- Pritchard, Luck, Risk, and a New Problem for Safety-Based Accounts of Knowledge.James Simpson - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-14.details
|
|
Memory belief is weak.Changsheng Lai - 2023 - Ratio 36 (3):204-214.details
|
|
Remembering is not a kind of knowing.Changsheng Lai - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):333.details
|
|
Knowledge, Individualised Evidence and Luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.details
|
|
The Explanationist and the Modalist.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Episteme:1-16.details
|
|
Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.details
|
|
Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):391-401.details
|
|
The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging.Thomas Grundmann - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (2):208-218.details
|
|
A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):249-261.details
|
|
Understanding a communicated thought.J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & J. P. Grodniewicz - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12137-12151.details
|
|
Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen De Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.details
|
|
Is epistemic safety threatened by Frankfurt cases? A reply to Kelp.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Diametros 17 (66):66-71.details
|
|
On the Possibility of Knowledge through Unsafe Testimony.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):513-526.details
|
|
Better virtuous than safe.Haicheng Zhao - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):6969-6991.details
|
|
Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & Joshua Shepherd - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):701-734.details
|
|
Modal Insurance: Probabilities, Risk, and Degrees of Luck.Evan Malone - 2019 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 41.details
|
|
Aesthetic risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Think 17 (48):11-24.details
|
|
Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility.Leandro de Brasi - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):113-140.details
|
|
Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2879-2894.details
|
|
Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - In Stephen Grimm Christoph Baumberger & Sabine Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 272-292.details
|
|
Testimonial Knowledge: A Unified Account.Peter J. Graham - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):172-186.details
|
|
Can Sensitivity Preserve Inductive Knowledge?Haicheng Zhao - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1865-1882.details
|
|
Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Ernest Sosa - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Varieties of Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):9-23.details
|
|
Saving Sensitivity.Brett Topey - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):177-196.details
|
|
Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge.Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3).details
|
|
Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?Haicheng Zhao & Peter Baumann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):118-126.details
|
|
How to Play the Lottery Safely?Haicheng Zhao - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):23-38.details
|
|
The epistemic significance of modal factors.Lilith Newton - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):227-248.details
|
|
The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (2):220-242.details
|
|
Is it Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.details
|
|
Why Dreaming Worlds aren’t Nearby Possible Worlds.James Simpson - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1226-1243.details
|
|
Statistical evidence and the criminal verdict asymmetry.Avital Fried - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6).details
|
|
Safety, domination, and differential support.Charles Neil - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1139-1152.details
|
|
Saving safety from counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5161-5185.details
|
|
Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3065-3077.details
|
|
“Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote.Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2341-2364.details
|
|
Safety and Unawareness of Error-Possibility.Haicheng Zhao - 2021 - Philosophical Papers 50 (1-2):309-337.details
|
|
Book Symposium: Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard, Michael Veber, Nicola Claudio Salvatore & Rodrigo Borges - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):115-165.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
No Luck in the Distance: A Reply to Freitag.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2015 - Theoria 82 (1):89-100.details
|
|
“Epistemic Frankfurt Cases” Against the Backdrop of the Original Frankfurt Case.Isabelle Keßels - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):233-245.details
|
|
A defence of the evolutionary debunking argument.Man Him Ip - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
|
|
Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):715-729.details
|
|
A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.details
|
|
The Problem of Anti-Luck Epistemology.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (165):217-236.details
|
|
Information, Epistemic Luck and Generality.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2017 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 26:326-354.details
|
|
Trust, distrust, and testimonial injustice.J. Adam Carter & Daniella Meehan - 2023 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 55 (3):290-300.details
|
|
Epistemic dependence.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):305-324.details
|
|