Adorno's moral philosophy has often been accused of making aporetic prescriptions that are too taxing for moral agents. In this article, I defend his approach in terms of a theory of moral dilemmas. My guideline is Adorno's famous sentence that wrong life cannot be lived rightly. I argue that this claim is not distinctly prescriptive, as most of Adorno's critics believe, but is a claim about moral reality. Emphasizing realist aspects of his moral theory, I suggest that wrong life is (...) neither inconceivable nor an amoral or skeptical trope. Instead, Adorno's sentence about wrong life can be interpreted as a claim about the salience of particular moral facts. This, I conclude, allows Adorno to envisage moral reasons that motivate moral conduct case by case, although they are blocked overall. (shrink)

This article discusses the problem of understanding in Adorno’s critical theory. It is argued that another rationale for the contingency of understanding is provided by Adorno, one that justifies understanding critical theory as disclosing critique. For Adorno, what is responsible for the contingency of understanding is not the local limitation of our knowledge and vocabulary, but the presupposition of understanding itself. In this article, two readings of this contingency of understanding are distinguished: an epistemo-critical one and an ideology-critical one. Finally, (...) the case is made for adopting the epistemo-critical view of the contingency of understanding in preference to the ideology-critical view - not least because it contains a normative impulse which goes beyond contextualism. (shrink)

This essay defends a form of ethical naturalism in which ethical knowledge is explained by human nature. Human nature, here, is not the essence of the species but its natural history as socially and historically determined. The argument does not lead to social relativism, but it does place limits on the scope of ethical critique. As society becomes “total”, critique can only be immanent; to this extent, Adorno and the Frankfurt School are right.

This article reinterprets the Dialectic of Enlightenment as a retelling of the Christian myth of the Fall. Through its account of the aporia, which Horkheimer and Adorno maintain stands at its core, the Dialectic of Enlightenment rearticulates the doctrine of original sin. The human condition is presented as tragic, and the source of this tragedy is inscribed into the very structure of human subjectivity. While the Dialectic of Enlightenment refuses to abandon hope, emancipation is reconceptualised on the model of redemption; (...) a kind of fulfilment of human nature, which would at the same time be an escape from it. Horkheimer and Adorno dispense, however, with any transcendent source of grace. Instead, the activity of philosophy itself takes on redemptive quality. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Adorno’s critical theory is distinguished by his affirming what I call the ‘Wrong Life Claim’, the claim that everything in existence exhibits wrongness or badness. This claim is notoriously hard to justify. The WLC, as I describe it, appears to rest on two things: the first is a form of Hegelian social holism; the second is some experience of or fundamental orientation towards reality which can motivate an ‘inversion’ of said holism. In this paper, I will leave aside questions of (...) whether Hegelian holism is itself justified, and instead focus my efforts on convincing already-convinced Hegelians of the plausibility of the WLC. My argument is that we can formulate a version of the WLC that stands a chance of convincing ‘the Hegelian’ by focusing on the Kierkegaardian heritage of Adorno’s ideas: specifically, by understanding Adornian ‘wrongness’ to be analogous to ‘despair’, a concept which Kierkegaard explores at length in The Sickness Unto Death. (shrink)

This paper advances a novel take on Chantal Mouffe’s appropriation of the late Wittgenstein, arguing that Wittgenstein’s philosophy, at the same time, gives rise to and offers a solution to the relativism problem as it can be found in Mouffe’s radical political thought. Unlike other vindications of Wittgenstein-inspired political thought, I also show at which point Wittgenstein’s support for such an approach comes to an end. I thus acknowledge that the relativism problem – at least to some extent – stems (...) from the ambiguity of Wittgensteinian thought itself. After having outlined these challenges, I suggest turning to alternative approaches from the field of critical social philosophy. In particular, Rahel Jaeggi’s Frankfurt School account of forms of life highlights what such a non-relativist but still context-sensitive approach may look like. By virtue of this last step, this paper contributes to recent engagements by Critical Theorists with the late Wittgenstein. (shrink)

It is often claimed that Hegel's philosophy cannot accept that something would remain beyond the grasp of conceptual language, and that his thought therefore systematically represses the possibility that something cannot be said. By analysing Hegel's account of the ineffable in the ‘Sense-Certainty’ chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, this article argues that Hegel does not repress, but firmly confronts the problem of what cannot be said. With the help of Giorgio Agamben's linguistic interpretation, it is shown that Hegel's conception (...) of the ineffable must be understood from the perspective of his dialectical understanding of language. What appears to be ineffable is only the constitutive result of the dialectical negation that conceptual discourse enacts. Consequently, the ineffable in Hegel's thought cannot be said to remain external to and independent from conceptual language. (shrink)

Lack of attention to definitions of indigeneity is a problem in both political theory and practice. Defining indigeneity has at least two important consequences: it affects who has access to resources or rights reserved for Indigenous peoples; and it shapes the kinds of privileges and resources available to Indigenous peoples. In this article, I draw on Theodor Adorno’s concept of ‘nonidentity’ as a resource for exploring the power and limits of conceptions of indigeneity. I argue that recognizing the non-identical aspects (...) of indigeneity enables critical engagement with constellations of concepts that attend to the distinctive aspects of indigeneity in particular moments and locations. To illustrate my argument, I draw on one conception of indigeneity that could be characterized as non-identity thinking – a research approach called Kaupapa Māori. I suggest that non-identity is a promising resource for conceptualizing indigeneity as it has potential to respond to some of the key problems with current responses to indigeneity; notably, that universal definitions may not best represent what it means to be Indigenous, and that unreflective acceptance of current definitions fails to produce just outcomes. (shrink)

A wave of recent studies attributes to Adorno, if not a full-fledged moral theory, at least an ethical model regarded to be adequate to the conditions of late modernity. The article argues that any attempt aimed at isolating an independent ethical domain out of Adorno’s philosophical writings is misguided. Adorno belongs to a tradition of thinkers - including Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger - who break away from the modern idea that the task of philosophy is to provide rational foundations (...) for the moral beliefs of individuals. Although it is true that Adorno’s work is scattered with innumerable moral considerations, the article suggests that these do not constitute the basis of a coherent moral system, but are to be understood within the context of Hegel’s philosophy of history retranslated in materialist terms. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s new categorical imperative : it suggests that the new imperative is an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential part of moral philosophy, (...) and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge to be translated into right action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My interpretation of the new categorical imperative focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the old, Kantian one—self-evidence and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. (shrink)

Завданням філософії, за думкою Адорно, є усвідомлення всезагального та необхідного. Не зважаючи на розвінчання понятійності як такої в «негативній філософії», Адорно залишається в рамках модерного проєкту. З цієї принциповості, а також з оригінальності, парадоксальності його мислення народжується цікава констеляція етичних міркувань, концептів моральної філософії, що можна поєднати в певну модель практичної раціональності. Ця конструкція пропонується до уваги в даній статті як конструкція практичної філософії німецького критика. Ідеї, що представлені в його моральній філософії осмислюються в перспективі розгорнення проблематики нормативного ядра критичної (...) теорії від першого покоління Франкфуртської школи через дискурсивну етику до сучасної критичної філософії. В статті показано розходження в обґрунтуванні належного між адорнівською філософією та дискурсивною етикою як розходження стосовно можливостей реалізації нормативності в формальних умовах комунікації. Позиція Адорно із збереженням кантіанських засад висвітлює те, навколо чого розгортується критика та нові формулювання дискурсивної етики. Адорно акцентує увагу на амбівалентності універсального в моральному мисленні, через встановлення «внутрішньої діалектики моралі». Він виступає проти абстрактності, формальності, що приховує за собою підпорядкування всього різноманіття та різнобічного своєрідність життя тотальній раціональності. Замість цього він пропонує поняття людяності, гуманності. Абстрактність є рисою визначення моралі через закон, що вимагає рівного відношення до всіх, яке виводиться абстрактними процедурами розуму, Адорно ж підкреслює імпульсивність, тобто саме те, що товкає до морального рішення. Діалектика моралі Адорно розгортається між імпульсом, відчуттям солідарності, живого відношення до існування з Іншими, та абстрактним принципом моралі із ключовим обґрунтуванням рівності та автономії. В результаті між цими модусами мислення про моральне встановлюється взаємозв’язок, індивідуалістичний модус є джерелом морального, але через рефлексію морального досвіду, етичні установки критики і пильності універсалізм та загальність не мають рис формального та зовнішнього. Дві сторони питання, що наявні в діалектиці морального за Адорно, імпульс і принцип поєднуються як теоретичний аспект, обґрунтування та практичний – застосування. Відтак висвітлюється ключова проблема для протистояння між універсалізмом та контекстуалізмом – гармонізація _правильності_ як морального закону та _блага_ як етичної установки. (shrink)

Adorno's moral philosophy is famously problematic. One of the main reasons for this is that it revolves around the moral addendum: a physical impulse of solidarity with suffering beings that, he argues, cannot and should not be rationalized. I show that, since this moral addendum remains vague and since Adorno's radical negativity forces him to dismiss as uncritical all other approaches to morality, he deliberately places his thought in danger of relapsing into irrationality. Most commentators therefore disagree about the manner (...) in which Adorno's references to the moral addendum can be translated into a moral theory. In this paper, I bring in some often overlooked material to form a more complete overview of the issues at hand and to adjudicate this contested area. I do this by briefly discussing Schopenhauer's moral observations on Mitleid and by focusing on Adorno's references to animal cruelty and corporeality. Although this interpretation stays close to Adorno's observations on the moral addendum, it forces us to accept that his moral philosophy is rather weak. I conclude, however, that this weakness reflects a disturbing aspect of reality and in that sense has critical value. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates what it identifies as ‘the institutional theory of freedom’ developed within recent neo-Hegelian philosophy. While acknowledging the gains made against the Kantian theory of autonomy as detachment it is argued that the institutional theory ultimately undermines the very meaning of practical agency. By tying agency to institutionally sustained recognition it effectively excludes the exercise of practical reason geared toward emancipation from a settled normative order. Adorno's notion of autonomy as resistance is enlisted to develop an account (...) of practical reason that is neither institutionally constrained nor without appropriate consideration of the historical location of the practical agent. (shrink)

Against the common supposition that Adorno’s thinking remains caught in a distressing form of pessimism rendering it impotent in the face of modern capitalism and the fungibility of subjects, the article argues that the operation of negative dialectics inherently contains a productive moment that suggests the promise of a qualitatively different philosophy. Through an analysis that employs the multivalent senses of play at work in Adornian thinking — and particularly the notions of gamble, risk and chance — as its primary (...) interpretive key, the article shows that this promise for a philosophy ‘to come’ is at work in the use of parataxis and the practice of constellating concepts; in the invocation of metaphysical experience and affective language; and in the descriptions of critical philosophy as engaged in a practice of ‘critique and rescue’ or ‘wounded healing’. (shrink)

When Adorno refers to the concept of maturity (Mündigkeit), he generally means having the courage and the ability to use one’s own understanding independently of dominant heteronomous patterns of thought. This Kantian-sounding claim is essentially an exhortation: maturity demands self-liberation from heteronomy, i.e. autonomy. The problem, however, is that in spite of Adorno’s general endorsement of Kant’s definition of maturity, he ultimately rejects the corresponding Kantian definition of autonomy. Yet Adorno does not simply discard the Kantian concept of autonomy. On (...) the contrary, he will try to correct it by returning to it what it lacks, namely, intimacy or ‘live contact with the warmth of things’. In this gesture, he aims to restore to autonomy its ethical substance or lived ethical context, not as a mere supplement to the purity of duty, but rather as necessary to the very process of becoming mature. This article examines Adorno’s concept of maturity in the context of the dialectical relationship between autonomy and intimacy. (shrink)

I argue that Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy articulates a radical conception of hope. According to Lear, radical hope is ‘directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is’. Given Adorno’s claim that the current world is radically evil, and that we cannot know or even imagine what the good is, it is plausible that his conception of hope must be radical in this sense. I develop this argument through an analysis of Adorno’s engagement with (...) Kant’s conception of hope, Adorno’s references to hope and his critical diagnosis of a metaphysical need for hope. Having demonstrated that Adorno must reject both ordinary and Kantian hope, I examine why Adorno thinks that we still may have reasons for hope. I also show that Adorno’s conception of hope differs from Lear’s in one important respect. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical interpretation of the theme, point, and methodological status of Adorno’s so-called negative dialectic. The theme at issue, ‘non-identity’, comes in several varieties; and the point of Adorno’s dialectic, namely reconciliation, is multifaceted. Exploration of those topics shows that negative dialectic seques into substantive doctrines, including a version of transcendentalism and a claim about deformation. The peculiar methodological status of negative dialectic explains that adumbration. In the appraisive register, my principal contentions include these: Adorno’s transcendentalism makes (...) some sense of the aforementioned deformation claim; and negative dialectic qua method avoids mystery and metaphysical excess. (shrink)

Many recent commentators have noticed how Adorno, in his late works, borrows Kant’s definition of enlightenment to define key areas of his own critical practice. These discussions, however, have failed to notice how these late borrowings present an image of Kant’s enlightenment which is diametrically opposed to his previous discussions. By tracing the development of Adorno’s engagement with Kant’s essay, I discover Adorno deliberately sublating Kant’s definition as to enable its incorporation into his own works. Further, the article will examine (...) some problems which appear to arise for Adorno when borrowing Kant’s definition of enlightenment in his late works, which coalesce around the topics of negativism and the prospects for societal change. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold. In the first place, I should like to show that Adorno’s philosophy is dependent, to a degree perhaps not always directly recognized in the literature, on a deeply contentious view on the relationship between the mind and the body. In order to show this, I explore and bring out the epistemic and ethical stakes for Adorno’s theory of the relationship between mind and body. Secondly, I move to better articulate precisely what Adorno’s view (...) on the nature of this relationship is. I hold that his position revolves around positing a porous boundary between the domains of the somatic and the cognitive. In closing, I show that Adorno’s account relies on this domain boundary being unidirectionally porous, in that determination of somatic impulses by cognitive content does not seem a live option for Adorno. I go on to note that this smuggles in a dubious position which does a lot of unearned work. The stakes which his implicit account of the body and mind relationship serv.. (shrink)

Adorno’s commitment to anti-foundationalism generates a concern over how his ethically normative appraisals of social phenomena can be founded. Drawing on both Kohlmann and Bernstein’s account, I produce a new reading which contends somatic impulses are capable of bearing intrinsically normative epistemic and moral content. This entails a new way of understanding Adorno’s contention that Auschwitz produced a new categorical imperative. Working with Bernstein’s account, I claim that Auschwitz makes manifest the hostility of the instrumentalization of reason to the somatic (...) grounds of reason. One’s mimetic identification with the victims of Auschwitz arouses a self-preserving desire to intercede in and re-orient the progress of reason itself, for the sake of one’s own somatic integrity. In closing, I claim – contra Zuidervaart – that this reading allows us to place the ethical as primary in Adorno, without reducing the political to it. (shrink)

There is a perennial problem affecting Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy: his theory seems to lack the resources to account for his normative claims. James Gordon Finlayson has offered an intriguing solution. He argues that within Adorno’s philosophy it is possible to access a kind of good that is suitable as a normative basis for his ethics: the good involved in the experiences of trying to have insights into the ineffable. In this paper, I show that this proposal is unsuitable both (...) (1) as a normative basis of Adorno’s ethics; and also (2) for explaining how it is possible for people to act according to this ethics. I outline an alternative solution that relies only on Adorno’s conception of the bad and defend it against objections. (shrink)

ExcerptI. Introduction Minima Moralia seems to go further than any other of Adorno's published works toward developing a substantive ethical point of view on modern society. It might appear curious, then, that this book could also stake an entirely plausible claim to be the most neglected and underappreciated work in Adorno's critical oeuvre.1 Minima Moralia has simply not been able to generate the critical readings of the same scope and influence that have helped make a name for the more programmatic (...) Negative Dialectics, nor those that have drawn on the ever popular, posthumously published Aesthetic Theory.2. (shrink)

In the aftermath of national or international tragedies, appeals for action such as, “Never Forget” or “Never Again” are ubiquitous. Theodor Adorno makes a similar call in the wake of the Holocaust, proclaiming that all education should be focused on the prevention of another genocide. While most would agree with such a statement, practically how do we respond to such a call, specifically in light of Adorno’s work? Answering this question is at the heart of this project and I argue (...) that imaginative memorials can fulfill Adorno’s criteria for post-Auschwitz education. I first present a theory of moral imagination by relying on contemporary accounts of the theory and then show how it complements Adorno’s work, specifically by offering an explanatory foundation to a number of his claims. I reveal that many of Adorno’s observations about the world are supported by recent advancements in the understanding of imagination and I argue that the combination of contemporary accounts of moral imagination and Adorno’s thought are mutually beneficial. After the two theories have been sufficiently discussed and integrated, I focus on Adorno’s arguments regarding education following Auschwitz. Adorno argues that we should investigate how such a horror could occur, and the people who committed the acts of genocide. Such information will be helpful for the prevention of another Auschwitz because we can attempt to overcome the values and ideas of those who perpetrated genocide. This dissertation is unique and of philosophical importance because it fleshes out Adorno’s discussion of the characteristics that led to the Holocaust and argues for a specific form of education that meets all of the criteria of Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education: memorials that stimulate the visitor’s imagination. In order to make this point, I highlight specific Holocaust memorials that are imaginative and argue for their efficacy. My goal for the project is to actualize Adorno’s post-Auschwitz education initiative through imaginative memorials. (shrink)

© Editorial matter and selection, 2008 Deborah Cook. Introduction Moral philosophy used to be full of promises. In ancient times, it aimed at providing a guide to the good life that integrated moral matters with other concerns. In modern times, it set out to present a supreme principle of morality from which a full-blown system of obligations and permissions was meant to be derived, guiding or constraining our conduct. However, if Adorno is to be believed, the promises of moral philosophy (...) have not been fulfilled: neither the good life, nor even the moral life, is currently available. In this sense, his position can be characterized as a negative moral philosophy. What makes this position interesting is why Adorno thinks that both the good life and the moral life are blocked and what implications he draws from this in terms of criticizing the dominant strands of modern moral philosophy and suggesting how we should live our distorted and deformed lives. In this chapter we shall look at each of these aspects and ask the following questions: 1. Why can no one live the right life in our current social world? 2. Why does the task of moral philosophy today consist essentially in the critique of moral philosophy? 3. Does Adorno say anything about how we should live, or is his negative moral philosophy devoid of any practical guidance? The impossibility of right living today Adorno is not alone in thinking that something is problematic about ethical practice and theory in the modern social world. For example, contemporary Aristotelians often lament the breakdown of traditional social practices which underwrote the exercise of the virtues. (shrink)