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A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts

In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. pp. 112-135 (2014)

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  1. What Intentionality Is Like.Keith Lehrer - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14.
    Intentionality is a mark of the mental, as Brentano (1874) noted. Any representation or conception of anything has the feature of intentionality, which informally put, is the feature of being about something that may or may not exist. Visual artworks are about something, whether something literal or abstract. The artwork is a mentalized physical object. Aesthetic experience of the artwork illustrates the nature of intentionality as we focus attention on the phenomenology of the sensory exemplar. This focus of attention on (...)
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  • Smells, Exemplars and Evidence: Smelling Knowledge of the External World.Keith Lehrer - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):611-631.
    Conscious experience of the sensation of smell provides exemplars of the sensation exhibiting to us what it is like. These exemplars of experiences can become vehicles or terms of representation and meaning. I call this exemplar representation and the process exemplarization. The notion of exemplarization is indebted to Hume and Goodman. I modify the notion here to apply to the sensation of smell. Exemplar representation differs from verbal representation because the exemplar, like a sample, exhibits what the represented items smell (...)
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  • Conceptos Fenoménicos.Diana Couto - 2020 - Enciclopedia de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica.
    Llamamos “conocimiento fenoménico” al conocimiento de nuestras experiencias conscientes: al saber cómo es tener una determinada experiencia. Los conceptos fenoménicos son aquellos asociados a este conocimiento y refieren, de modo introspectivo y directo, a las propiedades fenoménicas de nuestras experiencias. El papel que juegan estos conceptos es esencial en la filosofía de la mente contemporánea en la medida que muchos de sus defensores creen que una explicación adecuada de su naturaleza nos permitirá disipar un sinfín de rompecabezas epistemológicos (sobre la (...)
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