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Embodiment and Behavior

In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press (1976)

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  1. Foldor' solipsisms: dont's look a gift horse in the ….Donald A. Norman - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):90-90.
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  • Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.
    The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between (...)
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  • The content of a representation also depends on the procedure interpreting it.A. K. Joshi - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):84-84.
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  • Foundations for Moral Relativism.James David Velleman - 2013 - Cambridge, UK: OpenBook Publishers.
    In Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The five self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual (...)
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  • Organizational Ontology and The Moral Status of the Corporation.Lance B. Kurke - 1997 - Business Ethics Quarterly 7 (4):91-108.
    Abstract:This paper explores an ontological approach to the issue of whether corporations, like individuals, are morally responsible for their actions. More specifically, we investigate the identity of organizations relative to the individuals that compose them. Based on general systems theory, the traditional assumption is that social collectives are more complex, variable, and loosely coupled than individuals. This assumption rests on two premises. The first is a view of the individual as simple, stable, and tightly coupled (i.e., unitary). The second premise (...)
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  • Self to self.David Velleman - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):39-76.
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  • Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle.Wanja Wiese - 2024 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational simulation of such neural computations is conscious? Or must this computational simulation be implemented in the right way, in order to replicate consciousness? From the perspective of Karl Friston’s free energy principle, self-organising systems (such as living organisms) share a set of properties that could be realised in artificial systems, but are not (...)
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  • The Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and modality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 242.
    One of the main problems of personal identity is supposed to be how we relate to our bodies. A few philosophers endorse what is called a 'bodily criterion of personal identity': they say that we are our bodies, or at any rate that our identity over time consists in the identity of our bodies. Many more deny this--typically on the grounds that we can imagine ourselves coming apart from our bodies. But both sides agree that the bodily criterion is an (...)
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  • Methodological solipsism.Andrew Woodfield - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):98-99.
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  • Functionalism and type physicalism.Michael Tye - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (September):161-74.
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  • Dasein's revenge: methodological solipsism as an unsuccessful escape strategy in psychology.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):78-79.
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  • Fodor's guide to cognitive psychology.Jerrold J. Katz - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):85-89.
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  • States' rights.Ned Block & Sylvain Bromberger - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):73-74.
    This is a response to Jerry Fodor’s article, Fodor, J. (1980). "Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 63-109.
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  • Paying the price for methodological solipsism.Stephen P. Stich - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):97-98.
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  • Computational processes, representations and propositional attitudes.J. J. C. Smart - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):97-97.
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  • Methodological realism.Robert Shaw & M. T. Turvey - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):94-97.
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  • Two objections to methodological solipsism.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):93-94.
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  • Methodological behaviorism: a case for transparent texonomy.David M. Rosenthal - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):92-93.
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  • The formal and the opaque.Georges Rey - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):90-92.
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  • Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, eds Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar.Ian Phillips - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):639-650.
    If Ned Block were a rockstar he would be Mick Jagger: sartorial, iconic, ever youthful, and still producing hit records after half a century. Fittingly, then, P.
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  • Syntax, functional semantics, and referential semantics.Brian F. Loar - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):89-90.
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  • Selfless experience.Geoffrey Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):207-243.
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  • Implications of Fodor' methodological solipsism for psychological theories.Peter W. Jusczyk & Bruce Earhard - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):84-85.
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  • Sensing and reference.S. D. Isard - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):83-84.
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  • Knowing about formality.Pat Hayes - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):82-83.
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  • Formality and naturalism.John Haugeland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):81-82.
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  • What is methodological solipsism?Gilbert Harman - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):81-81.
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  • Some remarks on representations.P. T. Geach - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):80-81.
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  • Methodological solipsism: replies to commentators.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):99-109.
    The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between (...)
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  • Fodor flawed.Gareth Evans - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):79-80.
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  • On the need for a computational psychology and the hope for a naturalistic one.Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):76-78.
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  • Causes and representation.Robert Cummins - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):76-76.
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  • Some defects in Fodor' ‘computational’ theory.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):75-76.
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  • In defense of naturalism.Paul M. Churchland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):74-75.
    History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a “methodological naturalism” that disregards talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical (...)
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  • Some aspirin for Dasein.Eugene Charniak - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):74-74.
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