Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would undermine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of their ethical convictions than anti-realists. In addition, it (...) is sometimes argued that only moral realists can countenance the claim that nature is intrinsically valuable. Against this, we argue that the acceptance of moral anti-realism is no threat to the environmentalist cause. We argue, further, that the acceptance of moral realism is potentially an obstacle to delivering on a third core environmental ethicist demand: namely, that successful action on climate change and environmental destruction requires us to change some of our commonly-held ethical views and to achieve a workable consensus. (shrink)

The National Center for Biomedical Ontology is a consortium that comprises leading informaticians, biologists, clinicians, and ontologists, funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Roadmap, to develop innovative technology and methods that allow scientists to record, manage, and disseminate biomedical information and knowledge in machine-processable form. The goals of the Center are (1) to help unify the divergent and isolated efforts in ontology development by promoting high quality open-source, standards-based tools to create, manage, and use ontologies, (2) to create (...) new software tools so that scientists can use ontologies to annotate and analyze biomedical data, (3) to provide a national resource for the ongoing evaluation, integration, and evolution of biomedical ontologies and associated tools and theories in the context of driving biomedical projects (DBPs), and (4) to disseminate the tools and resources of the Center and to identify, evaluate, and communicate best practices of ontology development to the biomedical community. Through the research activities within the Center, collaborations with the DBPs, and interactions with the biomedical community, our goal is to help scientists to work more effectively in the e-science paradigm, enhancing experiment design, experiment execution, data analysis, information synthesis, hypothesis generation and testing, and understand human disease. (shrink)

It has seemed, to many, that there is an important connection between the ways in which some theoretical posits explain our observations, and our reasons for being ontologically committed to those posits. One way to spell out this connection is in terms of what has become known as the explanatory criterion of ontological commitment. This is, roughly, the view that we ought to posit only those entities that are indispensable to our best explanations. Our primary aim is to argue that (...) the moral nonnaturalist places herself in an invidious position if she simply accepts that the nonnatural moral facts that she posits are not explanatory. Instead, we offer the nonnaturalist an alternative strategy for dealing with moral explanations. The strategy is to retain the explanatory criterion of ontological commitment and maintain that moral properties are, in fact, explanatory. The explanations they provide are not causal explanations; instead, moral properties make a non-causal difference to the physical facts. (shrink)

According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like access (...) to normative properties. We argue that underlying this objection are several specific problems, rooted in the different types of mental states to which emotions may respond, that the sentimental perceptualist must tackle for her view to be successful. We argue, moreover, that the problems can be answered by filling out the theory with several independently motivated yet highly controversial commitments, which we carefully catalogue. The plausibility of sentimental perceptualism, as a result, hinges on further claims sentimental perceptualists should not ignore. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics offers the most authoritative and compelling guide to this diverse and fertile field of philosophy. Twenty-four of the world's most distinguished specialists provide brand-new essays about 'what there is': what kinds of things there are, and what relations hold among entities falling under various categories. They give the latest word on such topics as identity, modality, time, causation, persons and minds, freedom, and vagueness. The Handbook's unrivaled breadth and depth make it the definitive reference work (...) for students and academics across the philosophical spectrum. (shrink)

Habermas frequentemente adota o termo Estado de direito na sua obra Direito e democracia: entre facticidade e validade. O objetivo deste artigo, então, consiste na investigação da possibilidade desse conceito, no seu fundamento e na apresentação dos problemas dele decorrentes, contrapondo-o especificamente a sua antítese, isto é, ao monismo entre Estado e direito de Kelsen. Ocorre que a filosofia habermasiana, conforme entendimento do artigo, implica a adoção de uma teoria dualista entre os conceitos de Estado e de direito. Observa-se, assim, (...) o compromisso do filósofo alemão com a reformulação de uma doutrina jurídica específica e sua radical incompatibilidade com o positivismo kelseniano. (shrink)

Pretendeu-se estudar a aquisição da virtude em Aristóteles a partir da interpretação de M. F. Burnyeat. Para esse, a virtude aristotélica exige dimensões cognitivas e emocionais, sendo que ao aprendiz não basta conhecer os princípios e as regras gerais da ação, mas deve ter internalizado, através do hábito, uma vontade de praticar ações nobres e justas. Compete ao sujeito virtuoso, portanto, ter o conhecimento do que é correto (the that), assim como, subsidiariamente, a justificativa do porquê é apropriada determinada ação (...) (the because). Da análise dessas variáveis, o autor procura esclarecer a figura conflituosa do akratic (incontinente) e do akalastos (perverso) e elucidar a hipótese do desenvolvimento moral. Concomitantemente este artigo pretende introduzir o problema criminológico da ideia de ressocialização ou da pena capital, entendendo ser o argumento aristotélico ainda influente para a filosofia da virtude e jurídica hodierna e necessário quando se discutem novos paradigmas éticos e jurídicos. (shrink)

What role does the imagination play in scientific progress? After examining several studies in cognitive science, I argue that one thing the imagination does is help to increase scientific understanding, which is itself indispensable for scientific progress. Then, I sketch a transcendental justification of the role of imagination in this process.

O artigo analisa a leitura crítica de Hans Kelsen acerca da concepção jurídico-política de Thomas Hobbes, considerando críticas posteriores à própria interpretação de Kelsen. Para tanto, investigou-se primeiramente a posição de Kelsen sobre o jusnaturalismo buscando esclarecer conceitos centrais como os do ser e dever-ser e como o autor os associa a Hobbes. Nesse sentido, observouse a limitação da leitura de Kelsen em relação à filosofia jurídica do autor – uma doutrina jusnaturalista metafísica, tendo na regra de ouro o fundamento (...) natural para o direito positivo. Em contraposição, procurou-se apresentar uma postura crítica, que contesta a posição jusnaturalista atribuída a Hobbes e sustenta a tese de que o autor inglês é um precursor do positivismo jurídico. (shrink)

O artigo tem como objetivo apresentar o problema da determinação do sentido das normas para o Kelsen considerando a flexibilidade do quadro de interpretações. Expõe, primeiramente, a suposta transição do conceito de interpretação normativa, passando de um formalismo-normativismo restritivo para um realismo jurídico a partir das suas últimas obras; em um segundo momento apresenta o decorrente conflito ainda atual constituído por essas reformulações. Finalmente, defende a hipótese de superação da dicotomia formalismo-normativismo versus realismo jurídico através de uma leitura realista normativista.

O trabalho busca esclarecer dois pontos centrais da Filosofia política de Maquiavel – as figuras da Virtù e da Fortuna. A virtú deve ser vista como uma forma do livre-arbítrio do governante, sendo a principal variável na condução do principado.Destaca-se, também, a utilização da variável nacontestação aos valorestradicionais. Já a Fortuna constitui-se na indeterminabilidade de parte dos resultadosdo governo: ela deve ser dominada, conquistada para o benefício do príncipe.

O presente artigo aborda o problema da soberania para Hans Kelsen. Tem como objetivo analisar a posição do autor sobre o tema (especialmente através do texto Sovereignty), traçando paralelamente algumas considerações. Ocorre que para Kelsen o conceito de soberania mostra-se impreciso a partir da doutrina tradicional. Ainda, mesmo superando essa doutrina e a teoria dualista, também o conteúdo do direito nacional e internacional permanece inalterado. Portanto, prova-se a irrelevância de tal para a teoria jurídica.

O objetivo do artigofoi especular sobre a epistemologia proposta por David Hume (1711-1776), especificamente a perspectiva empirista e cética. Procurou-se, assim, expor os principais conceitos da sua filosofia, especialmente acrítica à concepção de causalidade, o problema da probabilidade e os conceitos de percepções, imagens e ideias. Finalmente buscou-se expor uma interpretação que entende haver um ceticismo mitigado no autor e a superação de uma teoria do conhecimento exclusivamente psicológica.

A separação entre o ser, isto é, o ato, e o dever-ser, ou seja, o sentido de comando, permissão etc.. do ato é parte fundamental para o entendimento da epistemologia proposta por Hans Kelsen. Dessa discriminação entre o ser e o dever-ser há o principal argumento do autor para a separação do direito das ciências causais e, principalmente, a superação da falácia naturalista no âmbito teórico e moral. Nesse sentido, também o artigo se propôs a analisar a refutação de Kelsen (...) a doutrinas morais e jurídicas negadoras de tal distinção e, consequentemente o reflexo de tal posicionamento na perspectiva da responsabilidade. (shrink)

A separação entre o ser, isto é, o ato, e o dever-ser, ou seja, o sentido de comando, permissão etc.. do ato é parte fundamental para o entendimento da epistemologia proposta por Hans Kelsen. Dessa discriminação entre o ser e o dever-ser há o principal argumento do autor para a separação do direito das ciências causais e, principalmente, a superação da falácia naturalista no âmbito teórico e moral. Nesse sentido, também o artigo se propôs a analisar a refutação de Kelsen (...) a doutrinas morais e jurídicas negadoras de tal distinção e, consequentemente o reflexo de tal posicionamento na perspectiva da responsabilidade. (shrink)

O artigo investigou o método para uma filosofia intercultural a partir da Ibero-América, de Raul Fornet-Betancourt. Partiu-se especificamente do texto do autor para posteriormente fornecer considerações críticas aos seus posicionamentos. Nesse sentido, analisou-se a originalidade do tema, a filosofia da libertação como modelo de diálogo intercultural, seus pressupostos hermenêuticos e epistemológicos e, por fim, o pensamento ibero-americano como base para uma filosofia intercultural. No final do trabalho apresentou-se seis críticas ao texto estudado – o problema da arrogância e dissimulação filosófica, (...) a adoção tácita de um platonismo e a não originalidade filosófica, o problema da falácia naturalista e do falsificacionismo e, finalmente, a não razoabilidade política das propostas. (shrink)

Com este artigo procura-se introduzir a questão da origem social das normas morais e jurídicas a partir da obra de Hans Kelsen e solucionar, de forma breve, o problema da conciliação do método lógico-transcendental da Teoria pura com a filosofia positivista e empirista do autor.

Pretendeu-se dissertar acerca do conceito kantiano do Direito a partir da gênese da sua fundamentação moral, ressaltando a aprioricidade da mesma e seu reflexo na doutrina jurídica. Contrariamente ao moral sense da Filosofia empirista inglesa, a moralidade kantiana baseia-se completamente a priori, abdicando de uma antropologia em sua exposição e formulando-se como pura metafísica, a partir de conhecimentos abstratos. Coaduna à concepção de moralidade kantiana o seu conceito de Direito, que também não possui, portanto, qualquer fundamento na experiência. Desta forma, (...) pretende-se fornecer uma interpretação sistemática em relação aos problemas da doutrina do direito, especificamente sobre a sua exterioridade, a função da coerção e a formação do Estado. (shrink)

O objetivo do trabalho é auxiliar o jurista desocupado responsável pelo ensino da cadeira de filosofia do direito. A situação mais frequente nas faculdades de direito são as aulas de filosofia e de outras cadeiras do eixo fundamental serem tapeadas por qualquer bacharel sem nada melhor para fazer. Ocorre que tais ociosos juristas muitas vezes se veem receosos quando instituídos nos seus cargos, isso porque não possuem qualquer conhecimento na matéria em que lecionam, ao mesmo tempo em que são lançados (...) em sala de aula expostos às dúvidas e críticas dos alunos. Nesse sentido apresento a esses professores, juristas desocupados, uma técnica pedagógica resumida e de fácil compreensão para ministrarem sem maiores sobressaltos a cadeira de filosofia do direito. Seguindo os passos propostos, o jurista desocupado não terá riscos de ser questionado pelos alunos ou pela instituição, mantendo seu complemento de renda garantido. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresentou a interpretação de Paul Guyer acerca da filosofia jurídica de Kant, delimitando seu objeto no oitavo capítulo da obra “Kant”. Procurou-se, por estratégia argumentativa, fixar-se no texto de Guyer, apresentado claramente o problema envolvido, a sua hipótese a e análise das variáveis. Concomitantemente procurou-se inserir uma breve apreciação crítica na forma de notas numéricas. Buscou-se, dessa forma, privilegiar o texto do autor, focando especificamente nos problemas por ele apresentado, sem, contudo, deixar de apresentar uma crítica aos (...) pontos mais cruciais do artigo. Guyer sistematizou a filosofia jurídica de Kant, requerendo à interpretação uma visão mais abrangente da obra do filósofo prussiano, isto é, Guyer procurou correlacionar o conceito de direito kantiano com a filosofia prática, fornecendo, assim, uma ótica em que direito apresenta-se como uma autorização e uma obrigação da razão prática. Nessa sequência, o direito de propriedade, os direitos de família, direitos contratuais, direito público e direito internacional segue uma fundamentação sistemática da obra kantiana. (shrink)

Pretendeu-se dissertar sobre a segunda conferênciada obra O Liberalismo Político de John Rawls. A exposição trata dométodo de justificação do autor, concentrada nos termos racionalidade(concepção de bem) e razoabilidade (senso de justiça);subsequentemente aborda as variáveis – cooperação, voluntariedade,autonomia, limites do juízo, discordância, pluralismo, reciprocidade,imparcialidade, publicidade, justificação, democracia e tolerância. Nessesentido, parte-se da obra supracitada para a sistematização da teoria eresolução de problemas: uma referência histórica em Kant; uma respostaàs hipóteses comunitaristas; a convergência de modelos de justificação,sobretudo uma deontologia com uma (...) concepção substancial de justiça; eos argumentos epistemológicos fundacionistas e coerentistas. Conclui-se,além da unidade da obra, a tipificação contratualista na história daFilosofia, um compatibilismo ético e o caráter epistemológico coerentista. (shrink)

A presente dissertação tem como tema central a proposta da abordagem hermenêutica da decisão judicial em Hans Kelsen considerando seu relativismo filosófico. No primeiro momento expõe a concepção de decisão judicial no autor e as suas reformulações conceituais no decorrer das suas obras – as passagens do formalismo normativista das primeiras obras até o ceticismo de regras na Teoria geral das normas. Também propõe a dissolução entre as leituras formalistas e realistas através da possibilidade de uma leitura realista moderada. Após (...) expõe a filosofia relativista do autor e seu resultado na exclusão dos elementos da moralidade do conceito de direito. Finalmente deduz regras de interpretação a partir de uma visão abrangente das obras do autor. O objetivo da dissertação, nesse sentido, é analisar a dinâmica da criação normativa pelo judiciário, a discricionariedade daí resultante e a possibilidade de interpretar os vários sentidos das normas sem recorrer a qualquer moralismo para tal. (shrink)

A teoria do Direito internacional de Kelsen é monista, ou seja, o autor reúne a legislação nacional e internacional em um único sistema normativo. Com isso, descarta o dualismo e promove uma tese fundada no princípio lógico da não-contradição, traduzido juridicamente para o princípio da imputação. Por essa afirmação, o Direito internacional, considerando o primado estadual, existe a partir do reconhecimento interno da validade da legislação externa; mais, a recepção dos acordos internacionais na legislação nacional acopla internamente o Direito internacional, (...) com seus tratados bi/multilaterais, pactos, instituições, costumes e tribunais. A teoria de Kelsen torna-se complexa, porém, quando, indagando o inverso dessa premissa, o Direito internacional posto e eficaz, já inserido internamente, não reconhece a validade normativa de eventual interpretação ou norma interna e atua como agente determinante da ordem jurídica nacional. Com isso, o Direito externo torna-se decisivo desse mesmo sistema jurídico interno, não necessariamente por uma ação coercitiva, mas por intermédio do seu reconhecimento da validade da legislação interna. Vimos esse fenômeno materializar-se no caso dos dois presidentes simultâneos da Venezuela: tanto o presidente Nicolás Maduro, quando o presidente Juan Guaidó, foram formalmente designados, por países e instituições distintas, como governantes válidos. Sendo assim, o objetivo do livro consiste em compreender esse fenômeno de reconhecimento externo dos sistemas normativos nacionais através da segunda edição da Teoria de pura do Direito como marco teórico. Igualmente, utiliza-se do estudo de caso sobre a determinação do presidente válido da Venezuela como elemento empírico e de falseabilidade. Com isso, defende a hipótese da necessidade do reconhecimento normativo-objetivo do Estado a partir da formação do Direito internacional, independentemente de seu primitivismo. Os quatro primeiros capítulos, na primeira seção, estabelecem uma interpretação sobre a obra de Kelsen, focada em seu aspecto internacionalista. Nos quatro últimos, na seção II, submeto as conclusões teóricas ao caso concreto, falseando-as ou não conforme seu teste empírico. (shrink)

A tese defende o antiplatonismo presente na obra do jusfilósofo Hans Kelsen como núcleo argumentativo da sua teoria do direito. Sustenta que a melhor definição da sua filosofia não é como neokantiana, mas como antiplatônica. Isso porque há significativas inconsistências na sua interpretação de Kant, o que a impossibilita de ser classificada como tal. Além, encontra-se na sua leitura sobre Platão referências mais sólidas e conceitos mais claros. Nesse sentido, advoga a hipótese de que a obra de Kelsen tem como (...) constante e como chave de entendimento a sua objeção e contestação às teses de Platão, sobretudo a questão da separação entre alma e corpo, isto é, forma e matéria. O primeiro e segundo capítulos defendem a hipótese da inconsistência das teses de Kelsen sobre Kant. Entende que a sua pressuposição de contradição entre a razão pura e a razão prática, assim como a ideia de uma contradição entre ser e dever-ser, não se sustenta considerando as próprias obras de Kant e a literatura especializada sobre o autor. No segundo capítulo apresenta a sua leitura sobre Platão, concentrada na obra A Ilusão da justiça (Dei Illusion der Gerechtigkeit). O quarto capítulo expõe, sopesando seu antiplatonismo, as duas principais referências teóricas para Kelsen a par de Kant, isto é, as teorias de David Hume e Sigmund Freud. O quinto capítulo demonstra como o antiplatonismo de Kelsen articula com os principais conceitos de suas teses, isto é, mostra que mesmo refutando a classificação do autor como neokantiano, conceitos como norma fundamental, liberdade, o monismo entre direito e Estado, monismo entre direito internacional e nacional e o problema da decisão judicial possuem justificativa e base filosófica coerente. Finalmente, conclui com a possiblidade da ideia de uma teoria kelseniana do direito desvinculada do neokantismo e fundada sobre os pressupostos céticos humeanos e freudianos, tanto moral, quanto teórico, ou seja, reconhece a unidade das obras do autor, desde que condicionada a sua interpretação como antiplatônica. (shrink)

According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains (...) guilt about mere causal responsibility, according to which guilt represents part of the self as bound up with what is bad. (shrink)

This paper defends a theory of hope according to which hopes are composed of a desire and a belief that the object of the desire is possible. Although belief plus desire theories of hope are now widely rejected, this is due to important oversights. One is a failure to recognize the relation that hope-constituting desires and beliefs must stand in to constitute a hope. A second is an oversimplification of the explanatory power of hope-constituting desires. The final portion of the (...) paper uses an enhanced understanding of the psychology of hope to make progress on normative questions about hoping well. (shrink)

This paper offers a qualified defense of a historically popular view that I call sentimental perceptualism. At a first pass, sentimental perceptualism says that emotions play a role in grounding evaluative knowledge analogous to the role perceptions play in grounding empirical knowledge. Recently, András Szigeti and Michael Brady have independently developed an important set of objections to this theory. The objections have a common structure: they begin by conceding that emotions have some important epistemic role to play, but then (...) go on to argue that understanding how emotions play that role means that there must be some alternative, emotion-independent route to obtaining knowledge of value. If there has to be such an emotion-independent route, then the perceptual analogy breaks down in a significant way. In this paper, I argue that the right ways for sentimental perceptualists to respond to each of these objections are revealed by thinking through how analogous objections applied to perception and the empirical domain would be answered. Although Szigeti's and Brady's objections should not persuade sentimental perceptualists to give up their view, the objections do put important constraints on what a form of the view has to be like in order to do exciting metaethical work. (shrink)

A prevalent political narrative is that we are facing an epistemological crisis, where many citizens no longer care about truth and facts. Yet the view that we are living in a post-truth era relies on some implicit questionable empirical and normative assumptions. The post-truth rhetoric converts epistemic issues into motivational issues, treating people with whom we disagree as if they no longer believe in or care about truth. This narrative is also dubious on epistemic, moral, and political grounds. It is (...) epistemically dubious in being largely insensitive to the problem of complexity in politics; it is morally dubious because “post-truth” is often a derogatory label for individuals or groups that are deemed stupid, irrational, or morally compromised; and it is a politically toxic neologism because it purports to use the language of ‘truth’ as a weapon against power, yet these truth-claims are often themselves attempts to exert power over others by delegitimizing their perspectives. While it may seem as if truth and democracy are on especially bad terms lately, politics and truth have long had a vexed relationship, and moral panics about the value of truthfulness in politics are as old as politics itself. (shrink)

The ‘Big 3’ theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfactionism, and objective list theory—attempt to explain why certain things are good for people by appealing to prudentially good-making properties. But they don’t attempt to explain why the properties they advert to make something good for a person. Perfectionism, the view that well-being consists in nature-fulfilment, is often considered a competitor to these views (or else a version of the objective list theory). However, I argue that perfectionism is best understood as explaining why certain (...) properties are prudentially good-making. This version of perfectionism is compatible with each of the Big 3, and, I argue, quite attractive. (shrink)

We might think that thought experiments are at their most powerful or most interesting when they produce new knowledge. This would be a mistake; thought experiments that seek understanding are just as powerful and interesting, and perhaps even more so. A growing number of epistemologists are emphasizing the importance of understanding for epistemology, arguing that it should supplant knowledge as the central notion. In this chapter, I bring the literature on understanding in epistemology to bear on explicating the different ways (...) that thought experiments increase three important kinds of understanding: explanatory, objectual and practical. (shrink)

The philosophy of hope centers on two interlocking sets of questions. The first concerns the nature of hope. Specific questions here include how to analyze hope, how hope motivates us, and whether there is only one type of hope. The second set concerns the value of hope. Key questions here include whether and when it is good to hope and whether there is a virtue of hope. Philosophers of hope tend to proceed from the first set of questions to the (...) second. This is a natural approach, for one might expect that you must develop a basic understanding of what hope is before you can determine its value. The structure of this chapter thus follows this approach. But readers should not be misled: there is in fact a good deal of feedback between the two sets of questions. A theory of hope is more plausible to the extent that it fits well with plausible ideas about the value of hope. So the movement from hope’s nature to its value is one of emphasis rather than a strict, step-wise process. (shrink)

This paper asks whether there is a moral virtue of hope, and if so, what it is. The enterprise is motivated by a historical asymmetry, namely that while Christian thinkers have long classed hope as a theological virtue, it has not traditionally been classed as a moral one. But this is puzzling, for hoping well is not confined to the sphere of religion; and consequently we might expect that if the theological virtue is structurally sound, there will be a secular, (...) moral analogue. This paper proposes that there is such an analogue, and that it is closely linked to the everyday notion of “having your priorities straight,” a phenomenon which is naturally understood in terms of the attitude of hope. It turns out that the priorities model provides an abstract way of characterizing a central but underexplored virtue, one which can be developed in secular or theological ways. (shrink)

This paper argues that Kant’s concept of ‘respect’ for the moral law has roots in Adam Smith’s concept of ‘regard’ for the general rules of conduct, which was translated as Achtung in the first German translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. After illustrating that Kant’s technical understanding of respect appeared relatively late in his intellectual development, I argue that Kant’s concept of respect and Smith’s concept of regard share a basic similarity: they are both a single complex phenomenon with (...) two core aspects, namely an attitude and a feeling. I then suggest that the concept of regard offered Kant a way to deal a problem concerning moral motivation that he was trying to solve at the time he likely first read Smith. I conclude by drawing some implications from the account I have offered for our understanding of Kant’s relation to Smith more generally. (shrink)

Epistemic decision theory produces arguments with both normative and mathematical premises. I begin by arguing that philosophers should care about whether the mathematical premises (1) are true, (2) are strong, and (3) admit simple proofs. I then discuss a theorem that Briggs and Pettigrew (2020) use as a premise in a novel accuracy-dominance argument for conditionalization. I argue that the theorem and its proof can be improved in a number of ways. First, I present a counterexample that shows that one (...) of the theorem’s claims is false. As a result of this, Briggs and Pettigrew’s argument for conditionalization is unsound. I go on to explore how a sound accuracy-dominance argument for conditionalization might be recovered. In the course of doing this, I prove two new theorems that correct and strengthen the result reported by Briggs and Pettigrew. I show how my results can be combined with various normative premises to produce sound arguments for conditionalization. I also show that my results can be used to support normative conclusions that are stronger than the one that Briggs and Pettigrew’s argument supports. Finally, I show that Briggs and Pettigrew’s proofs can be simplified considerably. (shrink)

The inflation of Type I error rates is thought to be one of the causes of the replication crisis. Questionable research practices such as p-hacking are thought to inflate Type I error rates above their nominal level, leading to unexpectedly high levels of false positives in the literature and, consequently, unexpectedly low replication rates. In this article, I offer an alternative view. I argue that questionable and other research practices do not usually inflate relevant Type I error rates. I begin (...) with an introduction to Type I error rates that distinguishes them from theoretical errors. I then illustrate my argument with respect to model misspecification, multiple testing, selective inference, forking paths, exploratory analyses, p-hacking, optional stopping, double dipping, and HARKing. In each case, I demonstrate that relevant Type I error rates are not usually inflated above their nominal level, and in the rare cases that they are, the inflation is easily identified and resolved. I conclude that the replication crisis may be explained, at least in part, by researchers’ misinterpretation of statistical errors and their underestimation of theoretical errors. (shrink)

We seem to be able to acquire evaluative knowledge by mere reflection, or “from the armchair.” But how? This question is especially pressing for proponents of sentimental perceptualism, which is the view that our evaluative knowledge is rooted in affective experiences in much the way that everyday empirical knowledge is rooted in perception. While such empirical knowledge seems partially explained by causal relations between perceptions and properties in the world, in armchair evaluative inquiry, the relevant evaluative properties are typically not (...) even present. The paper shows how sentimental perceptualists can ultimately provide a broadly causal explanation of our reflective evaluative knowledge. (shrink)

The fact that Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin seem to disagree about the ordinary use of words such as ‘voluntary’, ‘involuntary’, ‘voluntarily’, and ‘involuntarily’ has been taken to cast doubt on the methods of ordinary language philosophy. As Benson Mates puts the worry, ‘if agreement about usage cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as the class of Oxford Professors of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the sample is enlarged?’ (Mates, Inquiry 1:161–171, 1958, p. 165). In this chapter, (...) we evaluate Mates’s criticism alongside Ryle’s and Austin’s specific claims about the ordinary use of these words, assessing these claims against actual examples of ordinary use drawn from the British National Corpus (BNC). Our evaluation consists in applying a combination of methods: first aggregating judgments about a large set of samples drawn from the corpus, and then using a clustering algorithm to uncover connections between different types of use. In applying these methods, we show where and to what extent Ryle’s and Austin’s accounts of the use of the target terms are accurate as well as where they miss important aspects of ordinary use, and we demonstrate the usefulness of this new combination of methods. At the heart of our approach is a commitment to the idea that systematically looking at actual uses of expressions is an essential component of any approach to ordinary language philosophy. (shrink)

A metainference is usually understood as a pair consisting of a collection of inferences, called premises, and a single inference, called conclusion. In the last few years, much attention has been paid to the study of metainferences—and, in particular, to the question of what are the valid metainferences of a given logic. So far, however, this study has been done in quite a poor language. Our usual sequent calculi have no way to represent, e.g. negations, disjunctions or conjunctions of inferences. (...) In this paper we tackle this expressive issue. We assume some background sentential language as given and define what we call an inferential language, that is, a language whose atomic formulas are inferences. We provide a model-theoretic characterization of validity for this language—relative to some given characterization of validity for the background sentential language—and provide a proof-theoretic analysis of validity. We argue that our novel language has fruitful philosophical applications. Lastly, we generalize some of our definitions and results to arbitrary metainferential levels. (shrink)

Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths aretrue in virtue of,grounded in, orexplained byessentialist truths has been under attack. In what follows we offer two responses to the wave of criticism against his view. While the first response is pretty straightforward, the second is based on the distinction between, what we call,Reductive Finean EssentialismandNon-Reductive Finean Essentialism. Engaging the work of Bob Hale onNon-Reductive Finean Essentialism, we aim to show that the arguments against Fine's view are unconvincing, while we acknowledge (...) the presence of a deep standoff between the two views. (shrink)

Defends Kantian paternalism: Interference with an individual’s liberty for her own sake is justified absent her actual consent only to the extent that such interference stands a reasonable chance of preventing her from exercising her liberty irrationally in light of the rationally chosen ends that constitute her conception of the good. More specifically, interference with an individual’s liberty is permissible only if, by interfering, we stand a reasonable chance of preventing that agent from performing actions she chose due to distorted (...) reasoning and which would result in that agent’s rationally chosen ends not being as fully realized as they would have been had she so acted. -/- Applied to suicide intervention Kantian paternalism implies that such intervention is justified to the extent that it prevents a person from ending her life when, due to distorted reasoning, she engages in suicidal behavior that is at odds with her rationally chosen ends. (shrink)

If updating with E has the same result across all epistemically possible worlds, then the agent has no uncertainty as to the behavior of the update, and we may call it a transparent update. If an agent is uncertain about the behavior of an update, we may call it opaque. In order to model the uncertainty an agent has about the result of an update, the same update must behave differently across different possible worlds. In this paper, I study opaque (...) updates using a simple system of dynamic epistemic logic suitably modified for that purpose. The paper highlights the connection between opaque updates and the dynamic-epistemic principles Perfect-Recall and No-Miracles. I argue that opaque updates are central to contemporary discussions in epistemology, in particular to externalist theories of knowledge and to the related problem of epistemic bootstrapping, or easy knowledge. Opaque updates allow us to explicitly investigate a dynamic form of uncertainty, using simple and precise logical tools. (shrink)

Frege argued for the force-content distinction not only by appealing to the logical and fictional contexts which are most closely associated with the “Frege point", but also based on the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. Supposedly this is only intelligible if the question contains a forceless thought or proposition which an affirmative answer then asserts. Against this I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on assertions and other (...) forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher-level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed and present assertoric or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. Force is representational: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects non-conceptually present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge. (shrink)

The first part of this article makes the case that human cognition is an intergenerational project enabled by the inheritance and bequeathal of cognitive technology (Sects. 2–4). The final two sections of the article (Sects. 5 and 6) explore the normative significance of this claim. My case for the intergenerational claim draws results from multiple disciplines: philosophy (Sect. 2), cultural evolutionary approaches in cognitive science (Sect. 3), and developmental psychology and neuroscience (Sect. 4). In Sect. 5, I propose that cognitive (...) technology should be given to future generations in accordance with principles of pluralism and transparency. In the final main section of the article, Sect. 6, I apply these principles to topics such as the preservation of information, environmental offloading of cognition, and thinking itself. (shrink)

Raimo Tuomela’s most important contribution to the philosophy of collective intentionality was his development of the notion of the we-mode. In my chapter I extend the notion of we-mode to that of role-mode, the mode in which individual and collective subjects feel, think and act as occupants of roles within groups and institutional structures. I focus on how being in role-mode is manifest in the minds of subjects and on the following points. First, I argue that both we-mode and role-mode (...) are best thought of as further modifications of I-consciousness, respectively we-consciousness. Second, role-mode is further characterized by the fact that subjects will take positions as role occupants that they won’t take as mere individuals, or we-mode group members, or in other roles. Third, such divergences are only possible against a background of agreements between positions taken in different modes. Fourth, such divergences are also grounded in decision making procedures and the accessibility and admissibility of sources of evidence. Fifth, role-mode goes all the way down, that is, it is also manifest in how subjects feel, move and comport themselves when they occupy their roles. To put it into fashionable jargon, it is embodied and enacted. (shrink)

The replication crisis has caused researchers to distinguish between exact replications, which duplicate all aspects of a study that could potentially affect the results, and direct replications, which duplicate only those aspects of the study that are thought to be theoretically essential to reproduce the original effect. The replication crisis has also prompted researchers to think more carefully about the possibility of making Type I errors when rejecting null hypotheses. In this context, the present article considers the utility of two (...) types of Type I error probability: the Neyman–Pearson long run Type I error rate and the Fisherian sample-specific Type I error probability. It is argued that the Neyman–Pearson Type I error rate is inapplicable in social science because it refers to a long run of exact replications, and social science deals with irreversible units that make exact replications impossible. Instead, the Fisherian sample-specific Type I error probability is recommended as a more meaningful way to conceptualize false positive results in social science because it can be applied to each sample-specific decision about rejecting the same substantive null hypothesis in a series of direct replications. It is concluded that the replication crisis may be partly due to researchers’ unrealistic expectations about replicability based on their consideration of the Neyman–Pearson Type I error rate across a long run of exact replications. (shrink)

This paper explores the epistemological significance of the view that we can literally see, hear, and touch evaluative properties (the high-level theory of value perception). My central contention is that, from the perspective of epistemology, the question of whether there are such high-level experiences doesn’t matter. Insofar as there are such experiences, they most plausibly emerged through the right kind of interaction with evaluative capacities that are not literally perceptual (e.g., of the sort involved in imaginative evaluative reflection). But even (...) if these other evaluative capacities turn out not to alter the content of perceptual experience, they would still be sufficient to do all of the justificatory work that high-level experiences are meant to do. I close by observing that it may matter a great deal whether a certain other picture of value perception is true. This alternative picture has it that desires and/or emotions are perceptual-like experiences of value. (shrink)

There is a loud and persistent drum beat of support for schools, for citizenship, for diversity and inclusion, and increasingly for labor market readiness with very little critical attention to the assumptions underlying these agendas, let alone to their many internal contradictions. Accordingly, in this book I examine the philosophical, motivational, and practical challenges of education theory, policy, and practice in the twenty-first century. As I proceed, I do not neglect the historical, comparative international context so essential to better understanding (...) where we are, as well as what is attainable in terms of educational justice. I argue that we must constructively critique some of our most cherished beliefs about education if we are to save the hope of real justice from the rhetoric of imagined justice. (shrink)

Kerr coined the term ‘HARKing’ to refer to the practice of ‘hypothesizing after the results are known’. This questionable research practice has received increased attention in recent years because it is thought to have contributed to low replication rates in science. The present article discusses the concept of HARKing from a philosophical standpoint and then undertakes a critical review of Kerr’s twelve potential costs of HARKing. It is argued that these potential costs are either misconceived, misattributed to HARKing, lacking evidence, (...) or that they do not take into account pre- and post-publication peer review and public availability to research materials and data. It is concluded that it is premature to conclude that HARKing has led to low replication rates. (shrink)