- Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.details
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Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
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Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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The image of observables.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):585-597.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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Content, illusion, partition.York H. Gunther - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (2):185-202.details
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On Gall's reputation and some recent “new phrenology”.C. G. Gross - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):16-18.details
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Cognitive self-organization and neural modularity.Stephen Grossberg - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):18-19.details
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Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
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Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
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Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.details
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Fodor's holism.Clark Glymour - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):15-16.details
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Modularity: Contextual interactions and the tractability of nonmodular systems.Sam Glucksberg - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):14-15.details
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What's a theory to do... With seeing? Or some empirical considerations for observation and theory.Daniel Gilman - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):287-309.details
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The neurobiology of observation.Daniel Gilman - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (3):496-502.details
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Observation: An Empirical Discussion.Daniel Gilman - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (1):355-364.details
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La falacia intencional: Del New Criticism a la lingüística neurocognitiva.José María Gil - 2014 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 24 (2):81-100.details
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The centrality of modules.Howard Gardner - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):12-14.details
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A modular sense of place?C. R. Gallistel & Ken Cheng - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):11-12.details
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Special purpose computation: All is not one.K. I. Forster - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):9-11.details
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Module or muddle?Janet Dean Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):7-9.details
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Precis of the modularity of mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.details
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Reply module.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):33-42.details
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Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects.Chaz Firestone & Brian J. Scholl - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-72.details
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A Defense of Cognitive Penetration and the Face-Race Lightness Illusion.Kate Finley - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 1:1-28.details
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A defense of cognitive penetration and the face-race lightness illusion 1.Kate Finley - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (3):650-677.details
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Objectivity in the news: Finding a way forward.Carrie Figdor - 2010 - Journal of Mass Media Ethics 25 (1):19 – 33.details
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Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
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Experiencia perceptual y sustento epistémico.José Luís Falguera & Santiago Peleteiro - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 39 (2):7-32.details
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The thesis of theory-Laden observation in the light of cognitive psychology.Anna Estany - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (2):203-217.details
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Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
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Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception–Cognition Interface.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):215-245.details
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Science, folk theory, and popular ignorance: The case against Eliminativism.Thomas Duddy - 1997 - The European Legacy 2 (7):1177-1184.details
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Why I am not a literalist.Zoe Drayson - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (5):661-670.details
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Perception and Its Modalities.Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Sorting the Senses.Stephen Biggs, Mohan Matthen & Dustin Stokes - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-19.details
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The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics.Peter Ludlow - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory.W. M. Davies - 1996 - Avebury.details
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Bilim Tarihi Yazımı Sorunu Olarak Gözlemin Kuram Yüklü Olması: Mary Anning Örneği.Mehmet Cem Kamözüt - 2018 - Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 11 (2):45-57.details
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What Is Gender Essentialism?Charlotte Witt - 2011 - In Feminist Metaphysics. Springer Verlag. pp. 11--25.details
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Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory.W. Martin Davies - 1993 - Dissertation, details
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Modularity of Mind.Philip Robbins - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Naturalistic approaches to social construction.Ron Mallon - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Perceptual Learning.Connolly Kevin - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1:1-35.details
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