The Sa gītipary ya is the earliest Sarv stiv da philosophical text that enumerates a series of contaminants (anuśaya) , i.e. innate proclivities, inherited from former births, to do something of usually evil nature. This early list comprises seven such contaminants. As it is the contaminants that lead a worldling (p thagjana) to doing volitional actions and thus to forming a karmic result (karmavip ka) , these contaminants naturally also bear on the path to salvation. The gradual development of the (...) peculiar Sarv stiv din path to salvation necessitated a gradual refinement and reinterpretation of the original list of seven contaminants. Apart from a mere technical aspect, this reinterpretation also reflects the viewpoint of the Sautr ntika school of Buddhist philosophy on the nature of contaminants, i.e. their acceptance of a latent and an active state of the defilements, vis- -vis the Vaibh ika viewpoint according to whom no such difference exists. Within Sarv stiv da literature, the H daya treatises illustrate this philosophical development. (shrink)

The study of philosophical terms and doctrines in the Mahābhārata touches not only on important aspects of the contents, composition and the historical contexts of the epic, but also on the historiography of Indian philosophy. General ideas about the textual history of the epic and the distinction between “didactic” and “narrative” parts have influenced the study of epic philosophy no less than academic discussions about what is philosophy in India and how it developed. This results in different evaluations of the (...) place of philosophical texts in the epic and their relationship to the history of Indian philosophy. While some scholars have suggested that there is a “philosophy of the epic” its composers wished to propagate, others have argued that “philosophy” is included in the epic either in a “proto” form or in a variety of doctrines they deemed relevant. The article discusses these views and some of the heuristic assumptions on which they are based. It proposes to widen the scope of analysis by paying more attention to the interplay of narrative and didactic passages, the various ways in which philosophy is presented in the epic, and its connection to a larger spectrum of the reception of philosophy in textual genres and by audiences outside the expert circles of the philosophical schools. (shrink)

The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha’s (950–1000) contribution to the Buddhist–Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhmaṇical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance (...) to which mental properties belong, (3) the self as the agent of both physical actions and cognitions. The difference of Rāmakaṇṭha’s position from both Nyāya and Buddhism is then elaborated. He posits a self, but not one that is an eternally unchanging substance, nor one that is anything other than consciousness. Hence his difference from Nyāya. He falls with Buddhism in holding that consciousness does not require anything other than itself to inhere in, but departs from Buddhism in holding that consciousness is not momentary but enduring. The guiding metaphor here is light, but light considered as a dynamic, qualitatively unchanging repetition of the action of illumination. (shrink)

This article discusses a peculiar Sā$$\dot {\text{n}}$$n˙khya-Yoga theory of transformation (pariṇāma) that the author of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra created by drawing upon Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories of temporality. In developing his theory, Patañjali adaptively reused the wording in which the Sarvāstivāda theories were formulated, the specific objections against these theories, and their refutations to win the philosophical debate about temporality against Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. Patañjali’s approach towards the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories was possible, even though his system of Yoga is based on an ontology (...) that differs considerably from that of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism because both systems share the philosophical view that time is not a separate ontological entity in itself. Time is a concept deduced from change in the empirical world. This agreement results from the common philosophical orientation of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism and Yoga, which takes the phenomenon of experience as the basis of philosophical enquiry into the structure of the world. The intention that guided Patañjali’s adaptive reuse was twofold. On the one hand, he aimed at winning the debate with Sarvāstivāda Buddhism about how the problem of temporality can be solved. He thus integrated four mutually exclusive theories on temporality into a single theory of transformation of properties (dharma) involving a second-level and a third-level theory on the transformation of the temporal characteristic mark (lakṣaṇa) and on the transformation of states (avasthā), respectively. On the other hand, Patañjali intended to achieve philosophical clarification regarding the question of how exactly properties relate to their underlying substrate in the process of transformation of the three constituents or forces (guṇa) sattva, rajas and tamas of matter (pradhāna) that account for all phenomena of the world except pure consciousness (puruṣa). Patañjali’s theory of transformation is thus of central importance for his Sā$$\dot {\text{n}}$$n˙khya ontology, according to which the world consists of 25 categories or constituents (tattva), i.e., of primal matter (prakṛti) and its transformations and pure consciousness. (shrink)

The concept of the mahant- ātman-, or “vast self”, found in some of the Early and Middle Upaniṣads, has, at least since the days of Hermann Oldenberg, been explored by a number of scholars, most notably by van Buitenen :103–114, 1964). These studies have usually emphasized the cosmic implications of this concept; the vast ātman- being the non-individualized spirit that brings forth and pervades the universe, then enters the bodies of all created beings as their animating principle. As such it (...) precedes the mahān, or mahat, of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The present paper argues that the concept of a mahant- puruṣa- or “vast person”, appearing parallel to the vast ātman in these texts, is in fact older, being traceable to Middle Vedic texts; the emergence of the Upaniṣadic ātman doctrine has eventually led to its replacement by the mahān ātmā. Originally, it is argued, the adjective mahant- stressed the difference between this “vast” puruṣa, who is said to dwell in the sun, and the minute puruṣa within man, who is seen as the tiny “person” in one’s pupil, or resides in the heart, having the size of a thumb. In contradistinction to the ātman, the puruṣa is a thoroughly anthropomorphic soul-concept, a “person” within the person. The ultimate identity between this tiny soul-person and the puruṣa in the sun is a recurring, but little studied, motif in the micro-macrocosmic speculations of the Brāhmaṇa texts. This “vast”, solar puruṣa is sometimes identified with the Puruṣa or primeval man of Ṛgveda 10.90, from whose body the universe was formed, and much of the imagery surrounding the vast puruṣa of Middle and Late Vedic literature seems to derive from this hymn. (shrink)

This book is a synthesis of more than three decades of research into the concept of time and its semiotic nature. If traditional philosophy – and philosophy of time should be no exception – in the shadow of advancing biology can be said to have reached an impasse, one important reason for this, in harmony with Wittgenstein’s vision, appears to have been its lack of appropriate tools for explicating language. The present theory of time proceeds, accordingly, from the exploration of (...) temporal expressions in language as an evolutionary fact. It derives in a hypothetical, coherent feedback process of hierarchically ordered distinctions the semantics of time from its biologically dictated perceptual and cognitive-pragmatic origins. The corresponding abductive-regulative model is anchored in the assumption of biological rhythmization as the very foundation of perception and mental/physical action. Understood to originate in space and spatial perspective, time reveals itself as an instrument for temporal perspective on motion (events and situations) in a process of analysis, i.e., discontinuation of chaos made divisible and continuous by the rhythmical screen. Whereas traditional philosophy of time paid attention almost exclusively to the temporal category of tense, the biopragmatic model sees strong evidence in the perspectival nature of time for ascribing the decisive, and probably universal, role in temporal analysis to the linguistic category of aspect. Aspect may, according to the present findings, be assumed to partake already of change-of-state and cause-effect analysis without which man’s adaptation to new situations – and precondition for survival – would be inconceivable. The proposed model of space/time cognition, inspired by Hegelian dialectics, Heidegger-Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle and Peircean logic, makes Kantian a priori superfluous and liberates time from its enigmatic appearance. For the first time in temporal studies it thus appears possible to derive hypothetically linguistic expressions of time all the way from pretemporal, homogeneous continuity effected by biological rhythmization, via pretemporal metonymic (Gestalt), chunk-wise partitioning – as a general precondition for the perception and, based on primary metaphorization, the cognition of things, space and motion – to temporal analysis/discontinuation proper, primarily by aspectual perspective, and the subsequent synthesized, heterogeneous continuity of temporally ordered events. The conception of time, so disastrous for modern temporal logic, i.e., as moving object assigned extension, divisible continuity (‛linearity’) and direction, can be shown to have emerged as a result of secondary metaphorization. (shrink)

It is a well-known fact that the Śaiva nondualistic philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) adopted the Sāṃkhya principle according to which the effect must exist in some way before the operation of its cause (satkāryavāda). Johannes Bronkhorst has highlighted the paradox inherent in this appropriation: Utpaladeva is a staunch supporter of the satkāryavāda, but whereas Sāṃkhya authors consider it as a means of proving the existence of an unconscious matter, the Śaiva exploits it so as to establish his monistic idealism, (...) in perfect contradiction with the Sāṃkhya dualism of matter and consciousness. How does Utpaladeva achieve this complete reversal of meaning of the satkāryavāda? The present article argues that the elliptical verses of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā dealing with this issue have been partly misunderstood so far due to the loss of Utpaladeva’s own detailed commentary (Vivr̥ti) on this passage: Abhinavagupta’s two commentaries, however terse in this respect, clearly show that a crucial part of Utpaladeva’s reasoning remains implicit in the verses. The article therefore attempts to reconstruct the gist of Utpaladeva’s strategy by having recourse to various other Śaiva sources, including Somānanda’s Śivadr̥ṣṭi and Utpaladeva’s own commentary thereon. This examination shows that Utpaladeva’s appropriation of the satkāryavāda rests on a profound transformation of the Sāṃkhya notions of manifestation (abhivyakti) and potentiality (śakti), and that his criticism of the Sāṃkhya understanding of causality might target the Śaiva dualists as well as Sāṃkhya authors. (shrink)

svabhāva (own being) and yadṛchhā (chance, accident) are named as two different claimants among others as the first cause (jagatkāraṇa) in the ŚvUp. But in later works, such as Aśvaghoṣa’s poems, svabhāva is synonymous with yadṛchhā and entails a passive attitude to life. Later still, svabhāva is said to be inhering in the Lokāyata materialist system, although in which sense—cosmic order or accident—is not always clearly mentioned. Svabhāva is also a part of the Sāṃkhya doctrine and is mentioned in the (...) medical compilations. It is proposed that the idea of svabhāva as cosmic order became a part of Lokāyata between the sixth and the eighth century ce and got widely accepted by the tenth century, so much so that in the fourteenth century Sāyaṇa-Mādhava aka Vidyāraṇya could categorically declare that the Cārvāka/Lokāyata upheld causality, not chance. But the other meaning of svabhāva, identical with yadṛchhā, continued to circulate along with kāla, time, which was originally another claimant for the title of the first cause and similarly had acquired several significations in course of time. Both significations of svabhāva continued to be employed by later writers, and came to be used in another domain, that of daiva (fate) vis-à-vis puruṣakāra (manliness or human endeavour). (shrink)

This article consists of a tentative exploration regarding the Buddhist portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) as expressed in the Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāraḥ chapter of Bhāviveka’s 6th century Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, and its auto-commentary the Tarkajvālā; and the Jain portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection as expressed in Haribhadrasūri’s 8th century Śātravārtāsamuccaya (ŚVS) and Yogabindu. The article includes a translation of the Yogabindu, verses 444–457.

In his Pramāṇaviniścaya 3, Dharmakīrti criticizes the view of the Sāṅkhyas that the word anityatva (“impermanence”) means a process of transformation ( pariṇāma ) of primordial matter ( pradhāna ). In this connection, he deals with the following two explanations of transformation: (1) the disappearance ( tirodhāna ) of the previous dharma of an entity ( dharmin/dravya ) and (2) the cessation ( nivṛtti ) of the previous state ( avasthā ) of an entity ( avasthātṛ ). In response to (...) these explanations, he proves that whenever a transformation takes place, the previous entity is destroyed, and therefore, impermanence does not mean transformation, but only destruction ( vināśa ). His criticism is basically along the same lines as Vasubandhu’s arguments found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya . However, because of developments in the theory of transformation, Vasubandhu’s criticism allows room for a retort from the Sāṅkhya. For this reason, Dharmakīrti augments Vasubandhu’s theory in order to make it sustainable against the more developed Sāṅkhya theory. (shrink)

The Vārṣṇeyādhyātma, which is comprised of chapters 203–210 of the 12th Book of the Mahābhārata, is an early exposition of the practice of Yoga centered on the manas and the bodily channel called manovahā. The importance of the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma’s doctrine for the history of Yoga has not been appropriately acknowledged in previous research and its systematic description of the practice of Yoga has never been studied in its entirety. A careful reading of the text suggests that the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma touches upon (...) the physiological as well as psychological aspects of a human being in the context of the practice of Yoga. This paper attempts to reconstruct the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma’s understanding of the manas and the manovahā channel on the basis of a critical reading of Mahābhārata 12.207.16–29. (shrink)

This paper pursues precise information on the use of the Sanskrit word buddhi, “the intellect,” in the context of epic adhyātma discourse. The term buddhi makes its debut in this genre of discourse in texts of the Mahābhārata’s Mokṣadharmaparvan before going on to become a central term of classical Sāṃkhya philosophy. This paper examines closely the presence and role of the “intellect” in the argument of the Manubṛhaspatisaṃvāda, a text that is unusually rich in its theorizing and description of the (...) intellect. But this text is not primarily about the intellect, even if that organ plays a prominent role in the three main phases of the text’s teaching. The Manu-Bṛhaspati is a major, deliberately constructed body of teaching on ethics, ontology, and psychology, and what it says regarding the buddhi is embedded in those teachings, usually, but not always, incidentally. This paper tries to grasp those teachings in their particular idiom and present Manu’s teachings on the buddhi in the natural progression and settings of the overall argument. A number of points comparing the buddhi in this text to the adhyātma text-pair of MBh 12.187/239–41 are made and a striking contrast between Manu’s buddhi and the ‘saving buddhis’ of the early Mokṣadharma is discussed briefly. The main points regarding the buddhi in Manu’s teachings turn out to be: First, and most importantly, the buddhi has the ability not only to see and “resolve” current sensory experience coming from the senses and the mind, but to store those sensations and re-arrange and re-interpret them outside of ‘real time’. This ‘trans-temporal depth’ of the buddhi may be the reason for the second major fact about it, that the buddhi is the locus in a person from which that person’s residual energy from past deeds operates; the buddhi transmits that energy and its qualitative differentiations into the mind and the senses, entities that derive from it and operate “below” it. Third, the buddhi’s ability to select and arrange past perceptions and imagine not previously observed arrangements among them is the source of its fatefully erroneous substitution of the immediately present, phenomenal self of experience for the transcendent true Self. Fourth, the buddhi’s ability to imagine and re-interpret experience makes it the principal faculty for determining the truth of things that are not immediately apparent to the senses. Establishing the existence of the transcendent soul is the most important such truth, for that serves as the foundation for one’s eventually coming to see the true Self. Fifth, the buddhi works with the main perceptual organ, the mind, to clarify and then neutralize the operation of the senses, allowing yoga meditation to go forward. In the course of yoga meditation, when the buddhi is emptied of karma energy, the buddhi becomes “tantamount to the manas” and the ultimate reality is “seen, as if it were a streak of gold on a touchstone,” undoing the buddhi’s fateful error. Sixth, a point stressed in several places in the text, is that the entire embodied soul, which is basically led by the buddhi, is tremendously energetic in its rush down to the physical reality. It is not clear whether some of this energy is part of the original emanation of the principle of the embodied soul from the Absolute, but it is clear that some of it is the energy of karma stored in the “intellect.”. (shrink)

The account of the conversation between King Janaka and the Ṛṣi Pañcaśikha on the fate of the individual after death is one of the philosophical texts that are included in the Mokṣadharmaparvan of the Mahābhārata. There are different scholarly views on the history and composition of the text as well as the philosophical teachings propagated by Pañcaśikha. In contrast to earlier studies this paper not only analyzes the whole text, but also pays attention to the narrative framework in which the (...) philosophical discourse is embedded. In the text Bhīṣma functions as an external narrator, who relates and interprets the conversation as well as characterizes the protagonists and thereby influences the ways in which text is received by the audience. It is argued that it is important to deal with the interplay between the narrative and the philosophical discourse that is narrated, when analysing the philosophical positions that are either refuted or accepted in the text. 12.211–12 is not only a philosophical text, but also a tale about philosophical discourse in general and about how Sāṃkhya philosophy is taught to a non-expert audience. Seen from this perspective the text is significant for the way in which philosophical terms and issues are dealt with in the epic and adjacent non-expert texts, such as the Purāṇas. (shrink)

The dynamic process of karmic activity is one of the key philosophical concepts of the Buddhist doctrine, and is traditionally explained as the operation of a chain of 12 mutually interlinked members of dependent origination. Textual research, however, reveals that a series of alternative chains of members of dependent origination coexisted prior to the systematization of this earlier textual material into the standardized list of 12 members. Such an alternative list consists of 10 members. This article examines the importance of (...) this particular list of 10 members in the development of Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy. This philosophy, the basic interpretation of the mundane world of which is that the world around us only xists as the working of the human mind, i.e. the domain of perceptual consciousness, matured in the late fourth–early fifth century CE. This examination of the 10-fold formula of dependent origination also adds to our knowledge of the region of origin of Yogācāra philosophy, and thus on the geographical diversities within the development of Buddhist philosophy. (shrink)

The notions of selflessness ( an tmaka ) and karman are two key concepts in Buddhist philosophy. The question how karman functions with respect to the rebirth of a worldling who is, actually, devoid of a self, was a major philosophical issue in early Buddhist doctrine. Within the Sarv stiv da school, the Vaibh ⋅ ikas became the representative of an interpretation of this problem that hinges on the notion of 'possession' ( pr pti ). Their theory was contradicted by (...) the Sautr ntikas, whose interpretation is based on the notion of 'seed' ( bīja ). The Sarv stiv da H daya treatises, compiled in a time period spanning from the beginning of the common era to the fourth century AD, i.e. the period of the rise of the Sautr ntika school, are a particularly interesting set of works, as they reflect the gradual development of these two major theories. (shrink)

The dominant topic of this study pertains to the relationship between the possession of properties on the part of linguistic items, such as words, concatenations of words or sentences, and the possibility of truly ascribing those properties to the concerned units. It can be verified that among the qualities which linguistic expressions can exhibit there are some which could be correctly attributed to them only by employing items which differ from the pertinent expressions. As various properties exist which exhibit this (...) particular feature the question how different phenomena of the impossibility of self-ascription are related to each other attains relevance. There is evidence to the effect that the existence of linguistic qualities exemplifying the pertinent peculiarity has been realized even in some non-Western philosophical tradition. For that reason the present investigation possesses both historical and problem-oriented ingredients. On the one hand the goal is pursued to substantiate the claim that the phenomenon of impossibility of self-ascription has been recognized in a non-Western tradition, at least with respect to particular linguistic properties. This task is performed by an analysis of a textual segment within a work which has been written in the tradition of linguistic philosophy in India, presumably in the fifth or sixth century AD, and by an attempt to demonstrate that a most coherent argumentative structure can be distilled from the textual segment supposing that it concerns the topic of impossibility of self-ascription with respect to semantic functions. On the other hand the question of how the impossibility of self-ascription regarding particular semantic functions is connected with problems of self-ascription regarding lack of truth constitutes a major concern of the study. It is contended that the latter phenomenon involves specific aspects and that accordingly the thesis insinuated by some scholars that the investigated text could provide a basis for the solution of truth-paradoxes is unwarranted. In view of the fact that the supposition that self-ascriptions of lack of truth always lack the property of expressing a truth is not self-evident it has been endeavoured to support the plausibility of this tenet and to show that this stance need not lead to inconsistencies, if it were assumed that only a particular type of content differing from a linguistically expressed content exhibits the qualities of being definitely true or untrue and of always complying with ‘classical’ inference-rules — in particular modus ponendo ponens and reductio ad absurdum — as well as with a principle according to which a linguistic unit expresses a truth exactly if its content is true. A contention is that the postulation of this type of content need not be made merely ad hoc. The envisaged position implies that the existence of indexical elements is by no means the only factor preventing that linguistic synonymy guarantees identity of truth value and that even linguistic items without deictic ingredients can be simultaneously linked to various types of content. As the investigations also refer to other phenomena suggesting that being simultaneously related to a multitude of contents is not an uncommon feature of linguistic expressions they touch on questions of interpretation and translation and thereby affect some general issues of the humanities. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to analyze, classify and illustrate different scholarly approaches to the Sanskrit philosophical commentaries as reflected in some influential and especially thoughtful studies of Indian philosophy; at the same time it highlights some specific features involving commentary and annotation in general, drawing from results of studies on commentaries conducted in other disciplines and fields, such as Classical and Medieval Studies, Theology, and Early English Literature. In the field of South Asian Studies, philosophical commentaries may be assessed (...) from various overlapping and not always exclusive points of view, such as preservation of otherwise lost historical information, historical authenticity and reliability, interpretational innovation, spiritual or experiential insight, philosophical creativity, intellectual liveliness, doxographic intent, degree of incidentality, expository breadth and explanatory depth. The essay provides numerous examples taken from classical to early modern philosophical literature, especially of the Brahminical and Buddhist traditions, and also discusses their diverging perception by modern scholars and interpretators. (shrink)