The present essay on the being of the sensible investigates the individuation of intensity differentials. This is Deleuze's theme in the fifth chapter of Difference and Repetition, where he places individuation in the context of his ‘transcendental empiricism’. The mechanisms of subjectivation are conceived as spatially-temporally determined actualisations (of the virtual) whose implicit intensity relations are neither accessible empirically nor are they governed by transcendental conditions (in the conventional sense). Central to the discussion is the distinction, stemming from Kant, between (...) intensive and extensive magnitudes. (shrink)

In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well-summarized in Hume's maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or (...) localized a faculty to register them. We defend the perception of necessity against such Humeanism, drawing on examples from mathematics. (shrink)

Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume’s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within (...) this epistemological model, we cannot attain complete certainty about the continuum but only at most about discrete quantity. Geometry, in contrast to arithmetic, cannot be a fully exact science. A number of more recent commentators have offered sympathetic interpretations of Hume’s discussion aiming to correct the older tendency to dismiss this part of the Treatise as weak and confused. Most of these commentators interpret Hume as anticipating the contemporary idea of a finite or discrete geometry. They view Hume’s conception that space is composed of simple indivisible minima as a forerunner of the conception that space is a discretely (rather than continuously) ordered set. This approach, in my view, is helpful as far as it goes, but there are several important features of Hume’s discussion that are not sufficiently appreciated. I go beyond these recent commentators by emphasizing three of Hume’s most original contributions. First, Hume’s epistemological model invokes the “confounding” of indivisible minima to explain the appearance of spatial continuity. Second, Hume’s sharp contrast between the perfect exactitude of arithmetic and the irremediable inexactitude of geometry reverses the more familiar conception of the early modern tradition in pure mathematics, according to which geometry (the science of continuous quantity) has its own standard of equality that is independent from and more exact than any corresponding standard supplied by algebra and arithmetic (the sciences of discrete quantity). Third, Hume has a developed explanation of how geometry (traditional Euclidean geometry) is nonetheless possible as an axiomatic demonstrative science possessing considerably more exactitude and certainty that the “loose judgements” of the vulgar. (shrink)

Hume’s account of the origin and nature of our ideas of space and time is generally thought to be the least satisfactory part of his empiricist system of philosophy. The main reason is internal in that the account is judged to be inconsistent with Hume’s fundamental principle for the relationship between senses and cognition, the copy principle. This paper defends Hume against the inconsistency objection by offering a new systematic interpretation of Hume on space and time and illuminating more generally (...) the role of the copy principle in his philosophy. Humes Theorie des Wesens und des Ursprungs unserer Vorstellungen von Raum und Zeit wird generell zu den am wenigsten befriedigenden Teilen seiner empiristischen Philosophie gezählt. Der Hauptgrund dafür ist werkimmanent: Die Raum- Zeit-Theorie einerseits und Humes „copy principle“ andererseits – d.h. dasjenige Fundamental-Prinzip, das die Relation zwischen unseren Sinnen und unserem Denken regelt – werden als miteinander inkonsistent erachtet. Dieser Beitrag bietet eine neue, systematische Interpretation der Raum-Zeit-Lehre Humes und eine umfassendere Darstellung der Rolle des „copy principles“ in seiner Philosophie an. Auf diese Weise wird Hume gegen den Vorwurf der Inkonsistenz verteidigt. (shrink)

Eric Watkins has argued on philosophical, textual, and historical grounds that Kant’s account of causation in the first Critique should not be read as an attempt to refute Hume’s account of causation. In this paper, I challenge the arguments for Watkins’ claim. Specifically, I argue (1) that Kant’s philosophical commitments, even on Watkins’ reading, are not obvious obstacles to refuting Hume, (2) that textual evidence from the “Disciple of Pure Reason” suggests Kant conceived of his account of causation as such (...) a refutation, and (3) that none of Hume’s early German critics provided responses to this account that would have satisfied Kant. Watkins’ reading of Kant’s account of causation is thus more compatible with traditional views about Kant’s relationship to Hume than Watkins believes. (shrink)