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Ori Friedman
University of Waterloo
  1. The Folk Conception of Knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.
    How do people decide which claims should be considered mere beliefs and which count as knowledge? Although little is known about how people attribute knowledge to others, philosophical debate about the nature of knowledge may provide a starting point. Traditionally, a belief that is both true and justified was thought to constitute knowledge. However, philosophers now agree that this account is inadequate, due largely to a class of counterexamples (termed ‘‘Gettier cases’’) in which a person’s justified belief is true, but (...)
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    Knowledge Central: A Central Role for Knowledge Attributions in Social Evaluations.John Turri, Ori Friedman & Ashley Keefner - 2017 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (3):504-515.
    Five experiments demonstrate the central role of knowledge attributions in social evaluations. In Experiments 1–3, we manipulated whether an agent believes, is certain of, or knows a true proposition and asked people to rate whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. We found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent should act. In Experiments 4–5, we investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can explain an important finding on how people (...)
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  3. Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.
    We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence or testimony providing causal information. Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why (...)
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  4. Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries.John Turri & Ori Friedman - forthcoming - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. London, United Kingdom: pp. 45-69.
    We conducted five experiments that reveal some main contours of the folk epistemology of lotteries. The folk tend to think that you don't know that your lottery ticket lost, based on the long odds ("statistical cases"); by contrast, the folk tend to think that you do know that your lottery ticket lost, based on a news report ("testimonial cases"). We evaluate three previous explanations for why people deny knowledge in statistical cases: the justification account, the chance account, and the statistical (...)
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  5. Children Hold Owners Responsible When Property Causes Harm.Celina K. Bowman-Smith, Brandon W. Goulding & Ori Friedman - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147 (8):1191-1199.
    Since ancient times, legal systems have held owners responsible for harm caused by their property. Across 4 experiments, we show that children aged 3–7 also hold owners responsible for such harm. Older children judge that owners should repair harm caused by property, and younger children may do this as well. Younger and older children judge that owners should apologize for harm, even when children do not believe the owners allowed the harm to occur. Children are also as likely to hold (...)
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  6. The Development of Territory-Based Inferences of Ownership.Brandon W. Goulding & Ori Friedman - 2018 - Cognition 177:142-149.
    Legal systems often rule that people own objects in their territory. We propose that an early-developing ability to make territory-based inferences of ownership helps children address informational demands presented by ownership. Across 6 experiments (N = 504), we show that these inferences develop between ages 3 and 5 and stem from two aspects of the psychology of ownership. First, we find that a basic ability to infer that people own objects in their territory is already present at age 3 (Experiment (...)
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  7. How Do Children Represent Pretend Play?Ori Friedman - 2013 - In M. Taylor (ed.), Oxford handbook of the development of imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 186-195.
    How do young children represent pretend play? One possibility is that recognizing and representing pretend play depends on children’s ability to infer the mental states of the person engaged in pretend play (mentalist account). The two dominant alternative possibilities are that children view as a distinctive form of non-representational behavior (behavioral account), and that children represent pretense by temporarily treating objects as though they have fictional or make-believe properties (flagging account). This chapter provides an overview of the debate between these (...)
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  8. Ownership Rights.Shaylene Nancekivell, J. Charles Millar, Pauline Summers & Ori Friedman - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma Wesley Buckwalter (ed.), A companion to experimental philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 247-256.
    A chapter reviewing recent experimental work on people's conceptions of ownership rights.
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