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Jeremy Fischer
University of Alabama, Huntsville
  1.  53
    The Creeps as a Moral Emotion.Jeremy Fischer & Rachel Fredericks - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps is fitting just when its object (...)
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  2. Being Proud and Feeling Proud: Character, Emotion, and the Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals.Jeremy Fischer - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):209-222.
    Much of the philosophical attention directed to pride focuses on the normative puzzle of determining how pride can be both a central vice and a central virtue. But there is another puzzle, a descriptive puzzle, of determining how the emotion of pride and the character trait of pride relate to each other. A solution is offered to the descriptive puzzle that builds upon the accounts of Hume and Gabriele Taylor, but avoids the pitfalls of those accounts. In particular, the emotion (...)
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  3. Pride and Moral Responsibility.Jeremy Fischer - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):181-196.
    Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and (...)
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  4.  46
    The Ethics of Reflexivity: Pride, Self-Sufficiency, and Modesty.Jeremy Fischer - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (3):365-399.
    This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals: the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, the degree to which one interprets (...)
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  5.  66
    Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen – By Kwame Anthony Appiah. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fischer - 2011 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):96-99.
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  6.  29
    Self‐Assessment and Social Practices.Jeremy Fischer - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2):144-164.
    This article develops and defends a social practice-based theory of personal ideals. After sketching this theory, I show how it undermines the sharp dichotomy between evaluative self-assessment and assessment of one’s social standing that underlies common objections to accounts of pride and shame (such as Rawls’s account of shame) that explain these emotions in terms of personal ideals.
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