- Frankfurt's argument against alternative possibilities: Looking beyond the examples.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):770-793.details
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A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example.Michael McKenna - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3117-3129.details
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Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.details
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Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
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XV—Intelligent Capacities.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):347–376.details
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Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.details
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Taking control of belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.details
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A dilemma for morally responsible time travelers.Kelly McCormick - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):379-389.details
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Alternative possibilities and asymmetry.Erasmus Mayr - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):105-125.details
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Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):287-307.details
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Work lovers, freedom, and basic income.Julia Maskivker - 2011 - Contemporary Political Theory 10 (1):21-36.details
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Why a Uniform Basic Income Offends Justice.Julia Maskivker - 2018 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (2):191-219.details
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Regularity Accounts of Causation and the Problem of Pre-emption: Dark Prospects Indeed. [REVIEW]Cei Maslen - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (3):419-434.details
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Moral Responsibility.Elinor Mason - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (4):343-353.details
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Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency.Michael F. Mascolo & Eeva Kallio - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (4):437-462.details
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Intentions, Permissibility, and Choice.Anton Markoč - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (4):493-508.details
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Considering Intentions in Decision Making: What Is So Odd about It?Anton Markoč - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (4):481-498.details
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Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems.Ned Markosian - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.details
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Agents, actions and reasons.Maria Alvarez - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (1):45-58.details
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Agentive Modals.Matthew Mandelkern, Ginger Schultheis & David Boylan - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):301-343.details
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Acting without knowledge.Heidi Lene Maibom - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.details
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Précis of Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds.Edouard Machery - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):221-229.details
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Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise.Penelope Mackie - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):672-689.details
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Ability, relevant possibilities, and the fixity of the past.Penelope Mackie - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1873-1892.details
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A regulative theory of basic intentional omissions.Philippe A. Lusson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8399-8421.details
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Should we allow for the possibility of necessarily unexercised abilities? A new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle.Björn Lundgren - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The axiological solution to divine hiddenness.Kirk Lougheed - 2017 - Ratio 31 (3):331-341.details
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Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism.Ryan Long - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (1):107-130.details
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Three Recent Frankfurt Cases.Robert Lockie - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1005-1032.details
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Do group agents have free will?Christian List - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Alice Crary and Sandford Shieh, eds., Reading Cavell. [REVIEW]John Lippitt - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):138-144.details
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Frankfurt, responsibility, and reflexivity.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):369-382.details
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Moral Responsibility, the Author, and the Ethical Criticism of Art.Zhen Li - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2479-2496.details
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Ewaluacyjne i egzystencjalne aspekty trafu moralnego.Wojciech Lewandowski - 2019 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 67 (2):141-168.details
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The evidential status of philosophical intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Neural holism and free will.Daniel A. Levy - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-228.details
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Neural holism and free will.Donald Levy - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-229.details
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Frankfurt in Fake Barn Country.Neil Levy - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):529-542.details
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Excusing responsibility for the inevitable.Neil Levy - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (1):43 - 52.details
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Contrastive explanations: A dilemma for libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.details
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Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.details
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Countering Cova: Frankfurt-Style Cases are Still Broken.Neil Levy - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):523-527.details
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Capacities and Counterfactuals: A Reply to Haji and McKenna.Neil Levy - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):607-620.details
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Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.details
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Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-582.details
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Are We Agents at All? Helen Steward's Agency Incompatibilism.Neil Levy - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):386-399.details
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Agents and mechanisms: Fischer's way. [REVIEW]Neil Levy - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):123–130.details
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The willing addict: Actor or (helpless) bystander?Mark Leon - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):437-443.details
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Freedom and Determinism: The Importance of Method.Mark Leon - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):38-57.details
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