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Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom.Michael Robinson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.details
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Flickering the W‐Defense.Michael Robinson - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):198-210.details
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Semicompatibilismo, Responsabilidade e Manipulação.Leonardo Mello Ribeiro - 2011 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 10 (2):255-279.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.details
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The causal structure of Frankfurt‐ and PAP‐style cases.Matthew Rellihan - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Rightly or for Ill: The Ethics of Individual Memory.Alison Reiheld - 2018 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 28 (4):377-410.details
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Divine Command Theory and Theistic Activism.Simin Rahimi - 2012 - Heythrop Journal 53 (4):551-559.details
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An aristotelian approach to cognitive enhancement.Lubomira Radoilska - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):365–375.details
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Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):155-172.details
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Moral Bio-enhancement, Freedom, Value and the Parity Principle.Jonathan Pugh - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):73-86.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.details
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Online Responsibility: Bad Samaritanism and the Influence of Internet Mediation.Saskia E. Polder-Verkiel - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):117-141.details
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Free Will, Determinism and the “Problem” of Structure and Agency in the Social Sciences.Nigel Pleasants - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (1):3-30.details
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Omissões.Ulysses Pinheiro - 2006 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 47 (113):159-183.details
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Practical philosophy and the Gettier Problem: is virtue epistemology on the right track?Christian Piller - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):73-91.details
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Beware of Safety.Christian Piller - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (4):01-29.details
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The elements of responsibility.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (3):210-219.details
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On Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1535-1543.details
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Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):263-268.details
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Living without free will: The case for hard incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):477-488.details
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Hard incompatibilism and its rivals.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.details
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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
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Frankfurt examples, derivative responsibility, and the timing objection1.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.details
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Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s My Way.John Perry - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):157-166.details
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Can God Be Free?Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):121-127.details
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Principles of Criminal Liability from the Semiotic Point of View.Michał Peno & Olgierd Bogucki - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 34 (2):561-578.details
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J.D. Velleman, On Being Me: A Personal Invitation to Philosophy (with illustrations by Emily C. Bernstein). Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2020. ISBN 978-0-691-20095-8, $12.95, Hbk. [REVIEW]Daniel Peixoto Murata - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (2):319-333.details
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Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?Rik Peels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.details
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Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?Kenneth L. Pearce - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):158-180.details
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Freedom and the Incarnation.Timothy Pawl & Kevin Timpe - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):743-756.details
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The nature and basis of human dignity.L. E. E. Patrick & Robert P. George - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (2):173-193.details
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Sobre las alternativas robustas contextuales.Carlos G. Patarroyo G. - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1).details
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Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.details
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Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: The Asymmetry Thesis Rejected.David Palmer & Yuanyuan Liu - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1225-1237.details
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Deterministic Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3847-3864.details
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Capes on the W-Defense.David Palmer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):555-566.details
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Thomist or Tumblrist: Comments on the Compatibility of Evolution and Design by E. V. R. Kojonen.Meghan D. Page - 2022 - Zygon 57 (4):1037-1050.details
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Guidance control and the anti-akrasia chip.Chris Ovenden - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2001-2019.details
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Scanlon and the claims of the many versus the one.Michael Otsuka - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):288-293.details
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A Rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini.Michael Otsuka - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):37-42.details
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Dos versiones de la contraposición entre naturaleza y libre albedrío.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (2):89-110.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases and Moral Responsibility: A Methodological Reflection.Koji Ota - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3):295-319.details
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What is chaos and how is it relevant for philosophy of mind?John M. Ostrowick - 2015 - South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):323-335.details
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Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582.details
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Moral responsibility and alternatives.Douglas Odegard - 1985 - Theoria 51 (3):125-136.details
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Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.details
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Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples.Ezio Di Nucci - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):207 - 213.details
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Frankfurt counterexample defended.Ezio Nucci - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):102-104.details
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Believe what you want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.details
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