ABSTRACT This article defends the following argument: what makes you and I valuable so that it is wrong to kill us now is what we are (essentially). But we are essentially physical organisms, who, embryology reveals, came to be at conception/fertilisation. I reply to the objection to this argument (as found in Dean Stretton, Judith Thomson, and Jeffrey Reiman), which holds that we came to be at one time, but became valuable as a subject of rights only some time later, (...) in virtue of an acquired characteristic. I argue against this position that the difference between a basic, natural capacity and some degree of development of such a capacity is a mere difference in degree, that this position logically implies the denial of equal personal dignity, and that the selection of the required degree of development of a capacity is necessarily arbitrary. (shrink)

In this paper I analyse who should be able to control the use of human embryonic stem cell lines. I distinguish between different kinds of control and analyse a set of arguments that purport to show that the donors of gametes and embryos should not be able to control the use of stem cell lines derived from their embryos. I show these arguments to be either deficient or of so general a scope that they apply not only to donors but (...) also to those who derived the stem cell lines. Since we normally think that stem cell derivers have the right to control the use of the cell lines they derived, we have no justification for denying donors similar rights of control. In the final section I briefly discuss why informed consent is not an appropriate vehicle for transferring or alienating control rights. (shrink)

This book series deals with religion and its interface with the state and society in Southeast Asia. It examines the multidimensional facets of politics, public policies and social change in relation to contemporary forms of religions, religious communities, thinking, praxis and ethos. All articles in this Book Series were a direct result of a policy-relevant research collaboration conducted by investigators from the participating countries from 2013–2016. The issues under examination in this Series include: state management of diversity, multicultural policies, religious (...) social activism and state-society relations. All of the analyses in this Book Series are fixed within the context of a rapidly changing society in Southeast Asia. (shrink)

In her excellent essay, Blumenthal-Barby (2024) argues that it is “time for bioethics to end talk of personhood.” She is concerned, more specifically, with “the philosophical concept of personhood,...

Disorders of sexual differentiation lead to what is often referred to as an intersex state. This state has medical, as well as some legal, recognition. Nevertheless, the question remains whether intersex persons occupy a state in between maleness and femaleness or whether they are truly men or women. To answer this question, another important conundrum needs to be first solved: what defines sex? The answer seems rather simple to most people, yet when morphology does not coincide with haplotypes, and genetics (...) might not correlate with physiology the issue becomes more complex. This paper tackles both issues by establishing where the essence of sex is located and by superimposing that framework onto the issue of the intersex. This is achieved through giving due consideration to the biology of sexual development, as well as through the use of a teleological framework of the meaning of sex. Using a range of examples, the paper establishes that sex cannot be pinpointed to one biological variable but is rather d... (shrink)

Human embryonic stem cell research can bring about major biomedical breakthroughs and thus contribute enormously to human welfare, yet it raises serious moral problems because it involves using human embryos for experiment. The “moral status of the human embryo” remains the core of such debates. Three different positions regarding the moral status of the human embryo can be categorised: the “all” position, the “none” position, and the “gradualist” position.The author proposes that the “gradualist” position is more plausible than the other (...) two positions. Confucius’s moral principle of jen, which proposes a unique theory of “love of gradation”, and the principle of yi, which advocates “due treatment for persons”, are then explored. The author then argues that our moral obligations to do good to other living organisms, persons, and our families are different.Putting together the “gradualist” position on the human embryo, and Confucius’s theories of “love of gradation” and “due treatment for persons”, the author concludes that the early embryo has less ethical significance than the later fetus and adult human. The moral obligation we have toward persons is clearer and stronger than that which we have toward human embryos. Embryo research is justifiable if it brings enormous welfare to human persons that cannot be otherwise achieved. The “love of gradation” requires us, however, to extend love and respect towards other entities according to their different status. We should therefore be very cautious in using human embryos for research, acknowledging the gradualist nature of their moral status. (shrink)

Within the Western bioethical framework, we make adistinction between two dominant interpretations of the meaning of moral personhood: thenaturalist and the humanist one. While both interpretations of moral personhood claim topromote individual autonomy and rights, they end up with very different normativeviews on the practical and legal measures needed to realize these values in every daylife. Particularly when we talk about the end of life issues it appears that in general thearguments for euthanasia are drawn from the naturalist interpretation of (...) moral personhoodwhile the arguments against euthanasia, for their part, are derived from the idealistand/or humanist understanding of the same concept. This article focuses onexamining the metaphysical assumptions and internal contradiction found behind the opposingarguments presented by two prominent philosophers of these two traditions:Peter Singer and Ludger Honnefelder. The author claims that neither side of thedebate succeeds in defending its normative position without reconsidering how to takethe social aspects of moral personhood into account. The author holds that, despite ourneed to set individual's decision making into social context, the currentcommunitarian narrative concept of personhood fails to offer a convincing alternative.Instead of merely trying to replace psychological and atomistic view of personhood with acollective understanding of an individual's moral identity, we need to discuss thenormative relation between the concept of `moral personhood' and the demand for respect ofindividual autonomy in Western bioethics within a wider philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson argued that abortion is permissible because no one must sacrifice their rights to bodily autonomy. However, assuming a fetus has full moral personhood, and focusing on when abortion is unjust in particular, we argue that Thomson's view of what we ought to sacrifice to aid others is too impoverished. Instead, we argue that abortion is permissible when pregnancy threatens the ability of the mother, or the child, to live minimally well. After explaining the minimally good life account (...) and its application to abortion, we explain its advantages over alternative views. Finally, we examine arguments concluding that abortion is permissible because fetuses are not persons. We argue that personhood is probably a matter of degree rather than a binary property. Thus, abortion is generally permissible early in pregnancy, but as the fetus gets closer to full personhood, adopting the minimally good life standard is appropriate. (shrink)

Decision-making in health care is often challenging and therefore requires practical wisdom. The domains of such wisdom involve goals, perception, ethics, deliberation, and motivation. For Christian patients, there is a need for practical wisdom founded on Christian commitments that shape and guide these domains according to a Christian understanding of life, health, technology, illness, suffering, and death. In this essay, I outline a Christian approach to practical wisdom in health care by infusing Christian beliefs and values into a general framework (...) for practical wisdom in medicine I have described previously. I organize this approach by referring to Christian purpose, vision, ethics, piety, and practice. The result is a framework that intends to integrate faith and reason so that what we believe as Christians forms how we think about health and guides what we choose or decline when considering the possibilities that come before us in health care. (shrink)

Full-Blooded religion is not acceptable in mainstream bioethics. This article excavates the cultural history that led to the suppression of religion in bioethics. Bioethicists typically fall into one of the following camps. 1) The irreligious, who advocate for suppressing religion, as do Timothy F. Murphy, Sam Harris, and Richard Dawkins. This irreligious camp assumes American Fundamentalist Protestantism is the real substance of all religions. 2) Religious bioethicists, who defend religion by emphasizing its functions and diminishing its metaphysical commitments. Religious defenders (...) empty religion of its theology to present its feel-good functions in a way that is acceptable to the irreligious. However, religion reduced to its functions dissolves into a counter-culture that may counteract materialism but lacks the power to motivate much more. This article criticizes both camps, as both presume Enlightenment myths and consequently neuter religion. Both irreligious and religious bioethicists commonly presume Enlightenment myths about secularity and religion. Secularity is presumed neutral and rational. Religion is presumed divisive and irrational. This myth provides built-in value-judgements; we have already judged secularity as good and religion as bad. Much of the debate over religion in bioethics is arguing over false stereotypes of religion. Consequently, mainstream bioethics neuters religion, while the irreligious are gifted political power to define the field. (shrink)

In her highly thought-provoking article, “The End of Personhood,” Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) presents a number of reasons why bioethics should “… end talk about personhood.” Some of these rea...

In recent years there has been an increase in the number of requests formercy killings by patients and their relatives. Under certain conditions,the patient may prefer death to a life devoid of quality. In contrast to thosewho uphold this quality of life approach, those who hold the sanctity oflife approach claim that life has intrinsic value and must be preservedregardless of its quality. This essay describes these two approaches,examines their flaws, and offers a golden path between the two extremepositions.We discuss (...) the halachic and the secular views, arguing for a balancebetween the sanctity of life and the quality of life. We argue that, indeed,such a balance exists in practice, and that life is important, but it is not sacred. Life can be evaluated, but quality of life is not the solecriterion. (shrink)

The main aim of the presented paper is to look for an answer as to whether and how euthanasia reflected is in ethics of social consequences. Ethics of social consequences is a contemporary Slovak ethical theory with an original approach to delimitating moral agency. The paper puts this definition to the test while considering the main focus of the paper – responding to the question of whether euthanasia and end of life can be understood as a moral uncertainty. The intention (...) is to find out whether the definition is clear and adequate to withstand the basic arguments against euthanasia. Since ethics of social consequences is a consequentialist ethical theory, another partial goal is to analyse the fitness of such a position to be used in bioethical inquires. (shrink)

The recent case of Baby Theresa has once again raised the dilemma of organ donation from anencephalic infants. Baby Theresa's distraught parents wanted to create something good from something tragic, by donating the baby's organs so that other children could live. If the physician waited for their baby to die naturally, the organs would not be suitable for transplantation. If they took them before death they could be harvested. For this reason, the parents petitioned the Florida courts to declare their (...) baby dead at birth so the organs could be removed at an earlier, more propitious time. The court refused. The infant died, its vital organs unusable. (shrink)

The progress of the discussion about the 'indicators of humanhood' is reviewed, along with several associated problems. It is argued that a more serious problem is posed by social attitudes about mental handicap. The author concludes that an uncritical use of criteria of humanhood may simply reinforce a morally unjustifiable social attitude.

Defective newborn children are to be considered human persons. Thus, primary duty in proxy consent is to act with the infant's best interest in mind. This duty may at times override the otherwise prima facie right to life, but only under restricted circumstances. Refinements of McCormick's “relational potential” criteria and of ordinary-extraordinary means analysis prove useful in such decisions. Utilitarian considerations of social consequences have impact but can be kept subsidiary. The importance for decision making of available child support services (...) is considered. Spina bifida is used throughout as an example of issues discussed. (shrink)

:Something strange has happened to the concept of dignity in bioethics. After a long period in which U.S. pragmatist and U.K. consequentialist philosophers have argued that the concept is useless and vacuous, and in which they have been reasonably successful in expunging it from mainstream English-language academic bioethics, dignity has suddenly become popular again in debates about the legalization of physician-assisted dying. And, even stranger, it is deployed not by conservatives but by liberals. In the debates about PAD, liberal proponents (...) of legalization seem to accept without question that there is such a state or process as “death with dignity,” which is juxtaposed to “undignified dying.” It also seems to be accepted that both of these states can be fairly easily identified and that they carry great moral weight. This article provides an analysis of the current resurgence of “undignified” arguments and argues on the basis of that analysis that a proper understanding of the concept of dignity shows that the previous reductive arguments against dignity are partially incomplete and therefore partially misguided and that, despite dignity having meaning, the idea of an undignified death cannot carry the moral weight it is given by proponents of the legalization of PAD. (shrink)

The issue of what constitutes a person is examined in relation to whether or not the fetus or newborn has qualities of personhood. The discussion also dwells on birth and viability as determining factors in decisions concerning terminations. Such decisions are stated to be constrained by both biological and social factors, particularly in the way in which the fetus can possess personhood only through the ‘absorption’ of such froni its mother; both mother and fetus together are ‘the person’. This article (...) also considers whether, on Piagetian grounds, one can make personhood comparisons between infants and adults and suggests that such comparisons are a mistake. A social critique of Piagetian principles shifts the emphasis from individualism towards consideration of school, family and environmental factors. Equally, it is not feasible to view the fetus as an entity that is separate from its mother's perceptions of its social as well as its physical status. Finally, because termination decisions occur against ‘real life’ (and highly charged) backgrounds, we must reject any notion that such decisions are only an intel-lectual exercise. It is assumed that nurses would implicitly understand this and some attempt is made to state why this is so. (shrink)