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  1. Logics for Belief as Maximally Plausible Possibility.Giacomo Bonanno - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-43.
    We consider a basic logic with two primitive uni-modal operators: one for certainty and the other for plausibility. The former is assumed to be a normal operator, while the latter is merely a classical operator. We then define belief, interpreted as “maximally plausible possibility”, in terms of these two notions: the agent believes \ if she cannot rule out \ ), she judges \ to be plausible and she does not judge \ to be plausible. We consider four interaction properties (...)
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  • “Merely a Logician’s Toy?” Belief Revision Confronting Scientific Theory Change. [REVIEW]Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2012 - Metascience 21 (2):463-466.
    Review of Olsson, Erik J. and Enqvist, Sebastian , Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science.
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  • Choice Revision.Li Zhang - 2019 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 28 (4):577-599.
    Choice revision is a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, in which the agent partially accepts the new information represented by a set of sentences. We investigate the construction of choice revision based on a new approach to belief change called descriptor revision. We prove that each of two variants of choice revision based on such construction is axiomatically characterized with a set of plausible postulates, assuming that the object language is finite. Furthermore, we introduce an alternative modelling for choice revision, (...)
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  • Dynamic Epistemic Logics: Promises, Problems, Shortcomings, and Perspectives.Andreas Herzig - 2017 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 27 (3-4):328-341.
    Dynamic epistemic logics provide an account of the evolution of agents’ belief and knowledge when they learn the occurrence of an event. These logics started to become popular about 20 years ago and by now there exists a huge number of publications about them. The present paper briefly summarises the existing body of literature, discusses some problems and shortcomings, and proposes some avenues for future research.
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  • Back to Basics: Belief Revision Through Direct Selection.Sven Ove Hansson - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (5):887-915.
    Traditionally, belief change is modelled as the construction of a belief set that satisfies a success condition. The success condition is usually that a specified sentence should be believed or not believed. Furthermore, most models of belief change employ a select-and-intersect strategy. This means that a selection is made among primary objects that satisfy the success condition, and the intersection of the selected objects is taken as outcome of the operation. However, the select-and-intersect method is difficult to justify, in particular (...)
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  • Residual Contraction.Marco Garapa & Maurício D. L. Reis - forthcoming - Journal of Logic, Language and Information:1-20.
    In this paper, we propose and axiomatically characterize residual contractions, a new kind of contraction operators for belief bases. We establish that the class of partial meet contractions is a strict subclass of the class of residual contractions. We identify an extra condition that may be added to the definition of residual contractions, which is such that the class of residual contractions that satisfy it coincides with the class of partial meet contractions. We investigate the interrelations in the sense of (...)
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  • Iterated Descriptor Revision and the Logic of Ramsey Test Conditionals.Sven Ove Hansson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (4):429-450.
    Two of the major problems in AGM-style belief revision, namely the difficulties in accounting for iterated change and for Ramsey test conditionals, have satisfactory solutions in descriptor revision. In descriptor revision, the input is a metalinguistic sentence specifying the success condition of the operation. The choice mechanism selects one of the potential outcomes in which the success condition is satisfied. Iteration of this operation is unproblematic. Ramsey test conditionals can be introduced without giving rise to the paradoxical results that they (...)
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  • Katz’s Revisability Paradox Dissolved.Allard Tamminga & Sander Verhaegh - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):771-784.
    Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using (...)
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  • Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change.Hans Rott - 2014 - In Vít Punčochář Michal Dančák (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2013. College Publications. pp. 187-205.
    The theory of theory change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson ("AGM") has been widely known as being characterized by two sets of postulates, one being very weak and the other being very strong. Commenting on the three classic constructions of partial meet contraction, safe contraction and entrenchment-based construction, I argue that three intermediate levels can be distinguished that play decisive roles within the AGM theory.
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  • Reasoning Biases, Non‐Monotonic Logics and Belief Revision.Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4).
    A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way (...)
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  • On Non-Prioritized Multiple Belief Revision.Li Zhang - 2018 - Dissertation, KTH Royal Institute of Technology
    This thesis investigates a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, the operation of making up one's mind, and its generalization, the operation of choice revision. Making up one's mind about a sentence is a belief change that takes the agent to a belief state in which either the sentence or its negation is believed. In choice revision, the input information is represented by a set of sentences, and the agent should make a choice on which sentences to be accepted. Apart from (...)
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  • Frontloading, Supposition, and Contraction.Bryan Pickel - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):559-578.
    In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provided by our senses and introspection. Thus, on the basis of core evidence, one also can know (S) that water covers the majority of the Earth. This knowledge, Chalmers suggests, requires a great deal of apriori knowledge. Chalmers argues that even if one suspends belief in one’s core evidence, one can nevertheless reason from a description of this evidence to an ordinary claim such as S. Chalmers concludes (...)
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  • Reasoning Biases, Non‐Monotonic Logics and Belief Revision.Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):29-52.
    A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way (...)
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  • How to Make Up One's Mind.Li Zhang & Sven Ove Hansson - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (4):705-717.
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  • Gödel's Third Incompleteness Theorem.Timothy McCarthy - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (1):87-112.
    In a note appended to the translation of “On consistency and completeness” (), Gödel reexamined the problem of the unprovability of consistency. Gödel here focuses on an alternative means of expressing the consistency of a formal system, in terms of what would now be called a ‘reflection principle’, roughly, the assertion that a formula of a certain class is provable in the system only if it is true. Gödel suggests that it is this alternative means of expressing consistency that we (...)
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