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  1. A More Liberal Public Reason Liberalism.Roberto Fumagalli - 2023 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 10 (2):337-366.
    In recent years, leading public reason liberals have argued that publicly justifying coercive laws and policies requires that citizens offer both adequate secular justificatory reasons and adequate secular motivating reasons for these laws and policies. In this paper, I provide a critical assessment of these two requirements and argue for two main claims concerning such requirements. First, only some qualified versions of the requirement that citizens offer adequate secular justificatory reasons for coercive laws and policies may be justifiably regarded as (...)
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  • Markets, Morals, and Virtues: Evidential and Conceptual Issues.Roberto Fumagalli - 2020 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 13 (1).
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  • Markets.Lisa Herzog - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013.
    This article presents the most important strands of the philosophical debate about markets. It offers some distinctions between the concept of markets and related concepts, as well as a brief outline of historical positions vis-Ă -vis markets. The main focus is on presenting the most common arguments for and against markets, and on analyzing the ways in which markets are related to other social institutions. In the concluding section questions about markets are connected to two related themes, methodological questions in economics (...)
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  • Preferences versus opportunities: on the conceptual foundations of normative welfare economics.Roberto Fumagalli - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):77-101.
    Normative welfare economics commonly assumes that individuals’ preferences can be reliably inferred from their choices and relies on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare. In recent years, several authors have criticized welfare economists’ reliance on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare and have advocated grounding normative welfare economics on opportunities rather than preferences. In this paper, I argue that although preference-based approaches to normative welfare economics face significant conceptual and practical challenges, opportunity-based approaches fail to provide (...)
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