying the strengths and weaknesses of several well-known approaches to wisdom, I argue for a new theory of wisdom that focuses on being epistemically, practically, and morally rational. My theory of wisdom, The Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom, claims that a wise person is a person who is rational and who is deeply committed to increasing his or her level of rationality. This theory is a departure from theories of wisdom that demand practical and/or theoretical knowledge. The Deep Rationality (...)
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  • Moore’s Open Question Maneuvering: A Qualified Defense.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):91-117.
    §13 of Principia Ethica contains G. E. Moore’s most famous open question arguments. Several of Moore’s contemporaries defended various forms of metaethical nonnaturalism—a doctrine Moore himself endorsed—by appeal to OQAs. Some contemporary cognitivists embrace the force of Moore’s OQAs against metaethical naturalism. And those who posit noncognitivist meaning components of ethical terms have traditionally used OQAs to fuel their own emotivist, prescriptivist, and expressivist metaethical programs. Despite this influence, Moore’s OQAs have been ridiculed in recent decades. Their deployment has been (...)
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  • Evolution, explanation, and the fact/value distinction.Stephen W. Ball - 1988 - Biology and Philosophy 3 (3):317-348.
    Though modern non-cognitivists in ethics characteristically believe that values are irreducible to facts, they nevertheless believe that values are determined by facts, viz., those specified in functionalist, explanatory theories of the evolutionary origin of morality. The present paper probes the consistency of this position. The conventionalist theories of Hume and Harman are examined, and are seen not to establish a tight determinative reduction of values to facts. This result is illustrated by reference to recent theories of the sociobiological mechanisms involved (...)
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  • (1 other version)Utilitarian killing, replacement, and rights.Evelyn Pluhar - 1990 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 3 (2):147-171.
    The ethical theory underlying much of our treatment of animals in agriculture and research is the moral agency view. It is assumed that only moral agents, or persons, are worthy of maximal moral significance, and that farm and laboratory animals are not moral agents. However, this view also excludes human non-persons from the moral community. Utilitarianism, which bids us maximize the amount of good in the world, is an alternative ethical theory. Although it has many merits, including impartiality and the (...)
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  • Making room for going beyond the call.Paul McNamara - 1996 - Mind 105 (419):415-450.
    In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical theory, one on 'superogation', one on 'common-sense morality'. I bring these threads together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do. A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing more than (...)
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  • Does Psychological Egoism Entail Ethical Egoism?John J. Tilley - 2022 - Review of Metaphysics 76 (1):115-133.
    [If you find this article interesting, let me mention another of my articles, “On Deducing Ethical Egoism from Psychological Egoism” (Theoria, 2023), which in many ways is a more thorough treatment of the topic. But it’s not an expanded version of this one. For instance, each article addresses arguments not addressed in the other.] Philosophers generally reject the view that psychological egoism (suitably supplemented with further premises) entails ethical egoism. Their rejections are generally unsatisfying. Some are too brief to win (...)
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  • The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses.Bruce Russell - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):105-131.
    I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical (...)
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  • Evaluatively incomplete states of affairs.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (2):211 - 224.
    The main point of this paper has been to show that the concept of evaluative incompleteness deserves consideration. In addition, I have suggested that it is plausible to accept that certain states of affairs in fact are evaluatively incomplete. But I have not sought to prove that this is so; indeed, I do not know how such proof might be given. Just which states of affairs, if any, are evaluatively incomplete is an extremely vexed question, and it is not one (...)
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  • A paradox concerning Frankfurt examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):87-103.
    The set with the following members is inconsistent: F-Lesson: A person can be blameworthy for performing an action even though she cannot refrain from performing it. Equivalence: ‘Ought not’ is equivalent to ‘impermissible.’ OIC: ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and ‘ought not’ implies ‘can refrain from.’ BRI: Necessarily, one is morally blameworthy for doing something only if it is overall morally impermissible for one to do it. Since Equivalence seems unassailable, one can escape the inconsistency by renouncing any one of the other (...)
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  • The Open Question Argument: What it Isn’t; and What it Is1.Fred Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):22–43.
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  • Brandt's new defense of rule utilitarianism.Judith Wagner Decew - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (1):101 - 116.
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  • Objective consequentialism, right actions, and good people.Eric Moore - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):83 - 94.
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  • (1 other version)Utilitarian killing, replacement, and rights.Evelyn Pluhar - 1990 - Journal of Agricultural Ethics 3 (2):147-171.
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  • Well -being and actual desires.Mark E. Lukas - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    What makes a life good for the person who lives it? According to one answer, enjoyment. Hedonists tell us that one's life goes well to the extent that he enjoys himself and avoids pain. Another answer is that we do well in life to the extent to which we get what we desire. Some versions of this last answer count only "rational" of "informed" desires as relevant to well-being. I defend the view that a person's quality of life is determined (...)
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  • Sound intuitions on Moral Twin Earth.Michael Rubin - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307-327.
    A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of papers that make use of their “ Moral Twin Earth ” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic intuitions. If they are right, (...)
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  • The Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Obligation.Neil Schaefer - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    From an indeterminist's perspective, I support and defined the following argument for deontic incompatibilism: If determinism is true, then no one ever can do otherwise than he does. If no one ever can do otherwise than he does, then nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory. Therefore, if determinism is true, then nothing anyone does is ever right, wrong, or obligatory. ;They sense of 'can' I use in this argument is what I call "the power-'can' of ordinary language." (...)
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  • (1 other version)Basic intrinsic value.Fred Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (3):319-346.
    Hedonism: the view that (i) pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good, and (ii) pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad; furthermore, the view that (iii) a complex thing such as a life, a possible world, or a total consequence of an action is intrinsically good iff it contains more pleasure than pain.
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  • Basic moral values: A shared core.Frances V. Harbour - 1995 - Ethics and International Affairs 9:155-170.
    Without some form of objectivity, Harbour argues, there is no firm grounding other than taste for criticizing whatever constitutes another culture's values, or even for reforming one's own—and there is no firm grounding for moral objections to someone such as Hitler or Idi Amin.
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  • Moderate Conventionalism and Cultural Appropriation.Juha Räikkä & Mikko Puumala - 2019 - Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 1:81-88.
    Cultural appropriation, also called cultural borrowing, has been the topic of much discussion in recent years. Roughly speaking, cultural appropriation happens when someone outside of a cultural or ethnic group takes or uses some object that is characteristic or in some way important to the group without the group’s permission. Individuals who find cultural appropriation unproblematic have often argued that if we express moral criticism of the use of traditional Sami outfits by non-Sami, then we are logically committed to criticize (...)
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  • (1 other version)An analysis of U.s. Disinvestment from south Africa: Unity, rights, and justice. [REVIEW]David Malone & Susanna Goodin - 1997 - Journal of Business Ethics 16 (16):1687-1703.
    This study examines the issues associated with the disinvestment of U.S. interests from South Africa that took place in the mid-80s from the perspective of three dominant moral theories: utility, rights, and justice. By examining the issues in light of these three theories, the paper attempts to establish a decision framework from which managers and investors can evaluate similar decisions they are facing around the world today. Similarly, the reading may prove useful to educators who incorporate discussions of ethical decision (...)
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  • Ross and the particularism/generalism divide.Kristian Olsen - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):56-75.
    W. D. Ross is commonly considered to be a generalist about prima facie duty but a particularist about absolute duty. That is, many philosophers hold that Ross accepts that there are true moral principles involving prima facie duty but denies that there are any true moral principles involving absolute duty. I agree with the former claim: Ross surely accepts prima facie moral principles. However, in this paper, I challenge the latter claim. Ross, I argue, is no more a particularist about (...)
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  • Sportsmanship and Blowouts: Baseball and Beyond.Randolph M. Feezell - 1999 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 26 (1):68-78.
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  • Doing well enough: Toward a logic for common-sense morality.Paul McNamara - 1996 - Studia Logica 57 (1):167 - 192.
    On the traditional deontic framework, what is required (what morality demands) and what is optimal (what morality recommends) can't be distinguished and hence they can't both be represented. Although the morally optional can be represented, the supererogatory (exceeding morality's demands), one of its proper subclasses, cannot be. The morally indifferent, another proper subclass of the optional-one obviously disjoint from the supererogatory-is also not representable. Ditto for the permissibly suboptimal and the morally significant. Finally, the minimum that morality allows finds no (...)
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  • On the Wrongness of Cheating and Why Cheaters Can't Play the Game.Randolph M. Feezell - 1988 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 15 (1):57-68.
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