- Gavagai again.John Robert Gareth Williams - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):235-259.details
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Naming natural kinds.Åsa Maria Wikforss - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):65-87.details
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Situated action, symbol systems and universal computation.Andrew Wells - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (1):33-46.details
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The chinese room argument reconsidered: Essentialism, indeterminacy, and strong AI. [REVIEW]Jerome C. Wakefield - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.details
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Fodor on inscrutability.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):524-537.details
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Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.details
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On the metaphysics of internalism and externalism.Alberto Voltolini - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (18):1 - 24.details
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Learning to think: A response to the language of thought argument for innateness.Christopher Viger - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (3):313-25.details
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The fragmentary model of temporal experience and the mirroring constraint.Gerardo Alberto Viera - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):21-44.details
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Metaphysics, method, and the mouth: Philosophical lessons of speech perception.J. D. Trout - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):261-291.details
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Laws and Constrained Kinds: A lesson from motor neuroscience.Brandon Towl - 2012 - Synthese 189 (3):433-450.details
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Can Affordances Explain Behavior?Alexandros Tillas, Gottfried Vosgerau, Tim Seuchter & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):295-315.details
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Indeterminacy in recent theories of content.Donna M. Summerfield & Pat A. Manfredi - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):181-202.details
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Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions.Robin Stenwall - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):59-76.details
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From metasemantics to analyticity.Zeynep Soysal - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):57-76.details
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Three facets of consciousness.David Woodruff Smith - 2001 - Axiomathes 12 (1-2):55-85.details
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Explanation, understanding, and control.Ryan Smith - 2014 - Synthese 191 (17):4169-4200.details
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The tripartite model of representation.Peter Slezak - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):239-270.details
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What is radical interpretation? Davidson, Fodor, and the naturalization of philosophy.Robert Sinclair - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):161-184.details
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Rational reconstruction and immature science.Stuart Silvers - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):93 – 109.details
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Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.details
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Why we view the brain as a computer.Oron Shagrir - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):393-416.details
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Two kinds of intentionality in Locke.Lionel Shapiro - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):554-586.details
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The Brain as an Input–Output Model of the World.Oron Shagrir - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):53-75.details
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Multiple realization, computation and the taxonomy of psychological states.Oron Shagrir - 1998 - Synthese 114 (3):445-461.details
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Marr on computational-level theories.Oron Shagrir - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):477-500.details
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In defense of the semantic view of computation.Oron Shagrir - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4083-4108.details
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Intension and representation: Quine’s indeterminacy thesis revisited.Itay Shani - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):415 – 440.details
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What is context for? Syntax in a non-abstract world.Tom Sgouros - 2005 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (2):235-251.details
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The Causal Inefficacy of Content.Gabriel M. A. Segal - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):80-102.details
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Keep making sense.Gabriel Segal - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):275-287.details
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Content and Computation: Chasing the Arrows A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's The Elm and the Expert.Gabriel M. A. Segal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):490–501.details
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Content and Computation: Chasing the Arrows A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's The Elm and the Expert.Gabriel M. A. Segal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):490-501.details
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Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation?Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Marc Artiga - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):81-94.details
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Why be an anti-individualist?Laura Schroeter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.details
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The nature of symbols in the language of thought.Susan Schneider - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (5):523-553.details
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Monsters Among Us.Timothy Schroeder - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):167-184.details
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LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room.Susan Schneider - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):235 - 250.details
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Illusion of transparency.Laura Schroeter - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.details
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Illocutionary harm.Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1631-1646.details
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Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases.Susan Schneider - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker.Andrea Scarantino - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):419-443.details
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Retracing our steps: Fodor’s new old way with concept acquisition. [REVIEW]John Sarnecki - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (40):41-73.details
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Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past. [REVIEW]Mary Salvaggio - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):417-420.details
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The best test theory of extension: First principle(s).Robert D. Rupert - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (3):321–355.details
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Representation in extended cognitive systems : does the scaffolding of language extend the mind?Robert D. Rupert - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.details
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On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought.Robert D. Rupert - 1998 - Synthese 117 (1):95-131.details
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Minding one's cognitive systems: When does a group of minds constitute a single cognitive unit?Robert Rupert - 2005 - Episteme 1 (3):177-188.details
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Mental Representations and Millikan’s Theory of Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality?Robert D. Rupert - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.details
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