Recent pleas for more heterodoxy in explaining economic action have been defending a pluralism for economics. In this article, I analyse these defences by scrutinizing the pluralistic qualities in the work of one of the major voices of heterodoxy, Tony Lawson. This scrutiny will focus on Lawson's alternatives concerning ontology and explanation to mainstream economics. Subsequently, I will raise some doubts about Lawson's pluralism, and identify questions that will have to be addressed by heterodox economists in order to maintain the (...) claim of pluralism. (shrink)

This paper explores themethodological consequences of AmericanPragmatism for the social sciences. It alsocriticises some rival perspectives onmethodology of social research, in particularfalsificationist, realist and someanti-naturalist views. It is argued thatAmerican Pragmatism shows striking affinitieswith the genealogical method of history and thereflexive turn in cultural anthropology. It isalso argued that Pragmatism forces us to thinkdifferently about the relationship betweentheory and empirical research.

This chapter discusses the import of philosophical discussions of ontology for organisational studies. It analyses the ontological presuppositions of positivism that still permeate much of sociology and organisational studies. These ontological presuppositions are then discussed from philosophical perspectives that propose or presuppose different ontologies: interpretivism; Heideggerian ontology; negative ontology and realism. The chapter then traces how these philosophical debates are reflected and extended in the field of organisational studies. The following approaches are discussed: positivism, Marxism, critical realism, post-foundational approaches, actor (...) network theory, process perspectives, postcolonial critique, ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism. We conclude by highlighting promising developments at the intersection of ontology and organisation studies: encouraging multiple methods of enquiry; asking ‘what is’, ‘how did’ and ‘what does it do’ questions; reflecting on ontology’s ethical and political implications; and refining the sensitivity and coherence of future studies of organisations. (shrink)

As microeconomic calculus and macroeconomic estimation superseded earlier approaches to political economy, broad questions about how things are (ontology), how things might be known (epistemology), and how science should proceed (methodology) were neglected. As a corrective, Critical Realism (CR) has been proposed as an alternative to the orthodox deductive‐nomological (ODN) tradition; i.e., to mathematical deduction and statistical induction. In their place, retroduction—the use of analogy, metaphor, intuition and ordinary language—is supposed to illuminate root causes by identifying the deep mechanisms that (...) govern events. CR offers guidelines for social science that are of a most general kind: from initial “premises,” retroduction proceeds to hypotheses about deep structures and mechanisms. The initial premises are determined by a desire to understand events that surprise us. However, nothing is thereby excluded, including ODN. And since historical processes are revealed neither by assumption nor by the net effects of whatever initial conditions hold, it might be apposite to drop the search for (deep) socio‐economic laws and to use whatever evidence is at hand to see whether, and the extent to which, ideal types apply to any given historical sequence. (shrink)

In recent years there have been an increasing number of contributions to economic methodology that develop or seek to reveal ontological positions. Despite this there is no agreement about either what ontology is or how it can contribute to economics. For some ontological theorising reveals the presuppositions of economists and its role is largely descriptive. Others see ontology as primarily engaged in setting out and defending a general account of some domain of reality and suggest that such a conception can (...) help us evaluate the appropriateness of the methods economists deploy. In this paper I clarify the scope and role of such theorising in economics by considering two projects with ontological orientations, namely critical realism in economics as developed by Tony Lawson and Nancy Cartwright’s work on the nature of economic theory. I argue that there are similarities between these two projects but also differences and show that these can be better understood once we recognise that each draws on a distinct conception of the legitimate scope of ontological theorising. I use Peirce’s writings on the nature of sustainable metaphysical analysis to clarify certain aspects of the approach to ontological theorising that Lawson favours. (shrink)

In this article, I clarify some of the key concepts and commitments of realist social ontology in economics. To do so, I make use of a recent critique of Lawson’s Reorienting Economics by Mohun and Veneziani. Their article provides a useful foil because responding to their critique allows us to emphasize that realism’s claims are more conditional and less controversial than one might otherwise anticipate. The basic claim is that ontology matters and that explicit recognition and consideration of ontological issues (...) can be beneficial. However, developing a focus on ontology can create problems of interpretation among economists regarding what is being claimed and offered. I discuss some of these with reference to an adaption of Maki’s concept of economics imperialism and also with reference to Mary Morgan’s recent typology of experiments. (shrink)

From the perspective of a realist philosophy of social science, the recent explosion of criticisms of mainstream economics, including reinvigorated Austrian criticism, provides what seems like a rich opportunity to join what are too often disjoined disciplinary interests and inquirers, and also to extend the arguments not only as regards the realist theory of social science, but also as regards the implications of this approach for economics. I begin with a minimum sketch of key features of realist philosophy of science (...) as I understand it. The central difference turns on the role and nature of explanation and of theory, between what is frequently termed ‘deductivism’, and on an alternative in which explanation requires the articulation of a causal mechanism, for example, the mechanism provided by molecular chemistry that gives us an understanding of oxidation. I take the position that in social science, explanation requires social causal mechanisms. I consider the Austrian contribution from this point of view and conclude with some hints regarding how the foregoing bears on our understanding of capitalism and socialism. (shrink)

Recent developments in themethodology of economics have drawn uponpragmatist and realist philosophies of socialscience. These recent developments areoutlined. It is argued that a specific variantof realist philosophy known as critical realismcan provide the basis for a prescriptiveeconomic methodology that is not susceptible topragmatist criticisms.

The discipline of economics can benefit from a more explicit, systematic, and sustained concern with ontology; that is, with the philosophical analysis of the nature of the social world. Contrary to the argument advanced in these pages by Gerry Steele , critical-realist ontological analysis encourages fruitful economic research in a number of ways: by helping to identify research methods suitable for analyzing economic issues; by promoting the development of key substantive economic concepts; and by helping to reveal and resolve inconsistencies (...) in existing research. (shrink)

In Part 1 of this wide-ranging interview Tony Lawson first discusses his role in the formation of IACR and how he relates to the generalized use of the term ‘Critical Realism’. He then provides com...

This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.

This dissertation shows how initial conditions play a special role in the explanation of contingent and irregular outcomes, including, in the form of geographic context, the special case of uneven development in the social sciences. The dissertation develops a general theory of this role, recognizes its empirical limitations in the social sciences, and considers how it might be applied to the question of uneven development. The primary purpose of the dissertation is to identify and correct theoretical problems in the study (...) of uneven development; it is not intended to be an empirical study. Chapter 1 introduces the basic problem, and discusses why it has become especially salient in debates concerning uneven development. Chapter 2 develops an argument for the importance of initial conditions in the philosophy of science, developed specifically in the context of the Bhaskar/Cartwright ‘open systems’ (and by extension, ‘exogenous factor’) emphasis on the ubiquity of contingency in the universe and rejection of explanation based on laws of nature (regularity accounts) of causation. Chapter 3 makes three claims concerning the concept of contingency, especially as related to the study of society: 1) that there are eight distinct uses of the word contingency, and its many meanings are detrimental to clarity of discussion and thought in history and the social sciences; 2) that it is possible to impose some order on these different uses through developing a classification of contingency into three types based on assumptions concerning possible worlds and determinism; 3) that one of the classes is a special use of the word without relevance to the social sciences, while the two remaining classes are nothing more than a variety of the ‘no hidden factors’ argument in the debate on indeterminism and determinism (and thus related to the concept of spacetime trajectories caused by initial conditions and the interference of these in the form of ‘exogenous factors’ with ‘open systems’). Chapter 4 The concept of explanation based on initial conditions together with laws of nature is widely associated with determinism. In the social sciences determinism has frequently been rejected due to the moral dilemmas it is perceived as presenting. Chapter 4 considers problems with this view. Chapter 5 considers attitudes among geographers, economists, and historians towards using geographic factors as initial conditions in explanation and how they might acceptably be used, in particular their role in ‘anchoring’ aspatial theories of social processes to real-world distributions. Chapter 6 considers the relationship of the statistical methods common in development studies with the trend towards integrating geographical factors into econometric development studies. It introduces the statistical argument on ‘apparent populations’ that arrives at conclusions concerning determinism consistent with Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation. The need for the visual interpretation of data with descriptive statistics and maps and their utility in the study of uneven development is discussed with a number of examples. Chapter 7 applies these concepts to the ‘institutions versus geography’ debate in development studies, using Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s 2002 ‘reversal of fortune’ argument as a primary example. Chapter 8 considers possible directions for future work, both theoretical and empirical. Chapter 9 concludes with a discussion of additional possible objections to the use of initial conditions as exogenous factors in explanation. (shrink)

Se analizará en este texto la noción de aislamiento en el Realismo Crítico de Tony Lawson y su relación con su posición frente al uso de los modelos económicos mainstream para acceder al mundo social. Distinguiremos las nociones de abstracción y aislamiento en este autor. Mostraremos la irreductibilidad de las mismas y que la consideración de la complejidad de la realidad social se relaciona con su posición sobre el rol del aislamiento para llegar a ella.

This paper tries to deepen the notion of isolation in Tony Lawson´s Critical Realism and its relation with his position on the use of mainstream economic models to access the social world. I distinguish the notion of isolation and abstraction in this author. I show that the consideration of the complexity of social reality is related to his position on the role of isolation to reach it. Lawson´s social ontology is central to establish what the role is that isolation performs (...) in the knowledge of the social realm. There is, in this author, a pre-eminence of the ontological over the theoretical. How the world is determines the methodological possibilities to know it. (shrink)