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  1. Is Implicit Theory of Mind the ‘Real Deal’? The Own‐Belief/True‐Belief Default in Adults and Young Preschoolers.Lu Wang & Alan M. Leslie - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (2):147-176.
    Recent studies reveal spontaneous implicit false-belief understanding in infancy. But is this early ability genuine theory-of-mind? Spontaneous tasks may allow early success by eliminating the selection-response bias thought to underlie later failure on standard tasks. However, using anticipatory eye gaze, we find the same bias in non-verbal tasks in both preschoolers and adults. We argue that the bias arises from theory-of-mind competence itself and takes the form of a rational prior to attribute one's own belief to others. Our discussion then (...)
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  • Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default.Paula Rubio-Fernández - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (1):218-241.
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the (...)
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  • Executive function plays a role in coordinating different perspectives, particularly when one’s own perspective is involved.Ella Fizke, Dana Barthel, Thomas Peters & Hannes Rakoczy - 2014 - Cognition 130 (3):315-334.
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  • Belief–desire reasoning in the explanation of behavior: Do actions speak louder than words?Annie E. Wertz & Tamsin C. German - 2007 - Cognition 105 (1):184-194.
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  • A constructivist connectionist model of transitions on false-belief tasks.Vincent G. Berthiaume, Thomas R. Shultz & Kristine H. Onishi - 2013 - Cognition 126 (3):441-458.
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  • (1 other version)Evidence and Cognition.Samuel D. Taylor & Jon Williamson - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Cognitive theorists routinely disagree about the evidence supporting claims in cognitive science. Here, we first argue that some disagreements about evidence in cognitive science are about the evidence available to be drawn upon by cognitive theorists. Then, we show that one’s explanation of why this first kind of disagreement obtains will cohere with one’s theory of evidence. We argue that the best explanation for why cognitive theorists disagree in this way is because their evidence is what they rationally grant. Finally, (...)
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  • Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?Amir Amin Yazdi, Tim P. German, Margaret Anne Defeyter & Michael Siegal - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):343-368.
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  • Eye movements reveal the time-course of anticipating behaviour based on complex, conflicting desires.Heather J. Ferguson & Richard Breheny - 2011 - Cognition 119 (2):179-196.
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