The paper deals with Martin Buber’s claim that responsibility “is the basic theme of my work in general.” As I show in the opening section of the article, his statement applies to the dialogical period of his work, but not the pre-dialogical. In the mystical phase of Buber’s thought there is no place for responsibility because the very nature of mysticism excludes that possibility. The incompatibility of mysticism and interpersonal responsibility is confirmed in the autobiographical fragment “conversion,” one of the (...) two biographical moments I discuss in relation to the shift in his thinking on responsibility. The second is his relationship with his wife Paula Winkler, which profoundly influenced his thinking about the importance of love and marriage for an understanding of responsibility. I then explore his view of responsibility as a doctrine, which developed along with his dialogical philosophy. Finally, I examine his critical views on four basic ways of avoiding responsibility, which highlight the close connection between freedom and responsibility: belief in fate, individualism, collectivism, and religious acosmism. (shrink)

Research concerned with human beings is always an interference of some kind, thus posing ethical dilemmas that need justification of procedures and methodologies. It is especially true in social work when facing mostly sensitive populations and sensitive issues. In the process of conducting a research on the emotional life histories of Israeli men who batter their partners, some serious ethical questions were evoked such as (a) Did the participants really give their consent? (b) What are the limits of the researcher-participants (...) relationship and who decides them? (c) For whom is the study beneficial? and (d) To what degree did the methodology fit with the participants? In this article, I discuss the Socratic idea of truth revealed through dialogue and the idea of reciprocity that was developed in Buber's (1949) ethics of dialogue and Habermas' (1990) communicative ethics. The 3 essential conclusions drawn from the ethical questions raised and the discussion of the thinkers that are mentioned previously are (a) dialogical methodology is ethically justified; (b) dynamic interactions give a more holistic perspective of the human nature, thus enriching the field; and (c) through dialogical methodology both researcher and participant profit from growth of knowledge, which is a key for empowerment and change. (shrink)

Filozofia subiektywności dotarła w XX wieku do granic swoich możliwości. Jako odpowiedź na jej ograniczenia rozmaici filozofowie podjęli próby nowego rodzaju myślenia. Takie próby to m.in. myśl dialogiczna, która pierwszy wyraz znalazła w pismach takich filozofów, jak Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber czy Eberhard Grisebach. Innym przykładem jest postulat powrotu do pytania o bycie Martina Heideggera. W niniejszym artykule staram się pokazać, że obie próby mają ze sobą wiele wspólnego, choć ich przedstawiciele odnosili się do siebie nawzajem raczej krytycznie, o ile (...) w ogóle to czynili. Okazuje się jednak, że myśl Martina Bubera oraz Martina Heideggera ujmują człowieka jako byt dynamiczny, który staje w obliczu nachodzącego go wezwana. Dlatego też analizuję najpierw koncepcję Martina Heideggera z okresu Bycia i czasu, następnie przedstawiam myślenie Martina Bubera, głównie w oparciu o jego traktat Ja i Ty. Na koniec dokonuję zestawienia i porównania wątków wspólnych obu filozofom, jak również zaznaczam różnice, które dzielą obie próby przekroczenia filozofii podmiotowości. (shrink)

This article provides a historical overview of the Existential-Phenomenological tradition in psychiatry and psychotherapy, tracing its development from its origin in nineteenth and twentieth century philosophical thought, through its major European psychiatric proponents and schools, to its emergence as an influential approach in North America after World War II. The emphasis is on the implicit themes that provide continuity within this movement as well as on the distinctive contributions of individual thinkers. We conclude with a discussion of the present status (...) and future prospects of this tradition. (shrink)

By referring to mundane practices as well as to more systematic or theoretical discourses (those of Krishnamurti and Buber), this article shows the utility of focusing on the negatory, apophatic aspects of reflexivity, i.e. on attempts at removing obstacles (mainly thinking, decision-making processes) which prevent the spontaneous emergence of open-ended self—self and self—other relationships.

Some philosophers have become atheists because of “intellectual probity.” Martin Buber relates two occasions during which he advocated his view of the term “God” and rejected alternative perspectives. He never justified the basis for either his advocacy or his rejection, yet both play an important role in all his writing, especially his specific type of Zionism. Using what has been called the mere theism of William James’ “The Will to Believe” and the criteria for faith that James advances in that (...) essay illuminates both Buber’s general view of the divine and more particularly his Zionism. Once Buber, no less than James, is understood as a mere theist the basis of what he accepts and what he rejects as true religion becomes clearer. Buber’s theism meets James’ requirement of being a live, forced, momentous option and his Zionism also strives to meet those standards. (shrink)

Computer-mediated communication (CMC) raises anew traditional questions of truth and trust. Challenges to communicating with truth and trust are exacerbated by qualities of CMC which encourage users to communicate mindlessly, particularly its capacity to evoke a sense of being present to an Other, despite different locations in time or space. Rhetorical presence and dialogic presentness are used to explore the communication dynamics of CMC and delineate some of the challenges of truthful and trustworthy CMC.

‘Prayer’ can be defined as ‘the offering, in public worship or private devotion, of petition, confession, adoration, or thanksgiving to God; also the form of words in which such an offering is made’ (cf. Cohn-Sherbok 2010). In addition to this simple definition it could be said that there are different forms of prayer: some are vocal and articulate and others are only mental in nature; some prayers are communal and liturgical and other prayers are spontaneous or at least composed by (...) the one saying the prayer (cf. Stump 1999). Accordingly, it is evident that there are manifold intricacies involved in any characterisation of ‘prayer’. In this article my aims are twofold. First, I explore the implications of Martin Buber’s philosophy, particularly of his conception of God as Thou for our understanding of ‘prayer’; second, I will argue that Buber’s understanding of ‘prayer’ as dialogue serves as a way for the individual to seek reconciliation with itself, with others, and with God. (shrink)

This study examines German educational philosopher Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s (1903–1991) existential-hermeneutic theory of discontinuous forms of education, unstetige formen der Erziehung. At the core of this theory is a view of human being subjected to education that appears disruptive and critical, influencing the development of disclosing the true powers of a person and unfolding of truths about oneself that could not be uncovered otherwise. Typically, this theory has been interpreted on the continuum of hermeneutic philosophy, as hermeneutic pedagogy with an (...) extension of Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, antisubjectivism and especially his theory of truth as unconcealment. According to this line of interpretation, Bollnow’s project brings an existential addition to classical pedagogical theories, as a level of appealing pedagogy. According to this existentialist view, education in a strict sense cannot really take place: it could not affect the true core of a person, nor this person could be subjected under any pedagogical influence in any meaningful way. The only task left for education is to appeal to the conscience of an already autonomous person. However, in this study it is claimed that this line of interpretation falls short to the fact that Bollnow’s philosophy of education builds heavily on his overall philosophical-anthropological project, which springs from Kant’s first critique and especially, as shown in this work, from Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. The study shows, that Bollnow’s discontinuous forms of education are not resulted from hermeneutic educational reality, with an extension of existential potentiality to authenticity of a person. In fact, one could not derive such a view from mere hermeneutics. Instead, what Bollnow’s structural view of educational reality indicates, is that it should be understood as a phenomenological description of a priori categorical structures. It is claimed in the work, that the discontinuous forms are the products of phenomenological reduction. They are derived from the direct experience within consciousness, from the essence of what is experienced, from the very nature of what is it like to be in a process of becoming human. From this perspective, from the subject-point, education cannot be described as a paradox of freedom and restriction between educator and educatee, nor transmission of culture between generations, but instead could be described as the subjective experience of being educated or educating oneself, disclosing oneself to oneself, which is constituted only by the necessary conditions of these subjective experiences of discontinuity. (shrink)

Most of what has been written about Buber and education tend to be studies of two kinds: theoretical studies of his philosophical views on education, and specific case studies that aim at putting theory into practice. The perspective taken has always been to hold a dialogue with Buber's works in order to identify and analyse critically Buber's views and, in some cases, to put them into practice; that is, commentators dialogue with the text. In this article our aims are of (...) a different kind. First and fundamentally, we demonstrate the political and social ontological basis of Buber's thought; that is, we show that Buber, the philosopher of dialogue, held an authentic dialogue with his time, and demonstrate that Buber's work, in this case I and Thou, holds a dialogue with its Zeitgeist; that is the text dialogues with its Zeitgeist. This approach leads us to our second aim, which is to demonstrate that Buber's thought remains relevant to our times, particularly when it serves as a dialogical educational tool with which to resolve conflict of all types and to aid dialogue towards peace in inter‐community relations. (shrink)

There is a practical five-step method of ethics dialog developed by John Woolman, an 18th c. businessman and ethical activist, that was used by Robert K. Greenleaf, a 20th c. A.T.&T. Corporate Vice-President, that includes: (a) friendly, emotive affect; (b) discussion of mutual commonalities; (c) discussion of issue entanglements; (d) discussion of potential experimental solutions; and, (e) trial and feedback discussion. This method of dialog appears to proceed with a type of consciousness considered by John Woolman and Bernard Lonergan as (...) one where the I is conscious that I and Others are part of a more foundational, larger and prior We. This type of dialog is different than Socratic dialog. The corresponding type of consciousness is different than the more derivative, e.g., two allies being united in their response to a common goal. It is also different than Buber's I and Thou appreciative consciounsess of the interestingness, value, diversity, and uniqueness of others. Woolman dialog as seen in four cases appears to be a concrete method that has some value both as an end in itself and as instrumental means that can: be issue effective, help build ethical organization/community culture, and help facilitate peaceful, evolutionary change and development. Limitations of the method are also considered. The method may also be a several hundred year anticipation of experiment based pragmatist philosophy that is anthropologically sensitive to cultural entanglements. No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe, ... Each is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine.... John Donne (17th c.). (shrink)

The general discourse on education stresses either the teacher’s or the student’s position. This article aims to contribute to a relational theory of teaching by discussing three significant concepts of teaching from the standpoint of Martin Buber’s relational philosophy. Feldman suggests that teaching implies being human in a particular way and in a particular context; Kelchtermans shows that a teacher’s ‘personal interpretative framework’ plays a crucial role in teaching and is constantly modified through interactions; Biesta defines the essence of teaching (...) in terms of the relation between the teacher’s address and the student’s personal response. Although they all contribute to the relational theory of teaching, they also seem to neglect a vital dimension found in Buber’s philosophy – the exceptional moment when a teacher and a student turn to each other as ‘this particular other person’. As a supplement to the other concepts, this article outlines the concept of ‘teaching as a way of bonding’ and makes three suggestions: (1) bonding is a prerequisite for teaching; (2) there are qualitative differences between ‘social bonding’ and ‘relational bonding’; and (3) the teaching is ultimately best understandable in terms of ‘relational bonding’. (shrink)

The general discourse on education stresses either the teacher’s or the student’s position. This article aims to contribute to a relational theory of teaching by discussing three significant concepts of teaching from the standpoint of Martin Buber’s relational philosophy. Feldman suggests that teaching implies being human in a particular way and in a particular context; Kelchtermans shows that a teacher’s ‘personal interpretative framework’ plays a crucial role in teaching and is constantly modified through interactions; Biesta defines the essence of teaching (...) in terms of the relation between the teacher’s address and the student’s personal response. Although they all contribute to the relational theory of teaching, they also seem to neglect a vital dimension found in Buber’s philosophy – the exceptional moment when a teacher and a student turn to each other as ‘this particular other person’. As a supplement to the other concepts, this article outlines the concept of ‘teaching as a way of bonding’ and makes three suggestions: (1) bonding is a prerequisite for teaching; (2) there are qualitative differences between ‘social bonding’ and ‘relational bonding’; and (3) the teaching is ultimately best understandable in terms of ‘relational bonding’. (shrink)

Martin Buber is considered one of the twentieth century’s greatest thinkers, contributing to the fields of philosophy, theology and education. After Buber’s death the appreciation of his considerable legacy became rather muted, but was never completely forgotten. Recently, interest in Buber’s thought has increased and a number of journal articles and books dealing with both general and specific aspects of his philosophy have appeared. However, the number of commentaries on the importance of his socio-political thought are still small in number, (...) and it is arguable that only Mendes-Flohr and Avnon have provided significant discussions on this aspect of Buber’s philosophy. This article adds to the debate in this area by referring to Buber’s concept of the ‘living-centre’, and assesses the Mendes-Florian and Avnonian [my terminology] interpretations of this fundamental idea so as to establish which provides a more sustainable reading of Buber’s ideas. (shrink)

Education has two distinct but interconnected layers. There is an outer layer concerned with knowledge transfer and skills and an inner layer concerned with the development of character and relationships with others, both individually and socially. This inner layer provides the individual with the capacity to influence and to change society. In that sense, such an inner layer is ‘political’. In this article we argue that the ‘political’ in education can take two distinct forms: either that of dialogue or of (...) defiance. We claim that the former is epitomised by the philosophy of Martin Buber and the latter by the philosophy of Frantz Fanon. Our analysis contrasting these two philosophies clarifies the implications for education, and thereby for the individual and for society. (shrink)

Levinas's big idea is that our lived sense of moral obligation occurs in an immediate experience of the otherness of the Other, and that moral meaning is grounded in alterity rather than identity. Yet he also held what seemed an inconsiderate, or 'eurocentric,' view of other cultural traditions. In Saying Peace, Jack Marsh explores this problem, testing the coherence and adequacy of Levinas's central philosophical claims. Using a twofold method of reconstruction and critique, Marsh conducts a holistic immanent evaluation of (...) Levinas's major works, showing how the problem of eurocentrism, and abiding ambiguities in Levinas's political and religious thought, can be traced back to specific problems in his general philosophical methodology. Marsh offers an original analysis of Levinas's method that verifies and extends existing critical work by Jacques Derrida, Robert Bernasconi, Judith Butler, and others. This is the first book to foreground the normative question of chauvinism in Levinas's work, and the first to perform a holistic critical diagnosis of his general philosophical method. (shrink)