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  1. The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2017 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’ – at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by (...)
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  • The Ladder of Rationality.Julian Fink - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):787-791.
    This paper is a review and critical discussion of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. In particular, it engages critically with Broome’s view on the independence of normative reasons and rationality, his construal of the capacity, property, and requirement senses of “rationality”, and his account of reasoning as a conscious, rule-following operation on mental contents.
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  • Sources, Reasons, and Requirements.Bruno Guindon - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.
    This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some—but not all—requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view—which I (...)
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  • The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):117-140.
    Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’—at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that the property of full rationality is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, by replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement, we do not (...)
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  • Enkrasia.John Broome - 2013 - Organon F 20 (4):425-436.
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  • Normative Lessons for the Scope Debate of Rational Requirements.Julian Fink - 2016 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):99-106.
    A significant part of the debate concerning the nature of rational requirements centers on disambiguating ordinary articulations of conditional requirements of rationality. Particular focus has been put on the question of whether conditional requirements of rationality take a wide or a narrow logical scope. However, this paper shows that this focus is misguided and harmful to the debate. I argue that concentrating on syntactic scope renders us more likely to arrive at incorrect formulations of rational requirements and to overlook questions (...)
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