In this chapter, I investigate a problem for Kant’s claim that metaphysics can reach the status of science. The problem arises when one considers Kant’s account of the “architectonic unity” of metaphysics in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. Attaining architectonic unity is a condition for becoming a science for any body of cognitions that purports to be such. This is achieved when the cognitions belonging to a science are systematically organized according to the “idea of reason” which lies at the (...) basis of that science. However, Kant suggests that nobody can ever legitimately claim to have matched the idea of the philosopher, where this appears to imply that nobody can justifiably claim that she has fully grasped the idea of metaphysics. This generates a problem. I suggest that when Kant claims that the idea of the philosopher must remain an ideal or an archetype, he has a particular conception of philosophy in mind, that is, philosophy as a doctrine of wisdom. According to this understanding, philosophy must provide an example of how one can become virtuous. However, this is only a partial solution to our problem, for reasons that will be illustrated. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a strong continuity between the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature and the transcendental deduction of the ideas from the first critique. On these grounds, I provide an interpretation of the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature in which I argue that: 1) the necessity of the principle of purposiveness of nature does not derive from its role in solving some specific philosophical problem but from its relation to (...) a cognitive goal; 2) the representation of nature as conforming to the maxims of judgement is a direct, immediate consequence of a certain cognitive goal that the necessity of the empirical laws mentioned by Kant in the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness of nature is not so much their nomic necessity, but their necessity as consequences of higher laws. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to better understand Kant’s conception of philosophy as a “world concept”, which is at the heart of the Architectonic of Pure Reason. This is pursued in two major parts. The first evaluates the textual foundation for reading Kant’s world concept of philosophy as cosmopolitanism and concludes that he most probably never himself equated philosophy as a world concept with any form of cosmopolitanism. The second major part of the paper clarifies this concept of philosophy (...) through the specific role it plays in the argument of the Architectonic. Kant’s unique concept of science is examined and compared with several specific applications of it found elsewhere in Kant’s writings. From this it is concluded that Kant’s intention in the Architectonic was to derive his world concept of philosophy from its logical counterpart, namely the scholastic concept of philosophy, and that its function there is to provide the idea from which the entire structure of Kantian critical metaphysics can be derived. Philosophy as a world concept, it is further argued, is the complete system of critical or Kantian metaphysics in application and the philosopher in this sense is the ideal critical metaphysician who fully realizes its laws through her own understanding and will. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...) drawn surprisingly little attention, I argue that the faculty of feeling has the distinct role of making us aware of the way our faculties relate to each other and to the world. As I show, feelings are affective appraisals of our activity, and as such they play an indispensable orientational function in the Kantian mind. After spelling out Kant's distinction between feeling and desire, I turn to the distinction between feeling and cognition and show that while feelings are non-cognitive states, they have a form of derived-intentionality. §4 argues that what feelings are about, in this derived sense, is our relationship to ourselves and the world: they function as affective appraisals of the state of our agency. §5 shows that this function is necessary to the activity of the mind insofar as it is orientational. Finally, §6 discusses the examples of epistemic pleasure and moral contentment and argues that they manifest the conditions of cognitive and moral agency respectively. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Kant's conception of the history of pure reason and its relation to his metaphilosophy as it is presented in the Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft] (KrV). In particular, I will attempt to answer the following question: why did Kant conclude the KrV with the history of pure reason and why did he insist that, without it, a gap would remain in his system? In the course of attempting to answer this question, I (...) will argue that Kant chose to conclude the KrV with a sketch of the history of pure reason because he took his ability to provide the history of pure reason to be a mark of the adequacy and success of his own philosophical system, in so far as it is the system which comprehends the nature of human reason, specifically the teleological nature of human reason (i.e., the system that recognizes that reason has intrinsic, self-imposed interests and goals) and insofar as it is the only system which, as the culmination of all the past systems of philosophy, is in a position to identify and satisfy all of the interests of human reason. (shrink)

This paper argues that contrary to what is often thought, virtue for Kant is not just a matter of strength of will; it has an essential affective dimension. To support this claim, I show that certain affective dispositions, namely moral feelings and desires, are virtuous in the sense that they are constitutive of virtue at the affective level. There is thus an intrinsic connection between an agent’s practice of virtue and the cultivation of her affective dispositions.

The paper explores Nietzsche's observations on language in Human, All Too Human I, 11; reflects on the anti-realist position that Nietzsche defends in that aphorism; and focuses on the role she plays in his later investigation on Western culture and its anthropology. As will be argued, Nietzsche's criticism towards common sense realism is consistent with some pragmatist epistemologies developed during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. This treat of " timeliness " does not limit Nietzsche's originality on the topic. In fact, (...) the idea that philosophy can contrast the metaphysical commitment of common sense can be seen as the theoretical tool that allows Nietzsche to operate on the development of European culture and society. (shrink)

The subject matter of the article is the concept of “the real use of reason” alluded to by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason A299/b355 and in A305/b362. After comparing it with the “real use of understanding” examined in De mundi sensibilis and in the Critique of Pure Reason, the real use of reason is presented as a legitimate and useful performance that should be distinguished from the deceiving illusion induced by an appearance generated by reason itself. The real use (...) of reason proves itself as an unavoidable condition for the regulative use of ideas as well as a condition for the production of a critical metaphysics. (shrink)

Starting from Lyotard’s definition of Kantian reflection as “judgment repercussion”, my contribution aims to describe the logical side of this repercussion. To do this, I will focus on Kant’s concept of “judgment”, explaining it as the logical act of constitution of experience. I will then point out how judgment involves sensibility for its self-affection and restriction to sensibility. Finally, I’ll give a nominal explication of Kant’s concept of Zweckmäßigkeit, returning to Lyotard’s interpretation. The purpose, in so doing, is to offer (...) to Lyotard’s key concept a logical validation, finding its foundation in the Critique of pure Reason itself. And thus to gain an aesthetical definition of Judgment principle, to read the third Critique. (shrink)

In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant formulates teleological principles, or rather ideas, and explicates them referring to concrete examples of natural science such as chemistry, astronomy, biology, empirical psychology, and physical geography. Despite the increasing interest in the systematic relevance of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and its importance for Kant’s conception of natural science, the numerous historical sources for the regulative use of reason have not yet been investigated. One that is very central is Maupertuis’ principle (...) of least action. In 1781, Kant transformed teleology into heuristics and methodology, but in doing so, he partially develops a teleology which was disqualified by Maupertuis because its starting point lies in the construction of animals or plants, the structure of the earth, and the immensity of the celestial bodies. Based on Maupertuis’ principle of action, it can be shown that the Appendix forms a systematic interface between Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and Critique of Judgement which allows the reconstruction of Kant’s regulative use of reason and its specific status in the context of natural science and his critical appraisal of Maupertuis. (shrink)

This paper explores Beck’s theory of original representing in order to discuss both its historical and theoretical relevance and its implications concerning Kant’s views on the capacity to judge. My first concern will be to highlight the main points of Beck’s Kant interpretation and to show at which points he misunderstands Kant. My analysis also contains a positive aspect, for I adopt Beck’s claim that there is only one possible standpoint from which critical philosophy ought to be judged. Unlike Beck, (...) I shall argue that this standpoint is that of Judgment’s normativity. I will consider the normative structure of Judgment from three perspectives: the proto-synthetic import of sensibility; the normative character of the pure concepts of the understanding; the lawfulness of the principles of the understanding. My basic idea is that only a normative account of Judgment can prove how and why all experience depends on the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. On Kant’s account, the capacity to judge applies transcendental rules to establish the laws which make our experience and knowledge both possible and legitimate. Every single object is an object of experience only insofar as it conforms to the normative structure of Judgment. For Kant, to constitute an object means to apply the rules which make something possible as an object of experience and cognition. (shrink)

Intento di questo scritto è considerare la parvenza trascendentale all’interno di una cornice più ampia, ossia in relazione alla parvenza sensoriale, in quanto benché nell’Introduzione alla «Dialettica Trascendentale» Kant faccia solo brevi riferimenti alla parvenza dei sensi, per soffermarsi, invece, sulla parvenza oggetto di critica, mia convinzione è che, in realtà, sia possibile istituire un parallelo tra le due parvenze, perché ritengo che il modo in cui Kant struttura la questione della parvenza trascendentale sia mutuato da quella sensoriale sia rispetto (...) all’utilizzo di alcuni termini che all’uso di una certa metodologia. Il parallelo istituito è indispensabile affinché ci si possa addentrare in un’altra sottile questione sottesa alla parvenza trascendentale: il passaggio che può verificarsi, in certi casi, da ciò che semplicemente illude a ciò che inganna, che è possibile cogliere attraverso l’ampio vocabolario fornito da Kant: Illusion, Blendwerk, Wahn, Täuschung e Betrug. L’ultima parte è dedicata alla comprensione del perché nell’ambito della parvenza trascendentale la critica venga descritta come un metodo catartico. (shrink)

Scopo della presente ricerca è identificare all’interno della «Dialettica» della prima Critica i due tipi di necessità, naturale e funzionale, di cui sono portatori i concetti puri della ragione nonché di chiarire in che modo l’uno sia legato all’altro. Partendo da un chiarimento terminologico relativo alla parola idea si vuole rendere conto del significato del completamento della serie delle condizioni dell’intelletto da parte della ragione, tanto nei termini di una sistematizzazione dell’esperienza quanto nell’ottica di un rimando alla libertà come forma (...) incondizionata di causalità nel regno della ragion pratica. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that 1) Kant’s power of judgment is constitutively always reflecting, as its lawful employments involve a preliminary self-reference of the faculties the power of judgment itself is required to connect and let them match with each other. Accordingly, I claim that 2) the principle of purposiveness is the principle of the power of judgment as such, and not just of an allegedly self-standing reflecting branch of this faculty. I criticize the view that Kant draws a (...) dichotomy between reflecting and determining judgments and argue that 3) Kant’s point in the third Critique is to rule out the amphiboly between the reflecting and the determining employment of the principle of purposiveness. The power of judgment is, as such, always reflecting: while in the case of cognition it also works in a determining way, in the case of both aesthetics and teleology it is only reflecting, i.e., self-purposive – as it sets its function as its own end. (shrink)

Kant frequently employs the German term Bestimmung in his mature work, and depending on context, this term can signify the Latin determinatio, vocatio, or destinatio. These three senses of Bestimmung are interconnected within Kant’s system of moral teleology. Bestimmung as determination expresses our wills as formed and regulated by the moral law, via the categorical imperative. Bestimmung as vocation guides us toward a determination of willing by rational principles based on the moral law, and this “call” is inseparable from our (...) capacity to will and act autonomously under phenomenal and historical conditions. Bestimmung as “destination” conveys the ends toward which moral cultivation is directed, both individually and collectively. Understanding the three integrated uses of Bestimmung provides a clearer picture of the scope of Kantian ethics encapsulating the long-term goals toward which we are directed individually, as members of communities, and as human beings. (shrink)

The present study seeks to accomplish three goals: to shed light on the problem of reason in Husserl’s co-inherited philosophical project, to elucidate his transcendental critique of reason, and to present Husserl's idea of reason in its distinctive features. A historical excursus first provides a frame to understand the necessity of a critique of reason, its proper subject-matter, and its function for the project of genuine philosophy. In particular, this historical reflection identifies the form that a critique must assume in (...) order to fulfil its philosophical-scientific task. The focus is then directed at Husserl's methodological recalibration of the problem of reason. Husserl's ‘prinzipielle Kritik’ is elucidated in his transcendental reassessment of the headings ‘reason’ and ‘unreason,’ and is thought in connection to the concept of Selbstbesinnung. Lastly, Husserl’s idea of reason is reconstructed in relation to, and in disambiguation from, the concepts of self-evidence, logos, synthesis, fulfilment, positing, etc. Reason, as teleological rule and structural form of transcendental subjectivity, is clarified in its dependence on, and irreducibility to, the problems of constitution and in light of the question of its objective/subjective character. (shrink)

L’esigenza di conferire alla filosofia lo status di scienza per il tramite della forma sistematica è una delle caratteristiche principali dell’idealismo tedesco e, conseguentemente, una peculiarità ravvisabile nella filosofia e di Kant e di Hegel. Il presente contributo mira precisamente a comparare il sistema della ragione kantiano e hegeliano, al fine di metterne in luce gli elementi teoretici distintivi. In tal modo, sarà possibile rilevare non solo l’influsso esercitato dal filosofo di Königsberg sul pensatore di Stoccarda, ma anche l’originalità con (...) la quale il secondo assimila l’istanza sistematica del primo. In particolare, la tesi che si intende sostenere è la seguente: laddove per Kant, in ultima analisi, la dimensione morale è necessaria al fine di realizzare il sistema della ragione, per Hegel è fondamentale la dimensione teoretica, ovvero quella logica-concettuale. (shrink)

The article focuses on re-evaluating Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic by initially highlighting its seemingly negative function within the Critique of Pure Reason as a mere regulative form for cognition and experience. The Dialectic, however, does not only have such a negative-regulative function but also its very own positive and founding character for cognition that even is present in the supposedly most immediate forms of intuition. In exploring this positive side of the Transcendental Dialectic it becomes clear that it manifests itself as (...) a bridge between the so-called theoretical and practical reason inasmuch as it fills in their gap within Kant’s philosophy. From the practical side, the Dialectic is manifest as an action full of purposiveness, maxims, and imperatives within cognition, from a theoretical side it assumes the form of syllogistic inference, which is the adequate and acting theoretical form of practical reason. Therefore, the unity of reason is shown in presenting its inner gap as a dialectical misunderstanding that Kant not only highlights in the Transcendental Dialectic but also tends to leave unsolved mostly. Nevertheless, the Dialectic can be shown as the a priori synthetic act of unifying reason, if investigated in the context of Kant’s complete critical endeavour. (shrink)

Perhaps one of the most pivotal ideas of Kant which connects all of the periods of his continuous intellectual work is the idea of the nature as the whole. According to Kant the nature as the whole is equivalent to totality and universality. This is the rule of the fundamental idea: the particulars finally must be under the general in order to be explicable. But it is interesting to note that this general rule which remains unchanged in Kant’s three periods (...) of intellectual work has a special meaning in each period. So we seek to answer the question of how Kant begins with the nature as the objective and then reaches the nature as the ideal of the pure reason and consider it as the necessary totality for the power of judgment and from there reaches the nature as something that has legal requirements. But such a transformation into the legal and historical nature is possible only if we pay attention to the power of reflective judgments which are contained of aesthetic and teleological judgments. Because it is the power of reflective judgment that provides Kant with the necessary tools to view the nature as a totality whose purpose is the realization of rights. In this sense the nature is something that offers hope to the human race.. (shrink)

In questo articolo si analizzano congiuntamente l'origine delle idee e il loro uso regolativo. A questo scopo si comincia considerando la connessione tra uso logico della ragione e definizione della ragione in generale come facoltà dei principi. Si considera poi come la rappresentazione di un incondizionato derivi necessariamente dall'uso logico, e come quindi questo implichi necessariamente un uso reale della ragione. Si considera poi come le varie rappresentazioni dell'incondizionato diano origine alle idee trascendentali. Infine, si considera l'uso regolativo delle idee (...) alla luce della pratica di inferire dal quale derivano. (shrink)

Neo-Kantianism emerged over the course of the 1860s and it occupied a leading position in the German universities from the 1870s until the First World War. Demands for getting "back to Kant" had become common since the early 1860s, and these demands were discussed in the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin; PGB), which was the international organization of Hegelians. In this paper I address some reactions among the PGB members to the 1860s Kant revival. (...) The journal "Der Gedanke", the organ of the PGB, reported closely how Kant returned to the spotlight of German philosophy. The reactions of the PGB members to the Kant revival was not only critical. Over the course of the 1860s the interest on Kant among the members grew little by little. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss some relevant theses of Caranti?s Kant?s Political Legacy, whose aim is to provide a consistent account of how we could develop Kant?s political thought and see to what extent Kant?s insights can help us to critically understand the 21st century?s political world. First, I will focus on autonomy as the ground of dignity and discuss Caranti?s arguments against the exclusiveness of the Categorical Imperative as the sole principle of true moral agency. Second, I will take (...) into account Caranti?s views on history and consider whether human rational nature can be regarded as containing teleological - though non-biological - elements, thereby questioning Caranti?s Separability Thesis. nema. (shrink)

Il progetto antropologico di un mondo-ambiente nel quale l'uomo, grazie allo sviluppo delle proprie capacità, trova la sua posizione e conquista un ruolo centrale, si inserisce, in Kant, all'interno in un disegno più ampio che pone l'uomo al cospetto di scopi la cui realizzazione va ben al di là di quel che egli può fare; va ben al di là dell'immagine pragmatica di un mondo pensato e progettato a misura d'uomo. Come risulta insufficiente, dunque, ogni antropologia fisiologica che rimanga limitata (...) al punto di vista dell'uomo in quanto prodotto del gioco della natura, altrettanto insufficiente risulterebbe un'antropologia pragmatica che si legasse unicamente alla rappresentazione antropocentrica di un mondo pensato a misura dell'arbitrio e del potere umano. (shrink)